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ABSTRACT    
The Arabic television station Aljazeera started broadcasting in 1996, after the BBC’s Arabic 
news channel venture with Saudi-backed network Orbit failed, following differences over 
editorial censorship and policy. A number of public debates and controversies, as well as 
academic arguments, have surrounded Aljazeera since its inception, but neither the station’s 
critics nor its supporters can deny that the network has had a regional as well as a global 
impact. In this study, I will examine and critically evaluate scholarly works on the journalistic 
and political nature of Aljazeera, through a critical evaluation of three media models. I will 
focus my research upon two main points, the first being an analysis of the main models 
identified by academic works on Aljazeera, and the second being an examination of whether 
the concept of a ‘model’, as used in social sciences, applies to all Aljazeera programs.  
The first model, ‘Aljazeera: A Force for Arabism and Political Islam’, regards the station as 
promoting Arabism and political Islam. The second model, ‘Aljazeera: Advocate of 
Democratic Values and Journalistic Professionalism,’ sees the station as a force for change, 
freedom, democracy and human rights. Professionally, it also incorporates a declared 
commitment to a form of objectivity and balanced reporting.  The third model, ‘Aljazeera: 
Propaganda Agent,’ looks at Aljazeera as serving the interests and policies of the state of 
Qatar.  My critical evaluation of the scholarly works on these three models is organised along 
four principal lines of analysis.  The first assesses to what extent and in what way(s) each has 
taken into consideration the historical development of Aljazeera.  This includes the 
ideological, political and cultural environment in which the network came into existence, and 
how this has influenced its operations. The second line of analysis sets out critically to 
appraise the models, using empirical evidence as utilised by various academic works on the 
station. The third line of analysis engages with the three models in terms of their key 
conceptual frameworks, outlining principal criticisms organised around Aljazeera’s news-
reporting stance, whether conceived in terms of news ‘objectivity,’ ‘contextual objectivity’, or 
‘propagandistic bias’. The final line of examination engages with the methodological 
approaches adopted by various scholarly works, analysing their strengths and weaknesses. 
My methodology comprises a close critical reading of studies on Aljazeera, the three models 
in contention, and a comparative analysis of academic work on the station.  
The thesis concludes by arguing that there is a great deal of overlap between the scholarly 
works examined, that Aljazeera's primary purpose and aim is to serve the policies and 
strategic objectives of the state of Qatar, within the complexities of both the relationships 
within Qatar’s ruling Al-Thani family, and its competing priorities with its neighbours, 
chiefly Saudi Arabia and Iran.  There is, however, a great deal of difference between the 
studies examined in regard to whether in the process of carrying out this primary role, 
Aljazeera has not only changed the Arab and global media scene, but also changed its co-host 
Qatar. I have also concluded that there is a great deal of agreement amongst the works 
analysed, that Aljazeera provides a distinct media discourse, that if considered in its entirety 
and within the cultural, social and political context of the Arab world, could indeed qualify as 
a media model. One other area of overlap between the studies examined is that Aljazeera’s 
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output can’t be seen as a homogonous entity, as there are big differences between news, 
current affairs output and other programs.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Arab media, in particular satellite news broadcasting, have dramatically changed since the 
first attempts by the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) to broadcast news in a format 
that tried to emulate Western broadcasters such as the BBC, CNN and Sky News, during the 
early 1990s (Seib, 2008). There are now hundreds of satellite television stations serving the 
Middle East,  dedicated to news and current affairs (Al-Theidi, 2003; Sakr, 2001, 2005; 
Sayid, 2007;  Miladi, 2013; inter alia). The inception of Aljazeera, however, in November 
1996, marked a significant development in the way news and current affairs were presented 
to audiences across the Arab world. Many controversial issues and subjects, that were beyond 
discussion before Aljazeera came into existence, became matters of daily discussion in Arab 
living rooms, coffee shops and public discussion forums (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003;  
Al-Jaber,  2004; Zayani, 2005; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2013; inter alia). This has 
led researchers such as Lynch (2006) to argue that the station played an important role in 
developing an Arab public sphere. He notes that Aljazeera ushered in a new kind of open, 
contentious public politics in which plethora of competing voices clamoured for attention” 
(Lynch, 2006: 2). He also states that this new public,  influenced by Aljazeera, “was highly 
self-aware of its own role in challenging the status quo, giving it a self-defined sense of 
mission that sometimes sat uneasily with the standards of objectivity of journalism, and 
challenged the status quo with a fierce drive toward internal reform and foreign policy 
changes” (Lynch, 2006: 3).  
This interest in Aljazeera led to a large number of studies on the station, each one asking 
different questions about this new media phenomenon. Some of these works argue that 
Aljazeera has been a driving force in changing the region and challenging the traditional 
north-south flow of information (El-Nawawy and Iskander, (2003); Zayani, (2005, 2007); 
Qusaibaty, (2006); Zayani and Sahraui, (2007); Seib, (2008); inter alia). For instance, Zayani 
and Sahroui (2007) note that “the very existence of Aljazeera is revolutionary...Aljazeera has 
brought noteworthy innovations to Arab broadcasting and reporting, airing hard-hitting 
programs, bold and uncensored news coverage” (2007: 23). Others credit the station with 
being one of the most important factors that led to the ‘Arab Spring’ (Dabashi, 2012; Seib, 
2012; Khatib, 2012;   Cherkaoui, 2010; inter alia).  Doherty (2011), for instance, argues that 
“it was Aljazeera that first grasped the enormity of the Tunisia uprising and its implications 
for the region, and Aljazeera which latched onto - critics would say fuelled - subsequent 
rumblings in Egypt. And audiences around the world responded: the network's global 
audience has rocketed” (Doherty, 2011: 1).  
Mahroum (2011) agrees, stating that Aljazeera coverage of the Arab spring was one of the 
key factors that led to its success in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. He concluded that “Aljazeera’s 
coverage was instrumental in toppling Arab regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen” 
(Mahroum, 2011: 3). This has led many researchers,  e.g., Sakr (2001), Nawawy and Iskander 
(2003), Miles (2005), Zayani (2005), Lynch (2006), Qusaibaty (2006), Loory (2006), 
Rushing (2007) and Painter (2008),  to regard Aljazeera as an agent of change, freedom, 
democracy and human rights. On a professional level they argue that the station is an 
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advocate of high journalistic standards that promote contextual objectivity, and balanced and 
fair reporting of events in the Arab world and beyond.  
Others, however, such as Ajami (2001), Chafets (2001, 2002),  Zakaria (2004), Hudson 
(2006), Khashoggi (2002) and Rinnawi (2006), and Cherribi (2006), to see Aljazeera as 
standing for values of Arabism, political Islam, and the aim of placing these centre stage in 
the Arab world. They regard the station’s claims of professionalism as unrealistic and 
superficial and argue that the station advances these ideas by encouraging anti-American, 
anti-Western, anti-Israeli sentiments, and by appearing to be anti-establishment in the region. 
The station, while cultivating these sentiments, encourages audiences towards adopting the 
ideology of Arabism, which incorporates the values of political Islam. Contrary to this view, 
Hanson (2013), Dorsey (2013), Al-Sadi (2012), Anzawa (2011), Abu-Rab (2010), Azran 
(2010), Al-Tamimi (2012), Fandy (2007) and Kenana (2006), are amongst those who regard 
Aljazeera as a propaganda agent serving the interests of its host country, the state of Qatar. 
For them, Aljazeera might indeed appear to be anti-West or anti-Israel or pro-political Islam 
or pro-Arabism, but this is regarded as a deflection from the real motive, which is to serve the 
interests and policies of Qatar.   
Thus, three clusters of ideas emerge here, which, taken together, could constitute a model that 
may provide some explanation of Aljazeera’s nature, journalistic performance and practices 
(Al-Sadi, 2012; Azran, 2010; Anzawa, 2011; Fandy, 2007; Cherribi, 2006; inter alia). What 
these previous works have failed to provide, however, is a comprehensive analysis of these 
models in a wider context, taking into account historical, empirical, conceptual or 
methodological analyses. Furthermore, most of these works relied heavily on the collection of 
statements, declarations, interviews, personal experience and remarks, during visits to 
Aljazeera or encounters with its employees, without any attempt at building a coherent and 
systematic argument based on strong academic rigour.  For instance, Al-Sadi (2012) was 
interested only in examining the argument that Aljazeera is subservient to Qatar’s interests 
within a limited scope, without providing any clear and detailed outline of each of the three 
models, in an historic or conceptual context, or in any other relevant context.  
Others, such as Miles (2005), Zayani (2005), Lynch (2006), and Powers and El-Nawawy 
(2009), amongst others, used available open source materials as well as interviews they 
conducted with Aljazeera employees or former employees, which rendered their own analysis 
lacking in any clear methodological framework and a strong systematic analysis. My study, 
however, will attempt to examine each model in a detailed, measured way, outlining the 
strengths and weaknesses of each within historic, conceptual, empirical and methodological 
contexts. I will do this through as comprehensive an analysis as possible of the most relevant 
scholarly works on Aljazeera that dealt with the different arguments involved in the three 
models identified in this study. 
Al-Sadi (2012), Seib (2008), Sakr (2005), and Entman (2003) were probably the first to 
apply/refer the concept of the model to Aljazeera's nature and journalistic practices. While Al-
Sadi (2012) referred to Aljazeera’s practices within the context of a paradigm approach 
(referring to a model), Sakr (2001, 2005,) used the term in a much broader sense, while not 
10 
 
providing any specific grounds, methodological, or conceptual justifications for the use of the 
term ‘model’.  
The concept of the model, however, had deep-rooted uses in natural sciences before it found 
its way into the social sciences. I will therefore analyse the concept as applied to Aljazeera in 
various scholarly works, and examine in later sections the extent to which it does or does not 
represent the station’s programs and output. 
Justification for the study 
Examining the nature of Aljazeera and its professional performance, within the context of the 
three models identified through the examination and critical analysis of scholarly works on 
the station, is a very important endeavour. I would argue that such analysis can provide a 
significant contribution to the academic understanding of Aljazeera. It is also important 
because it will, through the examination and analysis of these studies; attempt to answer 
some of the questions about the nature of Aljazeera, the style of its journalistic performance, 
and its presumed influence in the Arab world and beyond.  
The study will, however, also attempt to determine the nature of the relationship between the 
network, as it is now called, and its owners, the state of Qatar, as presented in various 
scholarly works.  This is also important, because Aljazeera has become not only an Arab 
media phenomenon, but a major global player, broadcasting not only in Arabic, as when it 
started in 1996, but also broadcasting English-speaking channels - Aljazeera international and 
Aljazeera America. The network has also set up local channels in the Arab world, as well as 
in other parts of the world, such as Aljazeera Egypt, Aljazeera Balkans, and Aljazeera 
Turkish, and has many other services in development. The study also assumes Aljazeera’s 
importance also because it is  centre stage in a region that is undergoing major changes and 
the media, in particular Aljazeera, are thought to play a key role in these changes (Abul-Nasr, 
2013; Abdul-Jalil, 2012;   Douga, 2011; Hijjawi, 2011; Cherkaoui, 2010; inter alia). 
 
Research questions: 
This research aims to answer two main questions: 
1. What are the main contending models of Aljazeera, and what are the attendant 
strengths and weaknesses of each of these models, as outlined in various scholarly 
works? 
2. To what extent does the concept of the ‘model’, as examined in various academic 
works, represent the station's programs? 
To answer these two main questions, there are other sub-questions which form integral parts 
of the analysis: 
 What does each model say about Aljazeera, as examined in various scholarly works? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of each model? 
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 How important are scholarly works examined on Aljazeera, in relation to their 
contribution to understanding the station/network? 
 Does Aljazeera, within the context of the three models identified, provide a unique 
model that is an alternative to existing perspectives, or is it just a different media 
discourse? 
 How and when did the concept of a ‘model’ come to be utilised regarding Aljazeera? 
 Does each model identified stand separately, or is there overlap between the identified 
models for Aljazeera, as examined by academic works? 
 Does the concept ‘model’ fully or partially represent Aljazeera’s output? 
 Is Aljazeera anti-American, anti-West, anti-establishment, while at the same time 
propagating an Islamist, pan-Arabism agenda, as examined by various scholarly 
works? 
 Is Aljazeera a force for freedom, democracy, human rights and a contextually 
objective press? If so, doesn’t that contradict the stations claim to advance human 
rights, being a political campaigner and aiming to live by the values of objectivity in 
the media? 
 What is the nature of the relationship between Aljazeera and its founders, the Qatari 
royal family? 
 How does Aljazeera, as a media phenomenon, sit within the various works about 
global media theory? 
Thesis plan: 
My research will be divided into seven main chapters. Chapter one will include an 
introduction with a brief outline of the aims of the study, the research problem and questions 
to be addressed, as well as the justification and argument for the importance of tackling the 
subject of Aljazeera through the examination of various scholarly works. Chapter two will 
explore the various methodological approaches I intend to follow in order to achieve the aims 
of the research, attempting to examine the concept of the model as it has developed, both in 
applied sciences as well as social sciences. I will also place special emphasis on a cross-
comparative approach that tries to examine, compare and evaluate various scholarly works, 
and how they deal with the three models advanced here concerning Aljazeera.  
Furthermore, I will outline lines of criticism of various approaches and works. Chapter three 
reviews the various literatures on Aljazeera and different theoretical frameworks for 
understanding media, with special focus on global media theory, and will also discuss the 
idea of Aljazeera media practices, and whether the station’s performance could indeed be 
regarded as a unique media model. I will also explore, in this chapter, the coming of 
Aljazeera onto the Arab media scene, its structures, financing, and its alleged political, 
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economic and social influence on Arab media in general. In chapters four, five and six I 
intend to examine and critically evaluate each of the three media models noted above that 
may apply to Aljazeera. Chapter seven will examine the conclusions drawn, discussion and 
final remarks of the study. 
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Chapter two: Methodology 
Introduction 
Conducting a study that attempts critically to examine a body of scholarly works on Aljazeera 
is not an easy task to undertake, as the amount of research materials published on Aljazeera at 
various universities in the Arab world, and from other universities and other sources is 
exceedingly vast. I have obtained a primary list from Aljazeera Studies Centre, which 
employs a number of people tasked with surveying various institutions, establishments, and 
bodies across the globe to gather all studies, theses, articles, and other materials, published or 
unpublished, on Aljazeera. It is worth noting here that this list does not map out all that has 
been written on Aljazeera, whether published or not. Although Aljazeera Studies Centre’s 
ultimate aim is to publish one of the most comprehensive lists of studies about the station, it 
is currently far from doing so.   
Furthermore, what the list presents is a brief description of these studies, some of which are 
still unfinished, which obliged me to consult the original source, or to get in touch with the 
researcher, where possible. In my study, I aim to go further than that, and to gather as much 
material as possible, including published and unpublished, complete and unfinished works. 
There are, however, limitations to what I can gather. My study thus does not claim to have 
surveyed the entire array of publications, materials, articles and other works published on 
Aljazeera, because of the huge resources that such a task would require, as well the time 
needed to accomplish such an endeavour. Having said that, I have been able to collect and 
sample what I consider to be the most useful and important works, articles, books and theses, 
for fulfilling the objectives of this study, and for helping to advance and guide any future 
research on Aljazeera. If my research provides a contribution in this wider endeavour, helping 
future research on the station, and clarifying some of the questions outlined in the previous 
chapter that would fulfil the aims of this research.  
Comparative media studies in the Arab world: 
While there have been a large number of studies in the West that have attempted to compare 
various media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Aalberg, Aelsta and Curran, 2010; Baek, 2009; 
Curran, et al., 2012; inter alia), in the Arab world few comparative media studies have 
emerged in the past few decades. Among these early studies, Abdul-all (1994) examined 
journalistic performance across a number of Arab countries, and adherence to the legal 
frameworks in each of the countries studied, namely Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan. This study 
focused mainly on comparing media regulatory frameworks in these countries, with little 
attention to how journalists performed under these regulatory regimes. The study also failed 
to conduct any empirical or evidence-based examination. Its focus was on comparing these 
regulatory frameworks, although it drew conclusions regarding journalistic practices without 
any supportive evidence to substantiate these claims. It relied heavily on personal interviews 
with journalists and other media practitioners.  It also lacked methodological design and 
rigour.  
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Hamzah (2002) compared the notions of privacy and freedom of the press in a number of 
Arab states, looking specifically at those that adopted a secular legal system, in contrast to 
those that adopted Islamic law. The analysis proved useful, though here again there was a 
lack of proper methodological design and rigour. Izzat, et al. (2006) explored the concept of 
media freedom in Egypt and the Arab world, comparing modes of ownership, legal 
frameworks, and journalistic practices. This study provides a clear mode of analysis, and 
description of different legal, ownership and journalistic practices, with special attention 
given to Egypt, as the largest Arab country, but lacks any comparative aspects with respect to 
other Arab countries. Like previous studies it lacked empirical evidence for some of its 
conclusions. The study’s approach to Egypt’s case could be described as extensive and, 
overall, useful. Al-Cheick (2012) compared various models concerning freedom of 
expression, in a number of Arab countries that adopted certain Islamic legal values, with 
Western and authoritarian models. This study lacked focus on historical analysis, as well as 
any empirical evidence to support its conclusions. A common theme amongst the above 
studies is the lack of any empirical evidence to support their conclusions, as well as a loose 
methodological grounding and lack of academic rigour. 
In my study, however, I propose to examine scholarly work on Aljazeera’s nature and 
journalistic performance, through the analysis of three models applied to the station. My line 
of analysis will explain the nature of these three models, and whether they qualify as models 
in their own right, or are just a different media discourse about the station. I aim qualitatively 
to interpret, guided by Cushion (2012), the overall direction of Aljazeera’s journalism, as 
explored by a selected number of scholarly works, and hence identify the nature of the station 
by drawing on relevant sources concerning it. In my examination of relevant works, I will 
comprehensively review the empirical data based on analysing the key conclusions reached 
by these scholarly works, while paying special attention to certain of these works, as outlined 
later in my sampling strategies.  
Origins and definition of the concept ‘model’: 
As a concept, the ‘model’ has its origins in mathematics and applied sciences. Giere (2004) 
notes:  
‘What is special about models is that they are designed so that elements of the model 
can be identified with features of the real world this is what makes it possible to use 
models to represent aspects of the world’  
(Giere, 2004: 747) 
He argues that such a representation of the real world through the concept of a model is done 
“by exploiting similarities between a model and that aspect of the world it is being used to 
represent” (Giere, 2004: 743). An example of this would be the model representing the solar 
system, which is an approximate representation of the actual solar system, but is not the solar 
system itself. Another example is the model that represents weather pattern changes over a set 
period of time, for better approximation and representation of real weather changes. The table 
that represents chemical elements (Ibid: 747-748) is another such example. Giere argues that: 
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‘models are constructed according to explicitly formulated principles. Physics is 
especially rich in such principles: Newton’s principles of mechanics, Maxwell’s 
principles of electrodynamics, the principles of thermodynamics, the principles of 
relativity, and the principles of quantum mechanics. But evolutionary biology also has 
its principle of natural selection and economics boasts various equilibrium principles’.  
(Ibid: 744)  
In line with this, the model construction process is accomplished as follows: 
Real world       hypotheses and generalization       model      principles and specific conditions 
Scientists arrive at this principle of the model representing aspects of the real world: 
 
‘ ...by exploiting similarities between a model and that aspect of the world it is being 
used to represent. Note that I am not saying that the model itself represents an aspect of 
the world because it is similar to that aspect. There is no such representational 
relationship anything is similar to anything else in countless respects, but not anything 
represents anything else. It is not the model that is doing the representing; it is the 
scientist using the model who is doing the representing. One way scientists do this is by 
picking out some specific features of the model that are then claimed to be similar to 
features of the designated real system to some (perhaps fairly loosely indicated) degree 
of fit. It is the existence of the specified similarities that makes possible the use of the 
model to represent the real system in this way’.  
(Ibid: 748)  
Hence, for example, the model of a skyscraper is a representation of some of the features of 
the building, but not all of them… In other words models are constructed “in order to explain 
and appreciate the world, and sometimes we call our simplifications theories, paradigms, and 
hypothesis” (Ibid: 4). 
In social sciences “a model is a simplified picture of a part of the real world, it has some of 
the characteristics of the real world, but not the entire world” (Lave and March, 1993: 3). 
Little (1998) explains that the concept, ‘model’, appears and is used in social sciences when 
there is no mathematics anywhere in sight.  The model, he argues, in this instance bears the 
meaning of theory or:  
‘a system of related concepts to describe an idea or phenomenon. Quite frequently, use 
model in this way too, particularly with people who are not mathematical model-
builders. The word helps convey the tentative and incomplete nature of the theory’  
(Little, 1998: 2)  
16 
 
Lave and March (1993) argue that there are four key stages in model-building: observation of 
some facts and looking at them as though they were the end product of some process, 
speculating about the possible process that might have produced these results, deducing other 
results (implications, consequences, predictions) from the model constructed, and finally 
questioning the validity of the outcome, the model, and going on to produce a new model if 
necessary (Lave and March, 1993: 19).  
An example of a model could be the relationship between poverty/deprivation and low health 
outcomes, if I observe a family that lives in the slums in very bad hygiene, with an unhealthy 
food intake, and look at their general health and speculate that as a result of unhealthy living 
conditions, this particular family is more prone to certain illnesses than a comparable family 
living in wealthier conditions. In a similar fashion, researchers have also attempted to build 
models/paradigms/theoretical frameworks about a number of social interactions and 
relationships.  
After the Second World War and the emergence of television, for instance, many scholars 
feared that extended periods of exposure to television violence, especially among children, 
would tend to translate into children being prone to more aggressive behaviour. Thus, a 
model is built around a cause/effect relationship between children’s exposure to violence on 
television, and the impact that it might have on their overall behaviour (Abdelmoula, 2012; 
Cherkaoui, 2010; Lewis, 1991; inter alia).  Speculation is central to the construction of 
models, and “models are created by speculating about processes that could have produced the 
observed facts. Models are evaluated in terms of their ability to predict correctly other new 
facts” (Lave and March, 1993: 19).  
 
Little (1998) argues that problem solving is at the heart of models and model building.  He 
explains that the model-building process goes through three key stages. The first is to write 
down what I want the model to look like, and if it is supposed to produce computer output, in 
which case I may sketch a list of output variables, or even a screen display in the form that I 
would like the results to take. In the second stage, I would examine the outputs and write 
down the inputs I think will be required; data, relationships, values for parameters, etc.  Little 
(1998) points out that writing down the inputs implies that I have some sort of rough notions 
about key phenomena, and cause and effect relationships. He questions:  
‘where do these come from? From past experience or general knowledge about the 
subject, often gathered by interviewing people who know about the problem and by 
reading background materials’.  
(Little, 1998: 9). 
The last stage, he states, is to work on the model - what assumptions are required to convert 
inputs into outputs, what functional relationships are needed (Little, 1998: 8-9). Lave and 
March (1998) devise three rules for building good models. The first is that a good model is a 
statement about a process that is taking place. For instance, consider a teacher coming into 
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class and forgetting to bring the students’ exam papers. A good model asks why teachers 
forget students' test papers. This would be an attempt to uncover the process behind the 
teacher’s action.  
Building a model by supposing that teachers forget students' test papers, because during test 
time they have so much work pressure that they are bound to forget. The model would then 
attempt to develop implications or predictions of the process. For instance, in the example 
given above about the forgetful teacher, we might think of a way of helping the teacher forget 
less often, perhaps by getting one of the students to send those emails in advance in order to 
remind the teacher of the important things he/she has to bring to class. Finally, to generalise 
the model, we could devise a system of reminding teachers in advance what they should bring 
to their class, and it becoming standard policy. In this case we moved from a specific case 
study, to solving a wider problem, while at the same time uncovering the underlying process 
involved (Lave and March, 1998: 41-43). 
Aljazeera:  a distinct media model or just a different discourse? 
Al-Sadi (2012), Seib (2008), Lynch (2006), Zayani (2005), Miles (2005), and Sakr (2001, 
2005) were probably the first researchers who used the concept of a ‘model’ with regard to 
Aljazeera, arguing  that the station’s journalistic practices strongly qualify as a distinct media 
model, that is being copied and followed by other broadcasters in the Arab world and beyond.  
Seib (2008), for instance, notes “Aljazeera’s success, in this regard serves as a model in the 
Arab world and beyond, an example of a news organisations with regional and global reach 
that are certain to proliferate during the next decade” (2008: 23). 
 In the same vein, Franklin (2013) argued that Aljazeera provided a new media model in the 
Arab world, that everyone is trying to copy. This model, he argues, is characterised by 
breaking taboos that other television stations in the region dare not tackle (cf. Seib, 2008). 
The station, according to Seib (2008), also developed a unique journalistic practice within the 
context of Arab and Islamic culture. He notes “...satellite TV from the wider Arab world has 
forced Egyptian TV to get real and copy Aljazeera's model” (Seib, 2008: 38).  
This new model that Aljazeera ushered in, although inspired by many of the good practices of 
Western broadcasters, has an indigenous flavour in its application of the norms of freedom of 
the media, objectivity, neutrality and balance, that emphasises what El-Nawawy and Iskandar 
(2003) termed “contextual objectivity”, that takes into account the cultural and historic 
distinctions of the Arab and Islamic world. In the same vein, Al-Kandari and Haque (2008) 
argued that Aljazeera's journalistic style provides a unique media model in the Arab world. 
This model, they note “...might seriously provide impetus for change in the Arab world” (Al-
Kandari and Haque, 2008: 145). Ayish (2002) argues that current Arabic television models 
can be split into three categories. The first describes the authoritarian, government- controlled 
television that broadcasts government messages, where television is employed to serve the 
interest of those running the country, such as the national television in Algeria or Syria.  
 The second model is semi-commercially owned, and run according to the tenets of liberal 
media, applying Western journalistic practices.  In this model, stories and items to cover are 
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selected according to their newsworthiness within a regional and international context, while 
at the same time attempting to reflect pluralistic and critical views of society, with the aim of 
spreading the values of freedom of speech, democracy and transparency.  Ayish (2002) cites 
Aljazeera as the best representation and embodiment of such a model. The third model is 
television that is fully controlled by government, while at the same time incorporating 
reformist elements, after certain Arab governments realized that audiences were deserting 
their broadcasting platforms to stations such as Aljazeera. Television stations such as Abu 
Dhabi television are a fair representation of this model (Ayish, 2002: 140-142). 
The cascading model suggested by Entman (2003) in order to explain the process of influence 
as presented in news about foreign crises, public opinion, and elite thinking, provides a 
unique outlook to examine a global media outlet like Aljazeera. Although Entman’s model 
was specifically designed in order to examine the power of interchange between the White 
House spin machine and the media, and U.S. government attempts to influence the framing of 
issues in the news, with the aim of influencing public opinion, this model provides useful 
applications in the case of Aljazeera, especially as it is becoming a global media player (cf. 
Cherribi, 2006: 134). This is why Cherribi (2006) attempted to adapt this model to the case of 
Aljazeera, arguing  that such an application would be well suited to covering the role played 
by the Emir of Qatar (as an embodiment of the role played by the state of Qatar), and other 
Aljazeera structures, and provides a diagram to illustrate this idea in (Fig.1) as presented by 
Cherribi (2006: 135): 
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State, Islamic Institutions, 
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Figure 1 
Entman’s (2003) Cascading Network Activation Model Applied to Al-Jazeera 
Cherribi (2006) notes  
...the first three boxes in Entman’s model—Administration, Elites, 
Media—are modified in depiction of Al-Jazeera in Figure 1. What was the 
administration or the White House in Entman’s first box is replaced by the 
Emir of Qatar, who is both the leader of the country and the one who 
permitted Al-Jazeera to come into existence and to continue to broadcast 
from the country. Elites in this case in the second level include the Arab 
League, Arab leaders, Islamic Institutions, and Western leaders including 
the White House and U.S. officials. Al-Jazeera and its journalists are in the 
next level, but with them is included a constant factor, Al Qaradawi, who is 
not a journalist but a religious leader who issues fatwas (religious edicts) 
and who is being given a major platform in Al-Jazeera’s prime-time 
programming schedule. He functions like a judge who has ready religious 
and mental templates to classify and evaluate what is happening in the 
world. The next box, News Frames, remains as it is in Entman’s model. 
The last box, which is public opinion in Entman’s model, is in Al-Jazeera’s 
case focused primarily on pan-Arab and Muslim public opinion.  
       (Cherribi, 2006: 135-137)  
This, according to Cherribi (2006), is nothing new. It is rather a depiction of a medieval ruler 
who runs the media like any other state institution. 
Zayani and Sahroui (2007) argue, however, that Aljazeera does not fit neatly in any of the 
models that cover the Arab world. They explain that although the station is financed by the 
State of Qatar, “Aljazeera’s control system is loose and its integrated systems aren’t up to the 
level of sophistication required” (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007: 53). For Aljazeera to be a media 
model that is challenging the north-south flow, providing a real alternative, it has to fulfil 
many conditions.  
In the same vein, Iskandar (2006) argues that despite Aljazeera’s achievements, it cannot be 
seen as an alternative media model. He suggests that the station operates in much the same 
way as other mainstream institutions in the Arab world in terms of how the network plans and 
puts together its news stories. He also remarks that the station’s ownership and financing, as 
well as structure, impose a great degree of restraint on it being a unique alternative media 
model in the region (Iskandar, 2006). Fandy (2007) agrees with Iskandar, especially 
concerning Aljazeera’s ownership, financing and structure, adding that political oversight of 
the station’s operation, by the Qatari ruling family, as well as the absence of transparency 
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over its operations, financing, and decision making, pose many questions about the station’s 
independence, and thus casts further doubt as to whether or not it is a unique alternative 
media model.  
Rinnawi (2006) goes further. He regards Aljazeera as a continuation of the authoritarian 
model that still dominates the Arab world, directly or indirectly. This restrictive model, he 
argues, survived until the late 1980s with no challenge emerging from within the Arab world. 
Sakr (2001), Seib (2008), Abu-Rab (2010), Qassim (2012) and Al-Tamimi (2012) are 
amongst those who argue, however, that Aljazeera is evolving into a more responsible 
organisation that is much more institutionalised into the mainstream in terms of the adoption 
of journalistic professional standards, while retaining its unique Arab identity. They suggest 
the station aims to provide a serious alternative media model, not just in the Arab world, but 
globally.  
 In agreement with this, Thussu (2007 cf. Wessler and Adolphsen, 2008: 439-46) suggests an 
analysis of media flows that sees Aljazeera among many channels that are challenging the 
traditional flow of news and current affairs from the West. He notes that “There is evidence 
that global media traffic is not just one way – from the West (with the USA at its core) to the 
rest of the world, even though it is disproportionately weighted in favour of the former” (cf. 
Wessler and Adolphsen, 2008: 439-46). Sakr (2007, cf. Wessler and Adolphsen, 2008: 439-
46) extends Thussu’s arguments by maintaining that the concept of contra-flow is not just 
about more production capacity of news and current affairs in non-core zones, but also about 
the interaction, cooperation and even possible challenges that go between the newly set up 
counter flow outlets such as Aljazeera, and more established ones in the West. We could cite 
here for instance various cooperation agreements that Aljazeera signed with CNN and the 
BBC to cooperate and collaborate in many areas, while each broadcaster and outlet 
maintained their independence and competitive edge. Abdelmoula (2012) elaborates on this, 
arguing that other major broadcasting organisations are entering into partnerships with 
Aljazeera, whether it is the BBC, CNN, ZDF, NHK or others, as they see that the station 
provides an output that is different, and at times challenging to what they do.  
El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) agree with Sakr (2007), and suggest that the perspective 
given by Aljazeera and the other ASB (Arab Satellite Broadcasters) channels not only 
challenges Western views on current affairs, but can also create a bridge between the two 
worlds, enhancing the possibility of understanding and cultural exchange. More specifically, 
“with its bold independence, openness, and freedom, Aljazeera can improve the 
communication between the United States and the Middle East and achieve the ideals of 
Habermas (1984) theory of overcoming the residues of ignorance and misunderstanding 
through enlightened forms of public discourse” (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003: 10). Zayani 
(2010) goes further. He argues that Aljazeera's journalistic practices introduced news norms 
and practices that became known among media professionals, as well as researchers in the 
region, as the 'Aljazeera model', leading, as he notes, “to the reinvigoration of the culture of 
news broadcasting in some established channels and, subsequently, to the rise of competing  
channels and the development of a competitive media environment…aspects of Aljazeera’s 
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journalism and some of its program formats started to be copied among various outlets 
operating within a hitherto congested media-scape” (Zayani, 2010: 185).  
He remarks for instance that Aljazeera’s formula and model for setting up the ground rules 
and practices for investigative journalism in the region “started to take root in a region that is 
not traditionally associated with free and democratic institutions” (Ibid: 185). He suggests 
that the station’s rise to prominence and acceptance among media professionals, as a model to 
be copied, has impacted the “prominence of the news genre itself”, with many of the newly-
established channels having “more clout and freedom” (Ibid: 186).  
In other words, Zayani regards Aljazeera’s model as challenging the current media practices 
and flow, not just in the Arab and Muslim world, but also beyond, hence the rush to set up 
competing channels broadcasting in Arabic, by the US government (Al-Hurra), France 
(France 24), in Germany (DW Arabic), in China (CCCP Arabic), UK (BBC Arabic) and Iran 
(AlAlam). Zayani (2010) notes “the rise of Aljazeera on the world media-scape represents a 
rupture in a hegemonic West-centric order controlled by multi-national corporations and 
aligned with Western view-points and interests, whether they are economic, ideological or 
geo-political” (188). In his view, Arab satellite channels are becoming a very serious threat 
not only to media monopolies in the West, but also to the dominant position of core nations, 
advocated by the global media theorists because the likes of Aljazeera “are infusing the 
global media scene with contra-flow, which untie some of the hegemonic dynamics global 
media have been locked in” (Ibid: 188).   
Sampling strategies: 
In my sampling of studies on Aljazeera I have chosen a convenience sample as the best way 
to approach the study, because this method allows for a greater level of flexibility and ease of 
selection, and is appropriate to the limited time-scale available. Deacon et al, (1999) 
described convenience sampling “as less preconceived and direct, more the product of 
expediency, chance and opportunity than of deliberate intent” (Deacon et. al, 1999: 54). There 
are two types of convenience sample- weak and strong. The former could be defined as when 
“sample units or clusters are selected simply because they are nearest to hand. However, the 
strong where the sample units are focused around natural cluster of social groups and 
individuals who seem to present unexpected but potentially interesting opportunities for the 
research” (Ibid: 54). In my study, I have attempted to select my sample around the cluster of 
studies that Aljazeera Study Centre collected about the station, as the main sampling group. 
The first version of the collection, which was published in 2011, had a total of 191 studies (61 
PhD theses, 58 master’s theses, 49 books and 23 short studies). The latest version, published 
in 2012, had 214 studies (68 PhD, 59 masters, 51 books and 36 short studies and papers). I 
have divided the sources published in these into primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources included a number of  studies that looked at various aspects of Aljazeera as 
their main area of study; these include El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), Ayish (2002, 2005, 
2010), Alhassan (2004); Al-Jaber (2004), Abdel Rahim (2005), Miles (2005), Lynch (2006), 
Zayani (2005), Qusaibaty (2006), Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), Barkho (2007), Fandy (2007),  
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Seib (2008 (2012),  Hammond (2007), Anzawa (2011), Al-Sadi (2012), Powers and El-
Nawawy (2009), and Abdelmoula (2012). These studies were devoted almost in their entirety 
to Aljazeera, though they varied greatly in their approaches. Secondary sources were studies 
where Aljazeera was not the main area of focus, but a substantial section was devoted to the 
station, and include Sakr (2001), (2005), (2007),  Miladi (2006), (2013), Cherribi (2006), 
Tatham (2006), Thai (2010), Azran (2010), Cooper and Momani (2011), Abdullah (2012), Al-
Tamimi (2012), Hanson (2013), and Dorsey (2013). These studies’ bibliographies proved to 
be a very useful source for accessing other studies. The third sample included studies that 
dealt with broader issues about the media in the Arab world, and other parts of the world, but 
touched on certain aspects of Aljazeera as a media phenomenon; these include Khatib (2013), 
Hroub (2013), Cushion (2012), Abdullah (2012), Kamrava (2011), McPhail (2010), and 
Hafez (2004), inter alia. 
In selecting the sample to examine over the course of the study, I gave prominence to those 
studies that relied on multiple empirical tools to support the arguments and hypotheses of the 
study, especially the works selected within the primary group of studies. The reason for this is 
that many of the studies on Aljazeera are very descriptive in nature, and do not rely on strong 
empirical tools in order to answer the questions of the research or to test the hypotheses they 
put forward. Research that relies on strong, scholarly, empirical tools has thus been of 
importance in achieving the aims of the study. 
Another aspect of the selection of works to examine is that the greater the contribution the 
research makes toward answering my research questions, the more prominence it is given. 
Some of the research on Aljazeera would be useful in the theoretical chapter on Aljazeera, 
and may serve as a useful tool to clarify some of the points along the way, but it would not be 
regarded as a primary source of data or evidence collection, from which conclusions could be 
drawn and generalized. 
I have also collected a number of other materials from other open sources such as Google 
search and from various academic journals on media studies in general, as well as making 
extensive use of Cardiff University's internal and intra-university research facility. Using 
search words such as ‘Aljazeera Arabism and political Islam’ or ‘Aljazeera and Islamists’;  
search engines revealed 188 studies and books. Of these I selected 23 which were not 
mentioned in Aljazeera’s own studies book, and had the potential to contribute to the study as 
secondary sources. Furthermore, when using search terms such as ‘Aljazeera, democracy and 
freedom’, search engines revealed 63 books and academic studies of which 11 were selected 
as relevant secondary sources. On the other hand, when using words such as ‘Aljazeera agent 
for Qatar’ or ‘Aljazeera and Qatar’ or ‘ Aljazeera serving Qatari political agenda’, search 
engines revealed 2000 materials, of which 34 had already been selected as either primary or 
secondary sources through previous sampling strategies..  
Lines of critical evaluation: 
Guided by Cushion (2012) and Hallin and Mancini (2004), amongst others, I will critically 
examine the journalistic performance and nature of Aljazeera, and whether or not it fits as a 
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distinctive media model, as examined in various scholarly works, on four levels.  First of all, 
the historical level will be examined to determine to what extent various scholarly works took 
into account historic context in their analysis of Aljazeera's nature and journalistic 
performance, as well as how relevant this context is. Secondly, at the conceptual level I will 
analyse to what degree various studies examined concepts such as contextual objectivity, 
impartiality, balance, pan-Arabism, pan-political Islam, hegemony and propaganda, and 
whether Aljazeera’s journalism fits within the confines of the concept of a ‘model’ as defined 
in social sciences. Thirdly, I will critically evaluate scholarly works with regard to their 
empirical approaches to Aljazeera’s nature and journalistic practices, and how robust they are 
in terms of supporting the claims advanced. I will also attempt to uncover the strengths, 
common areas, and differences in each model, and whether there are areas of overlap 
between the three different models identified.  Finally, I will examine and critically assess the 
methodological approaches of various scholarly works on Aljazeera, identifying their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Problems and difficulties: 
One of the key problems I faced in doing this research is the short time available to me to 
fulfil the tasks required, and provide a comprehensive yet systematic mapping of various 
scholarly works on Aljazeera, across the globe. Another problem is that the multi-lingual 
variety of studies published on Aljazeera in different parts of the world and in different 
languages made difficult for me to examine/collect them all. I could speak only Arabic, 
English, and French fluently, which meant that many other pieces of research were beyond 
my reach. Some of the research published in Aljazeera’s list was written in German or other 
languages in which I am not fluent. Attempting to translate these works was not an option, 
because of both time constraints and financial factors.  
I would have preferred to have had more time in order to conduct a much more thorough 
mapping of scholarly works on Aljazeera across the globe, but this  remains a task which 
others with more time and financial resources at their disposal may be able to carry out in the 
future. One further problem that I faced is that although this study aims to be as 
representative as possible of countries where Aljazeera was studied, it has tended to be 
dominated by the output of certain countries, namely the UK, U.S., Egypt, Jordan, and 
Algeria, with other countries largely beyond reach, either because of difficulty in accessing 
research materials, or because of the time constraints I outlined earlier. I have found that 
Aljazeera has become a global phenomenon, with studies having been conducted on the 
station in China, Japan, India, Russia, Europe, and the Americas, and in many different 
languages, which highlights further the importance of this study in attempting to uncover and 
examine the nature of this station. In the next chapter, however, I explore the global context 
in which Aljazeera came into being, and its inception and proliferation across the Arab world.   
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Chapter three: 
  Global media theory, the Arab media scene and the coming of Aljazeera  
Section one: Global media theory 
The aim of this study is to examine the nature and journalistic performance of Aljazeera from 
the perspective of three models, as analysed in various scholarly works. These are Aljazeera 
as an advocate of Arabism and political Islam, as a supporter of democracy, press freedom 
and cultural understanding, and as serving the interests of Qatar. I also aim to examine 
whether the three models identified each fit within the concept of a ‘model’ as outlined in 
social sciences. Before I proceed, however, it is necessary to identify the position of Aljazeera 
within a theoretical framework. Much debate has been going on about Aljazeera’s identity 
and within which media model it best fits. Historically, the region to which Aljazeera 
belongs, the Arab world, has not featured at all in the early works of Siebert et al. (1956). 
They divided the world media system into four main theories. The free world of liberal 
democracies comprised the libertarian and social responsibility models, the Soviet and 
totalitarian sphere, the authoritarian societies, a mixture of countries that comprised most of 
the developing world, the fascist experience and the West before it adopted democratic norms 
and practices (Curren and Park, 2000: 4).  
 This approach tried to explain why the media take different forms and serve different 
purposes in different countries. It is founded on basic assumptions that all media behaviour 
can be understood in terms of two broadly defined social and political systems, i.e., liberal 
and authoritarian. According to Siebert et al. (1956), the media thus always takes on the shape 
and colour of the social and political system within which it exists and functions (Siebert et 
al. 1956). This attempt to explain media behaviour, however, has been described as having 
seen “...the universe only through Western eyes”, creating the need to de-Westernize media 
studies (Curren and Park, 2000: 4). After the Second World War the world was divided into 
two ideologically distinct camps: free market capitalism in the West, and state socialism in 
the East. Theories of international communication thus became part of the war between these 
two camps. For the advocates of capitalism the main objective of media communication is to 
promote democracy, freedom of expression, and markets. For the advocates of socialism, 
however, there was a perceived need for greater state regulation and control of 
communication and media organizations.  
The concept of the ‘free flow of information’ was adopted by the Western camp, especially in 
the U.S., which disapproved of communism’s limits on media freedom, and its use of 
censorship and propaganda as tools (Thussu, 2000: 55). The ‘free flow concept, again 
especially in the U.S., reflected a desire not only to advance capitalist ideas of democracy and 
freedom, but also to convince others not to impose trade barriers to their products (cultural or 
otherwise), or to make it difficult to gather news or make programs. This approach helped 
strengthen Western influence and dominance over global media markets and in the West’s 
ideological battle with the Soviet Union (Ibid: 56). In defence of the ‘free flow’ theory, 
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researchers such as Lerner (1958) and Schramm (1964) argued that this approach can have an 
extra desired effect, especially in developing countries, leading eventually to the adoption of 
Western standards. They regarded the Western path of development as the most efficient way 
to shake off traditional ‘backwardness’, and as leading to increased urbanisation and literacy, 
in turn leading to increased media exposure, and eventually culminating in wider economic 
and political participation (cf. Thussu, 2000: 56-57). Schramm (1964) viewed the mass media 
as an important agent in spreading education and leading the social transformation needed for 
economic development (cf. Thussu, 2000: 57).  
Consequently, by the late 1960s the modernization theorists started to measure general 
societal development depending on the level of media development.  Both development and 
‘free flow’ theories were, however, criticised for their perceived Western bias. Schiller (1969, 
1976) regarded these two theories as attempts by American media to dominate the world 
media scene. In other words, as Schiller remarks, ‘the United States exercises mastery over 
global communication and culture’ (cf. Curren and Park, 2000: 5). This approach has, 
according to its critics, also been “used to restrict freedom of expression and to justify 
political indoctrination” especially in Third World countries (Ibid: 5). These approaches have 
also been criticised for their assumption that the modern and the traditional lifestyles, 
cultures, and norms outside the West are inherently backward or inferior in comparison to 
Western ones (cf. Thussu, 2000: 59).  
By the late 1960s and early 1970s the dependency approach emerged, largely in Latin 
America, partly as a result of the U.S. continuing to support right-wing authoritarian 
governments in the region, and partly when educated elites in the continent realized that the 
development outlook on global media did not lead to the intended outcomes. The principal 
idea of the dependency approach was that transnational corporations, which are mostly based 
in the West, have great influence and power, with the support of Western governments. These 
corporations achieve this status by dominating markets, resources, production and labour 
(Thussu, 2000: 60-61). Schiller (1976) linked economic dominance and the pursuit of the 
commercial interests of U.S.-based corporations with their negative influence on the cultural 
autonomy of the countries in the South, and with thus creating dependency on both the 
hardware and software of communication and media, within developing countries. Because 
of this, researchers such as Barret (1977) started to speak of media imperialism, as ‘the 
process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one 
country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media 
interests of any other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of influence 
by the country so affected' (cf.Thussu, 2000: 63).  
By the late 1970s, globalization and its impact on politics, economics and the media had 
spread to an unprecedented degree.  This created the need for a new approach to 
understanding the media and its interactions with the worlds of politics and economics. This 
has led to the emergence of new outlook on the development of global communication. It 
advocated that the new global communication revolution enhances what it describes as 
Western, mainly American, “electronic colonialism” (Kim and Barnett, 1996; Lynch, 2006; 
McPhail, 2010; Abdelmoula, 2012; inter alia). This perspective attempts to examine how the 
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mass media influence the mind, concentrating on its role and the consequences of its 
operations in relation to the mind, and to global consumer behaviour (McPhail, 2010: 23).  As 
outlined earlier, with the onset of the global communication revolution, a new culture has 
emerged that is becoming a global phenomenon driven principally by large multimedia 
corporations who “control, reproduce and spread the global flow of words, images, and 
sounds …seeking to impact the mind without regard to geography” (Ibid: 23). These 
companies are, in other words, the “foot soldiers of electronic colonialism” (Ibid: 24). Many 
of these corporations are U.S.-based, and are not driven just by the pursuit of profit or 
commercial dominance; it is also a question of cultural hegemony (McPhail, 2010: 24). In 
many developing countries, this notion of Western imperialism was used as a pretext by right- 
as well as left-leaning regimes in order to justify illiberal controls against their own peoples 
(Ibid: 5).  
This notion of Western dominance was criticised, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, with 
reference to the complexities of global media interaction, flow of information, and the 
sometime counter-flow from the South to the North (cf. Curren and Park, 2000).  The 
advocates of this approach also failed to account for the ability of local communities to resist 
American cultural messages and to develop inherent resistance, meaning that communities 
may watch American soap operas or movies, but that their interpretation is not as the original 
sender intended (Abdelmoula, 2012; McPhail, 2010; Herbert, 2001; Barker, 1997; Lewis, 
1991; inter alia). In other words, there are more intervening variables and factors, apart from 
the message, that determine how audiences read American cultural products (cf. Liebes and 
Katz, 1994). 
One of the perspectives that developed in parallel as a result of the spread of globalization is 
the ‘world system theory’, which argues that global economic expansion, and hence, 
communication expansion, form a small group of “...core zone nation states out to two other 
zones constitute prime export markets for multimedia firms…” (McPhail, 2010: 24). This 
theory divides the world into core nations that produce and export most of the cultural 
products, software as well as hardware items, to semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. 
Consequently, the core nations are the major industrialised nations. On the other hand, the 
semi-peripheral (which may include countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others) and peripheral nations (encompassing states such as 
Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and others) are dominated in 
their interactions with the core nations, which exercise control to their own benefit, and 
define the nature and extent of interactions with the two other areas (Ibid: 24).  
This theory is supported by the empirical research conducted by Kim and Barnett (1996, 
2008; cf. McPhail, 2010). They examined the international news flow in 132 countries and 
found empirical evidence to support the inequality in international news flow between the 
core and the semi-peripheral and peripheral nations, meaning that the core nations (the 
Western industrialised countries, US and EU), produce and sell international news to the 
semi-periphery and periphery, who are consumers and are dependent for their information on 
the core nations (McPhail, 2010: 29). Galtung (1971: 89-93) identified five types of 
exchanges through which the core nations exercise control and impose their imperialism on 
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the peripheral state: economic, political, military, communication and cultural.  This means, 
according to Galtung, that the Southern nations know virtually nothing about events in their 
neighbouring countries that has not been filtered through the lenses of the developed media 
systems. He also suggested that peripheral states are tied to the core ones, and that 
information flows from different core states in different proportions, determined by capital 
and trade flows, as well as historical and colonial relations (Galtung, 1971, 64-91).  
The critics of this approach argue, however, that many countries in the semi-periphery, and 
even in the periphery, attempted to develop national media industries that have managed at 
times to reverse the flow of information into a South-North flow, and to challenge the core’s 
alleged dominance. The main examples of this are the soap operas and films of countries like 
China, India, Brazil, and Turkey. This approach has also been criticised because dominance 
of global communication markets does not necessarily translate into cultural dominance. 
Critics argue that interpretations of messages are a totally different matter, in which many 
factors are at play (Abdelmoula, 2012; McPhail, 2010; Barkho, 2007; Curren and Park, 2000; 
inter alia).  
The core zone is also dominated by the U.S. model that treats media and culture as economic 
products, and is thus a view that encourages private ownership. By contrast, other countries 
within the core zone in Europe regard media and culture as tools to inform, educate, and 
entertain, rather than being driven by maximizing revenue, as is the case with the U.S. 
paradigm. This has led to tension within this core of dominating nations, with the French for 
instance seeking to protect their cultural industries from what they regard as the American 
hegemonic drive (McPhail, 2010, Curren and Park, 2000). These stresses within the core 
zone, the semi-periphery, and, most importantly, among peripheral areas, gave rise to new 
debates about the need for a more equitable form of disseminating information, and a more 
level playing field in terms of sharing the benefits of globalization.   
Hence, in 1973, the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) summit set out to safeguard national 
cultures and overcome global imbalances within information flows and communications, and 
to initiate a new international order in information. The New World Information and 
Communication Order (NWICO) thus become a central issue within the ranks of UNESCO 
(Padovani and Nordenstreng, 2005: 264), which in the late 1970s adopted the principle of 
NWICO, with the aim of addressing the imbalances between the West and peripheral nations, 
not just in terms of production and exchange of information and knowledge, but intertwined 
with another UNESCO initiative, the New International Economic Order (NIEO), in order to 
address the imbalance in economic terms between the Western core nations and peripheral 
states. Western states, however, opposed NWICO, regarding it as an obstacle to media 
freedom and as increasing state control over the mass media.  
The NWICO, however, came into being at the height of the Cold War, and, with the 
withdrawal of the U.S. and Britain from UNESCO after opposing many of the planned 
proposals under NWICO and NIEO at the UNESCO general assembly in 1989, a new 
communication strategy that focused on the Western principles of freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, and the importance of an independent and pluralistic media, came 
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about, consigning NWICO to the history books (McPhail, 2010; Padovani and Nordenstreng, 
2005). NWICO, however, despite its difficulties “...not only forced a reanalysis and 
reaffirmation of values, but it also accentuated the need for hard data and planning practical 
strategies in order to enhance communication development throughout the world” (McPhail, 
2010: 81). 
Other works that followed this approach by systematically linking media and politics include 
Blumer and Gurvitch (1995), and Hallin and Mancini (2004).  Abdelmoula (2012) describes 
this approach as  
...an act or a process which reflects a tendency to explain differences and put things in 
order according to a predefined system or rationale. The basic assumption of the 
systemic approach is that there are always some forms of organizing political principles 
according to which all kinds of media operate and can be understood. 
      (Abdelmoula, 2012: 128). 
Unlike Siebert et al. (1956), who divided the media scene into liberal, socially responsible, 
and Soviet, authoritarian categories, Hallin and Mancini (2004) adopted a different division 
by which they identified three media models: the Mediterranean or polarised pluralist model, 
the North/Central European democratic corporatist model, and the North Atlantic or Liberal 
model, with each of the three models reflecting a particular political context.  
The Mediterranean model is characterised as elite-oriented, with limited circulation, an 
emphasis on internal affairs, weak journalistic performance, and the state largely exercising 
ownership and regulation of the media. The North/Central European model, on the other 
hand, is marked by a strong tradition of press freedom, wide circulation, and strong 
journalistic practices and organisational structures. Within the confines of this model, 
commercial and public media co-exist in the corporatist model. The third model, the North 
Atlantic or Liberal, also has a strong press tradition as well as large circulation, but it is 
dominated by commercially and politically oriented media (Abdelmoula, 2012: 134-135).  
There are a number of criticisms of this approach. Although it may still be a useful tool for 
analysis, most notably it tries to explain a changing phenomenon like the media as it interacts 
with other elements, such as political and economic ones, which may result in conditioning 
our interpretations and hampering our ability to reach a full understanding of the processes 
that are at play (Ibid: 137). In the same vein, Herman and Chomsky (1988) looked at the role 
of the mass media as an instrument of propaganda and state power. Utilising a number of case 
studies, they formulated their propaganda model, which examines how news in the 
mainstream U.S. media system goes through five key filters. The propaganda model's key 
assumptions are that the dominant media are deeply entrenched into the market system, seek 
only profit, are largely owned by wealthy business people, and rely by and large on 
advertising as their primary funding source. Herman and Chomsky also assumed that these 
media are dependent on government or government-related sources, or business, for 
information, and are largely constrained by the dominant ideology, which at the time was 
anti-communism.  They note:  
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the five factors involved -- ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and anticommunist 
ideology -- work as ‘filters’ through which information must pass, and that individually 
and often in additive fashion they help shape media choices. We stressed that the filters 
work mainly by the independent action of many individuals and organizations; these 
frequently, but not always, share a common view of issues and similar interests. In 
short, the propaganda model describes a decentralized and non-conspiratorial market 
system of control and processing, although at times the government or one or more 
private actors may take initiatives and mobilize coordinated elite handling of an issue. 
Propaganda campaigns can occur only when consistent with the interests of those 
controlling and managing the filters.  
(Herman, 1996: 5)  
The propaganda model has, however, been criticised both on the grounds that it has a 
perceived conspiratorial nature, although its authors deny this, and in that it is allegedly too 
mechanical or functionalist, and ignores the existence of space, contestation, and interaction. 
It has also been criticised as attempting to provide a blanket explanation of media behaviour 
in the West without taking account, for example, of concepts such as journalistic 
professionalism, and public sector media that provide an alternative to commercial television 
(Hallin, 1994: 13). The authors of the propaganda model refuted their critics, however, 
arguing that:  
we never claimed that the propaganda model explains everything or that it shows media 
omnipotence and complete effectiveness in manufacturing consent. It is a model of 
media behaviour and performance, not media effects. We explicitly pointed to 
alternative media, grass roots information sources, and public scepticism about media 
veracity as important limits on media effectiveness in propaganda service, and we 
urged the support and more effective use of these alternatives.  
(Herman, 1996: 8)  
On the issue of media professionalism, they also argued that it is not uniform among media, 
but that:  
professionalism and objectivity rules are fuzzy, flexible, and superficial manifestations 
of deeper power and control relationships. Professionalism arose in journalism in the 
years when the newspaper business was becoming less competitive and more dependent 
on advertising. Professionalism was not an antagonistic movement by the workers 
against the press owners, but was actively encouraged by many of the latter. It gave a 
badge of legitimacy to journalism, ostensibly assuring readers that the news would not 
be influenced by the biases of owners, advertisers, or the journalists themselves. 
(Herman, 1996: 12)  
As stated by Walters (1995), however, globalization, especially with the proliferation of 
satellite television and of the internet, could be seen as the dominant feature of the 20th and 
21st century (cf. Thussu, 2000). In the globalized world, the expansion of information and 
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communication technologies, combined with a simultaneous increase in the prevalence of 
market-led democracies, is leading to the creation of what Clark (1997) termed ‘global civil 
society’, in which “global homogenizing forces at play such as standardized communication 
networks (hardware and software) media forms and formats, influence cultural conciseness 
across the world” (Thussu, 2000: 76-78). This has led scholars such as Ritzer (1999) to speak 
of the ‘McDonaldization’ of global society (cf. Thussu, 2000, 78).   
Consequently, as Hallin and Mancini (2010) concluded, “the liberal model has clearly 
become increasingly dominant  across Europe as well as North America, as it has, no doubt, 
across much of the world, its structures, practices and values displacing, to a substantial 
degree, those of the other media systems” (Hallin and Mancini, 2010: 154).  
On the other hand, they admit that there are forces at play that may limit the process of 
convergence towards the monolithic liberal model, because “differences among national 
political systems remain substantial and are likely to prevent complete homogenization of 
media systems for the foreseeable future and changes in media markets have created counter 
tendencies even in the liberal countries” (Ibid: 182). Such counter-flow dynamics move from 
the South to the North and others from the South to the South (Hallin and Mancini, 2010).  
Examples of such players could be the Indian film industry (Bollywood), the Latin American 
Telenovelas, the South Africa based pan-African network M-Net, the Russian network 
(RTTV), the Chinese international television network (CCTV) and  the Qatari based 
Aljazeera Network (Thussu, 2010: 222-223). In this, Thussu (2010) remarks that “the global 
media landscape of the first decade of the 21st century represents a complex terrain of multi-
vocal, multimedia  and multi directional flows” (Thussu, 2010: 222). 
The Arab world, through Aljazeera, has been at the heart of this trend as McPhail (2010) 
notes:  
the balance of power in international media was shifting from the West to the Arab 
world, with its vast wealth and newly emergent media. A decade after launching 
Aljazeera, Qatar created an English-language sister channel, Aljazeera English, in the 
hopes of gaining the same kind of influence in the ‘global south’ that the Arabic 
channel had given it in the Arab world.    
(McPhail, 2010: 302)  
Others, however, disagree. Sabry (2005) suggests that it would not be wise to regard the Arab 
media as global, because “...the dominant oligopolistic media players..., who enjoy long 
history and more established market structures, are not regarded as global” (Ibid: 41). The 
criteria for global reach, he argues, are that the media have to “transcend nation state 
boundaries and language communities, use English, the language of globalization, and attract 
a cross section of international audiences that is not limited to the rich and 
influential…coupled with access to the resources and means of production necessary to 
compete at a global level” (Ibid: 42). When taking these conditions into account, Arab media 
hardly qualify as global, as they are bound by restrictive state policies that are largely 
directed towards national players, with both private and publicly owned media directly or 
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indirectly controlled by governments or circles of power that are loyal to the government or 
whoever is in charge (Sabry, 2005). He also argues that Arab media are technologically 
dependent on the West, with Western style and norms extensively followed by Arab stations 
“...for instance pop idol on MBC” or ‘who wants to be a millionaire’ on the same channel, 
and a large amount of Arab television production is imported from the West (Sabry, 2005). 
What he and others (Sakr, 2001, 2005; Fandy, 2007; inter alia) highlight is the same problem 
that many peripheral nations suffer from as a result of the core nations dominating the flow of 
information and communication. Furthermore, after the events of 9/11 the U.S. saw that its 
hegemonic approach to the Arab world had to evolve from the traditional ‘mind management’ 
into direct communication through the use of U.S.-sponsored radio (Radio Sawa) and 
television (Al-Hurra) stations (Sabry, 2005).  
In the next section, I shall examine the contexts in which Aljazeera came into being, how it 
was conceived and organised, and how influential it has been in the Arab world and beyond. 
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Section Two 
Aljazeera and the Arab media scene 
 
Arab media, as outlined by McPhail (2010), came about in the aftermath of the German 
defeat in the First World War, and the splitting up of what was left of the Ottoman Empire 
between the Western powers, especially Britain and France (McPhail, 2010). The debate over 
Arab nationalism among a number of thinkers in the Arab world was heavily expressed by 
the newly emergent media, with the state and ideology key dominating players in the region 
(Sakr, 2001, 2007; McPhail, 2010; Dabashi, 2012; inter alia). Hafez (2001) described the 
Middle Eastern media system as “the most closed and controlled in the world with 
information control and censorship widespread” (Hafez, 2001: 4). Hafez's (2001) description 
does not only apply to media conditions in earlier decades, as such censorship and restrictions 
still apply today. Any advances that have been achieved as a result of the Arab spring are still 
in their early stages, and may have been reversed, as is the case in Egypt (Miladi, 2013). 
This restrictive media environment is in line with the model identified by Rugh (1979), who 
divided the Middle Eastern media into three categories. The first is the mobilised press, 
which is controlled by the state. It exists in countries such as Algeria, Sudan and Morocco. 
The second is the loyalist press, in which the press or the media is owned by private investors 
but is indirectly controlled by the government or by people who are loyal to it. This model 
exists in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The third group is the diverse press, 
where media are largely free from government control, as in countries such as Lebanon 
(Rugh, 1979, cf. Hafez, 2001: 5). The situation has changed slightly as of the mid-1990s, due 
largely to the coming of satellite channels which have the ability to cross borders, states, and 
continents. The relatively newly established television stations such as the Middle East 
Broadcasting Centre (MBC) and Arab Radio and Television (ART), despite their professional, 
Western news style, and critical approach to certain issues such as the Oslo  
Peace Accord between the Palestinians and Israelis, remain loyalist outlets, rarely touching 
anything critical of their respective supporting governments (Sakr 2001).   
 
The changes that came with the foundation of MBC and RTA were influenced by three main 
factors, as identified by El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003). First, the introduction of foreign 
media led to negotiations over a supposed standard of objectivity, independence, and fairness 
starting to be contested and articulated. The West first began influencing public opinion in the 
Arab world in 1934, when it was targeted by Italian radio. Nazi Germany followed suit 
shortly thereafter, as did the BBC in 1938. Since then many other nations have followed in 
these steps (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003). The second major change started when a 
number of local broadcasters went on air using Arabic. Such attempts later helped make 
Egypt the leading Arab country in the television, cinema and theatre industries. It also helped 
to nourish the pan-Arab liberation movements and saw the establishment of the ‘Voice of the 
Arab’ radio station, which led to anti-colonial efforts across the region during the 1950s and 
1960s. This happened, however, at a time when most Arab states still applied various degrees 
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of pressure and control over the media. Until the 1990s, most Arab countries had Ministries 
of Information acting as regulatory bodies and overseeing all monitoring and censoring of 
mass communication in their respective nations. That is why, according to El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar (2003), foreign broadcasters such as the BBC's World Service built large audiences 
in the Arab world, because of their presumed credibility in comparison with local 
broadcasters or media outlets. The coming of Arab satellite television would, however, soon 
displace Arabic-language foreign broadcasters (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003). 
The third major change occurred when Arab media reacted to CNN's coverage of the 1991 
Gulf War by trying at least partially to imitate American success. This helped create the first 
attempts at real investigative reporting and war correspondence. The first Arab television 
station to emulate the CNN model was the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), which 
was based at the time in London. In November 1996, after the BBC Arabic television 
experiment came to an end over editorial differences between the BBC and its sponsors, the 
Saudi-owned Orbit, Aljazeera came into being. When it started, most of the staff came from 
the BBC Arabic television service (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003).  
In fact, Sakr (2001) and McPhail (2010) argue that the Iraq War and the resultant coverage 
that came from CNN were pivotal in planting the seeds of modern Arab television news, and 
of the adoption of many journalistic techniques and styles by many news channels across the 
region in later stages. Most importantly, the establishment of the BBC flagship Arabic 
television (1994-1996), in partnership with the Saudi backed Orbit, marked a turning point in 
the tightly-controlled media scene of the region, especially for the medium of television. The 
station, which closed as a result of attempts by Orbit to censor certain BBC Arabic programs 
that showed dissident political opponents of the Saudi ruling family, made many realise that 
their stranglehold on information flow and dissemination within their respective countries 
was being eroded (McPhail, 2010: 292). 
Arab satellite channels and a new civic society: 
This trend of new satellite television broadcasters, Lynch (2006) argues, started a wave of 
change that few in the Arab world could anticipate. The changes that followed in terms of 
providing a transnational platform were immense for audiences not only in the Arab world, 
but also among the émigré population (Lynch, 2006). Likewise, Sakr (2001) argued that the 
emergence of these transnational television platforms to, from and within the Middle East 
seemed to offer new opportunities to challenge censorship and state media control. Satellite 
stations brought with them the hope of liberation from the government-controlled media 
monopolies and tight censorship of terrestrial television. Middle East Information Ministers 
had to face the possibility that satellite channels would provide viewers in their respective 
countries with news and commentary on local issues and affairs, outside their control. 
Political commentators from a wide spectrum of political persuasions had access to television 
without government surveillance (Sakr, 2001: 3-4).  
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Eickelman and Anderson (2003) argue that these new media outlets offer forums for 
alternative voices, with the aim to challenge or limit state power and influence in 
disseminating and controlling information. They also defied the conventional religious 
authorities, and contributed to the creation of a new kind of civil society (Eickelman and 
Anderson, 2003: 18). At the beginning the overwhelming currents of satellite channels in the 
region were generally aimed at the protection of vested interests and observance of editorial 
taboos. That, however, began to change when BBC Arabic started to broadcast to the Middle 
East and some of these issues started to be discussed. Although this trend did not have the 
time to mature and spread, due to the closure of BBC Arabic television, which occurred 
because its financial backers, Saudi owned Orbit, could not live with the appearance of Saudi 
dissidents such as Mohammmed El Masarry and Saad El Faqeeh on air, discussing sensitive 
Saudi issues such as human rights violations in the Kingdom, political rights and the call for 
democracy.  
The coming of Aljazeera: 
That, however, was about to change dramatically. Around the end of November 1996, 
Aljazeera started broadcasting to audiences across the Arab world. Miles (2005), Sakr (2007), 
Zayani (2005) and Lynch (2006), amongst others, have suggested that the station’s coming 
onto the Arab media scene not only changed the region, but also for the first time, challenged 
the monopoly of Western media on the traditional North South flow of information. El-
Nawawy and Powers (2008) argued that Aljazeera, as a broadcaster from the Arab world and 
a disseminator of news and political commentary, as well as of cultural, sports and children’s 
programming, represents a profound reversal in the flow of information that was the source 
of great animosity towards the West for much of the twentieth century.   
They argued that Aljazeera represents a critique of Western news and programming, while at 
the same time embodying a hybrid identity of Western technologies and formats adapted and 
evolved to meet the culturally and historically constructed expectations of Arab and Muslim 
societies (El-Nawawy and Powers, 2008). Seib (2008) also argued that, for the first time in 
the modern history of many independent Arab countries, there is a media organization that 
reflects the aspirations, hopes, and problems of many in the region. It is seen as a station that 
has managed not only to break regional taboos, but also to break the West’s hold on the flow 
of information. The main question that Sakr, (2001), Miles (2005), Lynch (2006), Alhassan 
(2004), and others ask is why it happened at this particular time, and in Qatar.  
In early 1995, when BBC Arabic television closed and most of its employees were made 
redundant, a close confidante of the Emir of Qatar suggested that he start up a news channel 
that emulated the model of the BBC in presenting news. The Emir Cheick Hamad Ben 
Khalifa Al-Thani, who had just taken over from his father in a peaceful coup d’état, 
embarked on an extensive program of modernizing Qatar.  He abolished the Ministry of 
Information (1995), the only Arab state to have done so, and took other legal steps to increase 
media freedom in his country. After a short consultation period, the Emir agreed to the 
proposal and the process of recruiting all the former BBC Arabic television staff, as well as 
others from across the Arab world, began in earnest. In November 1996 the station went on 
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the air with a limited program schedule, which was later gradually extended. There were 
some initial problems, but the station became an instant hit among Arab viewers who, for the 
first time, could see opposition figures airing their views without censorship or limitations 
(Miles, 2005; Seib, 2008; Al-Tamimi, 2012; inter alia). Not only that, but audiences across 
the Arab world could see various conflicts live and direct in their homes, and interact with the 
station through its various programs. So, programs such as ‘The Opposite Direction,’ ‘More 
Than One Opinion,’ ‘Century Witness’, and many others became instant successes, and 
viewers copied them and passed them to each other. Many viewers who did not already have 
satellite dishes bought one in order to watch this new medium (Lynch, 2006). The station was 
also open to figures who were described by many Arab and Western governments as 
‘terrorists’, such as Osama Bin Laden. It caused controversy when, for the first time in the 
history of the region, it opened its airwaves to Israeli officials (Miles, 2005).  
One big question, however, has still not been answered fully, and that is why did Cheick 
Hamad Ben Khalifa, who in 2013 resigned as Emir of Qatar (a move which is historic in the 
Arab world, in the sense that no Arab ruler has done so before, in the absolute monarchies) 
and handed power to his son, Cheick Tamim Ben Hamad, set up Aljazeera? Al-Sadi (2012), 
McPhail (2010), Fandy (2007) and Qusaibaty (2006) are among those who have argued that 
Qatar did not set up Aljazeera in order to spread press freedom, democracy, and the rule of 
law, as its official line states. McPhail (2010) suggests that:  
...the Emir of Qatar did not launch Aljazeera to save the Arab psyche or because he 
wanted a membership card at the local press club! He did it for the same reason he 
invited the US military to move its Gulf central command (from Saudi Arabia yet to 
become a bitter foe of Qatar) to Qatar, to make himself a player in the region…Al-
Jazeera gave the Emir the power to drive public opinion.  
(McPhail, 2010: 294)  
Such a trend, he argues, was in opposition to the interests of Saudi Arabia, whose dominance 
of the region Qatar had long disputed, and whose politics Qatar wanted to challenge, in the 
Gulf and beyond. Furthermore, when Cheick Hamad Ben Khalifa, the late Emir of Qatar, 
staged a peaceful coup against his father, Saudi Arabia is alleged to have conspired to re-
instate his father (McPhail, 2010).  
Aljazeera started with a grant from the state of Qatar of $150 million, to cover the setting up 
of the station and the running  costs for the first 5 years, after which it was intended that it  be 
self-sufficient (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; Al-Jaber, 2004; Alhassan, 2004; Miles, 2005; 
Tatham, 2006; inter alia). The new station was placed under the supervision of Qatar’s 
Foreign Ministry, and the powerful figure of the Emir’s cousin, Qatar’s late Prime and 
Foreign minister, Cheick Hamad Ben Jabr Al-Thani, the second most powerful person in 
Qatar, after the Emir himself. The channel’s budget came directly from Qatar’s Finance 
Ministry (and still does), and after three years of operation the station needed another 
injection of funds, which the Emir supplied (Al-Jaber, 2004; Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; 
Lynch, 2006; Tatham, 2006; Al-Tamimi, 2012; inter alia).  Aljazeera's foundation followed 
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the structure adopted by many of Qatar's public organisations, although it was given a greater 
degree of independence and freedom in its running, as well as freedom to report on events 
without any of the restrictions that hampered much of the media in the Arab world at the 
time. Inside Qatar, the Emir had just abolished the Information Ministry in 1995, which many 
saw as a step towards liberalizing the media in the country (Alhassan, 2004; Miles, 2005). 
The station had an operational charter, with a board of directors, a chairman directly 
appointed by the Emir in coordination with those known in Qatar as the ‘movers’ (who are 
the small circle of people who influence the Emir, though the Emir retains absolute 
authority), such as his wife, Cheicka Moza Al-Musned, Cheick Hamad Ben Jassim Ben Jabr, 
the Prime and Foreign minister and the Emir’s cousin, Cheick Hamad Ben Thamer Al-Thani 
(the Chairman of Aljazeera since 1996).  The Emir appointed a Chairman of the board of 
directors, his cousin Cheick Hamad Ben Thamer Al-Thani, and the first Director General of 
the station, Adnan Al-Sherif, a Palestinian BBC veteran broadcaster, to be replaced months 
later by Qatari Mohammed Jassim Al-Ali, who stayed in this position until 2003 (Miles, 
2005). 
For many of these early years, Aljazeera was a source of controversy for many Arab regimes, 
who closed its offices, banned its reporters from operating within their borders, and even 
went as far as withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar. Hence the station’s success 
remained limited to the Arab world (Sakr, 2001; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; Alhassan, 
2004; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006; inter alia). The Director General in these first few years had 
enormous decision-making powers, with direct access to the Chairman or to the Emir 
himself, and the station was centralised around him. This was positive in terms of quick 
decision making, but it also proved to be controversial as it exposed a lack of consultation 
and transparency, as well as lack of due process (Khanfar, 2009; Miles, 2005; Zayani and 
Sahraoui, 2007; inter alia).  
The functions and roles of Aljazeera’s board remain a mystery, and there were no published 
or declared outlines of how this supervisory role was to be exercised, with much left to the 
discretion of both the Chairman and the Director General (Miles, 2005). The station adopted 
the guiding principle of ‘the opinion and other opinion’, but there were no publicly published 
editorial guidelines, and editors were given the general task of implementing the station’s 
principle, which meant adhering to standards of journalistic professionalism, objectivity, 
neutrality, and balance, as each editor defined them, and they remained very ambiguous 
(Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Fandy, 2007; inter alia).  
The events of September 11
th
, 2001, and the events that followed marked a turning point in 
the history of Aljazeera and the region. The American invasion of Afghanistan (2001 to the 
time of writing), the invasion of Iraq (2003), and the war that followed, as well as Aljazeera's 
ability to broadcast an image that is not identical to what Western media broadcast, earned the 
station many admirers as well as foes (Seib, 2008). By 2003, immediately after the end of the 
second U.S. invasion of Iraq, Aljazeera's long-standing Director General, Mohammed Jassim 
Al-Ali, and the entire board apart from the Chairman, were sacked by the Emir, presumably 
because of major editorial mistakes in the coverage of the Iraq war (2003).  Others regarded 
this change as an attempt by the Emir to move away from the staunch pan-Arab agenda 
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adopted by Al-Ali, which was claimed  by the station’s enemies (Al-Jaber, 2004; Miles, 2005; 
Lynch, 2006; Fandy, 2007; Khanfar, 2009; Anzawa, 2011; inter alia). The new board and 
Director General, Wadah Khanfar, had a pro-political Islam agenda. Khanfar was known for 
his membership and staunch support for the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, which has 
strong links to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood movement (Miles, 2005; Cherribi, 2006; Fandy, 
2007; inter alia).  Months after his appointment, Khanfar published a mission statement for 
the station, setting out its nature and identity. He also put in place guiding principles for the 
station’s journalistic practices and performance.  
Thus in 2004 the station’s ‘code of ethics’ came to be. The code was adopted after much 
criticism of the station’s dealing with controversial issues, and as a result of the direct 
intervention of the station’s board. It was an attempt to develop some kind of systematic 
approach to news coverage, especially when dealing with uprisings, political upheaval or 
wars. The application of the code of ethics and journalistic guide was, however, a contentious 
issue, and caused tension both inside and outside of Aljazeera. For instance, McPhail (2010) 
notes that “Aljazeera’s code of ethics stated that its reporters distinguish between news 
material, opinion and analysis to avoid the pitfalls of speculation and propaganda. Yet its 
airwaves…were thick with opinion masquerading as reportage” (McPhail, 2010: 301). 
 The station continued to cause controversy despite attempts to adopt increasingly 
professional journalistic practices, and claims to be the most objective, impartial, and 
balanced news organisation in the Arab world and beyond. This has led to many different 
outlooks on its nature and journalistic practices, and to claims that it represents a unique 
model that is being copied not just in the Arab world by stations such as ‘Al-Arabiya’, ‘Al-
Hurra’ and ‘France 24 Arabic’, but also in other parts of the world, such as with ‘Telesur’ in 
Latin America. Therefore, in the next chapter, I aim to examine a different perspective on 
Aljazeera as a media model that is challenging or reinforcing current trends and opinions, or 
that is providing an outlook that is unique to Arab and Muslim cultural identity. 
Aljazeera: Media model or just a different discourse: 
Al-Sadi (2012), Azran (2010), and Abu-Rab (2010), amongst others, identified three models 
which they claimed apply to Aljazeera.  Al-Sadi (2012) argues that Aljazeera is a radicalizing 
factor for the Arab street (cf. Ajami, 2001; Alt, 2004; Brumberg, 2005; Friedman, 2003; 
Chafets 2001, 2002; Khashoggi, 2002; Zakaria, 2004; inter alia). He states that these authors 
claim that Aljazeera, because of its anti-establishment rhetoric, feeds and eventually leads to 
'radicalism' for the majority of the Arab populations.  He argues, therefore, that the station is a 
radicalizing force and stirs up anti-American, anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiments (Al-
Sadi, 2012: 2). They, (Cherribi, 2006; Ajami, 2001; Chafets, 2001, 2002) suggest that as the 
station adopts these views it directs and promotes pan-Arab/pan-political Islam ideas.  
The second model regards Aljazeera as an advocate of democracy, press freedom, journalistic 
professionalism, objectivity and human rights (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003;  Al-Jaber, 
2004; Alhassan, 2004;  Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2006, 2013; Seib, 
2008;  Hroub, 2013; inter alia).   
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The third model argues that Aljazeera is serving the interests of its paymaster, the state of 
Qatar (Hanson, 2013; Dorsey, 2013; Al-Sadi, 2012; Qassim, 2012; Al-Tamimi, 2012; 
Anzawa, 2011; Azran, 2010; Zayani, 2005; El-Iryan, 2002; Al-Dajani, 2002, inter alia).  The 
advocates of this perspective argue that the channel, despite its starkly anti-establishment 
rhetoric, is not a historical anomaly; as far as its establishment and objectives are concerned, 
Aljazeera is in fact not different from other media in the region. Al-Sadi (2012) notes that 
“...the station is in line with other state-sponsored Arab mass media that aim, first and 
foremost, at serving and defending the strategic interests of the host state, Qatar in the case of 
Aljazeera” (Al-Sadi, 2012: 3).   
Aljazeera: anti-West, pan-Arab and pro-political Islam? 
The proponents of this model regard Aljazeera as encouraging anti-West, anti-Israel and anti-
establishment sentiments, while at the same time advancing a pan-Arab and political Islamist 
agenda. Benjamin Gilman, the Republican Chair of the House International Relations 
committee sees Aljazeera as an organization stirring up “the fanatical anti-American and anti-
Semitic incitement sweeping the Arab world.” (Lynch, 2006; 20).  He argues that such 
actions by Aljazeera “...constitute [sic] a real threat to long-term interest of the US in the 
region” (Ibid, 20). 
The advocates of this model, see any attempts by the station to stand by its motto ‘the opinion 
and the other opinion’, in presenting various opinions, as inadequate. Chafets (2001) for 
instance, dismisses what he describes as “Aljazeera’s token attention to presenting opposing 
views and balanced opinions” (2001: 1-3). He argues that with Aljazeera “it is occasional 
interviews with Western statesmen which are designed to provide it a fig leaf of 
objectivity.”(Ibid: 1-3).  Consequently, Chafets considers the station to be “the most potent 
weapon in the Islamic arsenal” (Ibid: 1-4). He goes on to describe the station as “an Islamist’s 
propaganda machine that aims to spread hate against the US, Israel and the West in general 
by steering Arab feelings and amplifying them” (Ibid: 1-4). He writes that “Aljazeera is the 
great enabler of Arab hatred and self-deception. It propagates the views of Osama Bin Laden, 
It cheerleads for Palestinian suicide bombers, and it has become Saddam's voice” (Ibid: 3). 
Commenting on the station’s exclusive coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he 
added that “...even a legitimate news organization shouldn't have monopoly coverage of a 
war; but Aljazeera is far from legitimate” (Ibid: 4). Aljazeera, according to Chafets, is  
...an Arab propaganda outfit controlled by the medieval government of Qatar that 
masquerades as a real media company, for years it has inflamed the Arab world against 
the United States and its allies and its occasional interviews with Western statesmen, 
such as Secretary of State Powell, are designed to provide it with a fig leaf of 
objectivity.  
          (Ibid: 4).  
Ajami (2001) goes further, claiming that the station is controlled by Islamic fundamentalists. 
He explains that Aljazeera reporters see themselves as 'anti-imperialists' (2001: 1). He argues 
that “...these men and women are convinced that the rulers of the Arab world have given in to 
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American might, these are broadcasters who play to an Arab gallery whose political bitterness 
they share and feed” (Ibid: 1). Ajami also accuses Aljazeera of inciting Arab radicalism and 
fuelling Arab and Muslim anger against the U.S. He claims that the station incites 
demonstrations and ignites the anger of fundamentalists, which can lead to more violence 
against Americans. Ajami (2001) uses the term “fans the flames of Muslim outrage.” He 
writes that:  
...compared with other Arab media outlets, Aljazeera may be more independent -- but it 
is also more inflammatory, for the dark side of the pan-Arab worldview is an aggressive 
mix of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, and these hostilities drive the station's 
coverage, whether it is reporting on the upheaval in the West Bank or on the American 
raids on Kandahar 
         (Ajami, 2001: 2).   
Aljazeera expresses Arab anger at the West: 
In the same vein, Khashoggi (2002) argues that Aljazeera is being led by the masses rather 
than leading them. He suggests that Aljazeera staff and editorial management “know the taste 
of the Arab street, and the Arab street is anti-American and anti-Israel” (cf.  Lynch, 2006: 46). 
The newly outlined Aljazeera mission statement states clearly that “Aljazeera is an Arab 
broadcasting station presenting news from an Arab perspective” (cf. Qusaibaty, 2006: 113).  
On the other hand, Kessler (2012), Lynch (2006), Zayani (2005) and Tatham (2006) see the 
popularity of the station as expressing a sense of frustration with the biases of Western media 
in general, and American outlets in particular. Zayani (2005) states that the station represents 
a challenge to Western media, as it did for the first time in history break the Westward flow of 
information. Even if the images on Aljazeera may be far more expressive of the Palestinian 
'Intifada' and the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan than those presented on Western media, 
many Arab viewers see Aljazeera as a viable alternative, offering coverage of the Middle East 
that hasn’t been distorted by American news media.  
Aljazeera as anti-establishment: 
Aljazeera has also been seen as an anti-establishment, anti-hegemony force in the Arab world 
and beyond. Al-Shahri (2012), Iskandar (2006), Seib (2008), Painter (2008) and Soueif 
(2001), amongst others, have argued that the station from its inception was an anti-
establishment institution that aimed to challenge the establishment norms and concepts, 
whether political, economic or social. To this end, Soueif (2001) notes that “Aljazeera's 
challenge to perceived conventions and understandings in the Arab world has been nothing 
short of revolutionary” (Soueif, 2001: 3). Al-Shahri (2012) agrees with Soueif’s assertion, 
arguing that since its foundation Aljazeera has played a crucial role in instigating and 
reinforcing the demise of taboos and conventions in the Arab world, as well as the current 
changes and revolutions sweeping the Arab world (Al-Shahri, 2012: 34). Painter (2008) 
acknowledges the role played by Aljazeera in challenging established conventions in the Arab 
world and in providing an alternative to hegemonic forces. He concluded that there is strong 
evidence that, in comparison with BBCW and CNNI, Aljazeera has more coverage of stories 
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from developing countries, and significantly less from Europe and the US, and that the station 
seeks reaction to international stories from developing countries rather than from the Western 
world (Painter, 2008). 
Aljazeera: pro-democracy and pro-freedom 
The second model credits Aljazeera with creating a revolution not only in the Arab world but 
globally. To a certain extent, the station is the voice of the people and the platform through 
which they express their ideas, feelings, hopes and aspirations. Advocates of this model 
suggest that the station challenged current values and practices and led to change that was 
unthinkable before its establishment (Al-Sadi, 2012: 1-9). Lynch (2006) agrees with Sakr's 
analysis, stating that Aljazeera “ushered in a new kind of open, contentious public politics in 
which a number of competing voices competed for attention” (Lynch, 2006: 2). He argues 
that the new television stations, along with newspapers, internet sites, and many other 
channels of communication, encouraged Arabs to argue, to disagree, and to question their 
current situation. This argument suggests, at least on the face of it, that stations like Aljazeera 
might have helped create what Lynch calls “a new kind of Arab public” and a “new kind of 
Arab politics” (Lynch 2006: 2-3). 
Qusaibaty (2006) takes a more positive view of the impact of Aljazeera, arguing that its 
editorial policy has helped the creation of a new public space for dialogue, and an alternative 
to other media organizations, such as the BBC, CNN and other Arab government-owned or 
semi-controlled channels in the region (Qusaibaty, 2006: 13). Lamloum (2004) also suggests 
that the station creates a space that allows for the growth of an alternative political culture in 
the Arab world. It shows the diversity of the Arab world in political, social and economic 
terms (Lamloum, 2004). Loory (2006) went further, arguing that democracy can be enhanced 
and the free flow of information encouraged, not only by fighting those who want to stifle a 
free press in their own countries, but also by guaranteeing access to news channels by 
organizations such as Aljazeera. He also accepts that such channels, like Aljazeera, would 
have their own different and distinct characters (Loory, 2006: 44).  
Within the Arab world, Soueif (2001) argues that ‘Aljazeera has rendered censorship of news 
and opinion pointless. For us outside, it provides the one window through which we can 
breathe’ (Soueif, 2001: 5). 
Aljazeera and journalistic professionalism: 
Valeriani (2008), Mazhar (2007), Lynch (2006) and Al-Mikhlafi (2006), and others, argue 
that Aljazeera has had a deep impact on journalistic practices in the Arab world, as it has set 
the ceiling of coverage and inspired journalists who aspire for the highest level of journalistic 
independence, and objective and balanced reporting of events and various issues. Al-Theidi 
(2003) argued that “Aljazeera has actively been successful in encouraging freedom of 
expression in the Arab world and brought a collective Arab public opinion into being” (Al-
Theidi, 2003: 16). 
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The station’s effect on Arab broadcasting has also stimulated governments in the region and 
beyond to set up alternative channels to compete directly with it. The Saudi-backed media 
group MBC set up Al-Arabiya, the United States government established  Al-Hurra (the free), 
Russia launched its own Arabic news service (Russia Today), and even the BBC set up a rival 
Arabic service channel (Zayani, 2005: 1-6). From 1997 to 2007, many observers in the 
Middle East such as Al-Jaber (2004), Alhassan (2004), and Gafla (2011), termed it the 
‘Aljazeera era’.  Lynch (2006) notes that Aljazeera, unlike earlier satellite stations, 
concentrated on politics and open debate and quickly assumed a dominant, near monopoly 
position within Arab public discourse. It was the one station that virtually everyone watched 
(Lynch, 2006: 22-23). This has led El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) to use the term 
‘contextual objectivity’ in describing the nature of Aljazeera's journalism (El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar, 2003: 54). 
Aljazeera and satellite democracy: 
Zayani (2005), Al-Hail (2004) and Miles (2005) add that to treat Arab media as the fourth 
estate and to say that television leads to political changes is to look at the issue from a narrow 
perspective. They contend that the perception of freedom enjoyed by media such as Aljazeera 
gives the impression that there is real democracy in the region, which is an impression which 
delays real democratic processes and changes. Miladi (2013), Lynch (2006), El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar (2003) and El-Nawawy (2010), are amongst those who disagree with such a notion, 
arguing instead that the margin of freedom enjoyed by Aljazeera, and others like it, would 
serve to hasten democratic change.  
In the same vein, Ghareeb (2000: 57) noted that, ‘since its inception, Aljazeera has been 
viewed as promoting debates on human rights and democracy, exposing political corruption, 
and to a large extent has ‘raised the ceiling of political and social debate throughout the Arab 
world’, Hence, Mahroum (2011) puts forward the idea that Aljazeera was one of the most 
important factors that led to the success of the Arab revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. 
He argues that the station turned from a pure media outlet, carrying various opinions, into a 
force for change, and that it campaigned directly for democratic change. Aljazeera, he 
suggests, claims that its code of ethics makes it imperative for it to support human rights, 
democratic values, and freedom of speech (Seib, 2008; Miles, 2005). Alterman (2003) and 
El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) agree, stating that Aljazeera’s code of ethics supports the 
idea that the station’s aim is to play a positive role in moderating the attitude of the Arab 
street, supporting the values of democracy, respect for human rights, and freedom. 
Hafez (2004) went further, arguing that the station has become a kind of de facto political 
party, in light of the absence of a well-established democratic political system, though he was 
writing before the Arab spring. He writes “Aljazeera has been considered as one of the most 
important ‘Arab political parties’” (Hafez, 2004: 12-14). He goes on to say that since most 
Arab countries:  
have not yet established functioning democracies, relevant institutions, such as political 
parties and a parliamentary  opposition, are still non-existent or useless in their 
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functions. To many observers, Arab satellite television seems to have the potential to 
take over part of their designated role. As a voice of Arab peoples and 'the common 
man,' Arab satellite broadcasting seems able to mediate between the state and society.  
(Hafez, 2004: 12-14)  
Aljazeera: a propaganda tool for Qatar? 
The advocates of the third model claim that Aljazeera is a tool serving the national interests 
of the state of Qatar. Al-Sadi (2012), after conducting a contextual analysis of three of 
Aljazeera's most popular programs, ‘the opposite direction’, ‘more than one opinion’, and 
‘without bounds’, concluded that Aljazeera’s anti-establishment discourse is far from being 
an expression of a real, liberated, anti-establishment political rhetoric, that runs contrary to  
policies and political objectives and aims of the Qatari state. Rather, the discourse is an 
expression of a rhetorical strategy that allows Aljazeera to increase Qatari influence, and help 
boost Qatari interests in the region and beyond, on three fronts.  
First, he superficially agrees with the audience's radicalism, whether it is anti-West, anti-
Israel, or indeed anti-America, or anti-dictatorship in sentiment.  
Second, he argues that the station aims to water down the radical ideologies of nationalism 
and jihadist Islamism, or any other radical program of action that they may inspire, by 
presenting views that are contrary in substance and rigour to these two most popular 
ideologies (i.e., pan-Arabism nationalism, and jihadist Islamism).  
Third, he argues that the station directs audiences away from what are presented as ‘radical 
ideologies outlined earlier’, toward alternative notions and ideology, with a set of policies 
that is in line with the strategic and national interest of Qatar. Al-Sadi (2012) identifies this 
new policy and strategy with a new model of an Arab state, which Qatar represents and aims 
toward. It is a vision of a state that aspires to democratic values, and to be a self-reforming 
state that meets much of the expectations of the Arab masses and could, thus, replace both 
radical Arab regimes such as Syria and Iraq, and unpopular, moderate, pro-Western Arab 
regimes such as Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Thus, Aljazeera 
is a tool to reshape and reform Arab authoritarian regimes, instead of challenging them (Al-
Sadi, 2012: 7-9).   
Aljazeera as an instrument for Qatar’s soft power: 
Souag (2012: 2), Managing Director of Aljazeera media network, argues plays a key role 
apart of Qatar’s soft power strategy. He explains that  
...in the media age it is all about soft power and if you are a small country like Qatar 
you want to be successful and drive through your policies and strategy in the region, 
you don't need warships or airplanes; you need soft power and that done through the 
media, science and culture.  
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He affirms that “I believe that the Emir was aware of this and I believe that's a great vision” 
(Souag, 2012: 3). Al-Tamimi (2012) agrees. He argues that Aljazeera has been instrumental 
“not only in serving the country’s foreign diplomacy, but also in designing and implementing 
these policies directly or indirectly” (Al-Tamimi, 2012: 84). Al-Tamimi (2012), however, 
goes further. He adds that Aljazeera had a direct and overwhelming influence on Qatari 
internal affairs, as “it helped to quicken the pace of change politically, economically and 
culturally” (Al-Tamimi, 2012: 83). In this Al-Tamimi (2012) is in total agreement with Hroub 
(2013), who suggested that Aljazeera, while instigating major changes across the Arab world 
within the framework of a Qatari vision, instigated the biggest changes to Qatari society and 
Qatari politics.  
To come back to the main idea of Aljazeera as a tool of Qatari policy, Fandy (2007) argues 
that “even if not all Arab media are formally state owned, the state retains strict control over 
them. The media in the Arab world are therefore instruments of the regimes that fund them” 
(Fandy, 2007: 8-9). He also suggests that Aljazeera reports on other Arab states, which widely 
exposed certain regimes while praising others, and conceals the problems of Qatar, or seems 
willingly to forget about them. For example, while the station reported extensively on Saudi 
Princes being implicated in the bribery scandal surrounding British arms company BAE 
Systems, it ignored similar investigations implicating Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani (Fandy, 2007: 9).   
Sheriff (2012) argues that Qatar's popularity consequently seems to be on the rise, especially 
since the Arab Spring, as the country is perceived as being on the side of the Arab masses, 
and as doing something tangible to help them to achieve their goals. On the other hand, there 
are those in states like Syria, Tunisia and Libya who resent what they see as Qatar’s meddling 
in their internal affairs for the past few years, and, especially since the beginning of the Arab 
Spring, Qatar has perfected the art of 'punching above its weight' in regional and international 
affairs. The state uses its vast wealth and its media outlet, Aljazeera, to project soft power. 
Sheriff (2012) argues, however, that it is with the onset of the Arab Spring that Doha truly 
seems to have made major inroads into the region. He explains that it used Aljazeera directly 
in the Arab Spring, like Libya, Syria, Egypt and others, to advance its policy of change (Ibid.: 
5).  
Abdullah (2011) also acknowledges that in Qatar's rapid ascent in the region, there is no 
denying the central role played by the Aljazeera TV station, especially the Arabic version, 
which has become extremely popular amongst the Arab masses. He argues strongly that Qatar 
used Aljazeera as a tool to promote its agenda, and notes that Aljazeera: 
...is a tool, and a very effective tool in Qatar's foreign policy. And there's nothing wrong 
with that. I think the BBC is a tool of British foreign policy, and CNN of American 
foreign policy and so on. Yes, Aljazeera is part of Qatar's soft power. And like any 
modern state, it is exercising it.  
(Abdullah, 2011: 14) 
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Al Ezzi (2011) concurs pointing out that “As for the use of Aljazeera as a tool, this is a reality 
we see every day. But the station attained its present status well before the Arab revolts 
began; it was not only as a result of these revolutions” (Al Ezzi, 2011: 7).  
Sheriff (2012: 71) goes further. He argues that “Qatar through Aljazeera has managed to 
become a major peace broker in the region”. He cites the example of the role it played in the 
Darfur, Lebanon, and inter-Palestinian peace talks (Sheriff, 2012: 71).  Atrache (2010) gives 
the example of how Qatar, through Aljazeera, managed to increase its influence from 
virtually nothing to becoming a very important player within the space of a few years. She 
argues that in Lebanon, Qatar was able to develop and preserve very good relations with both 
the March 14 (political wing against the Shiite Hezbollah), and the March 8 (rival Shiite 
wing) coalitions, using Aljazeera and its huge financial clout in funding South Lebanon's 
reconstruction after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah (Atrache, 2010).  She further 
explains that: 
 Qatar managed to attain this level of influence and emerges as the most  
dynamic Arab state in the Arab Spring because unlike the US,  
Saudi Arabia, Egypt under [Hosni] Mubarak, Syria or Iran, Qatar did  
not try to take sides or fall into the regional divisions.  
        (Atrache, 2010: 43-54)  
In the following chapter, I will therefore examine and critically evaluate the claim that 
Aljazeera is an anti-West, anti-American, pro-Arabism and political Islam channel, in a 
detailed and systematic manner. I will also outline the strengths and weaknesses of the 
arguments advanced in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Aljazeera: A Force for Arabism and Political Islam? 
In the previous chapter I examined in general terms the various models and approaches to 
Aljazeera’s journalistic practices, and different media theories and their relevance to this 
study. In this chapter, I will critically analyse one of the media models applied to Aljazeera, 
namely Aljazeera as a force for Arabism and political Islam.  
Aljazeera, pan-Arabism and political Islam: 
Aljazeera has been described as encouraging Arab nationalism across the Middle East, and 
advancing an agenda that aims to combine political Islam and nationalist revival (Zakaria, 
2004; Al-Zaidi, 2003; Khashoggi, 2002; Al-Ali, 2002; Cherribi, 2006; inter alia). It does this 
by encouraging anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments in order to unify Arabs and Muslims 
against a common enemy (Kessler, 2012; Hijjiwi, 2011; Chafets, 2001, 2002; Ajami, 2001; 
Abuzalma and Jarboua, 2002; Cherribi, 2006; inter alia). At first it would seem contradictory 
to encourage two ideologies which historically have been bitter foes in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds. For decades each of these ideologies tried to outdo the other in the most extreme of 
ways. Images of the struggle that occurred between Egypt’s Nasser in the 1960s and 1970s 
and the Muslim Brotherhood movement are still vivid in many people’s memories (Rayyis, 
1987; Alewe, 2000; Dawisha, 2003;  Azzam, 2005; inter alia).   
Dawisha (2003) defines Arabism as “Arab cultural uniformity, combined with a strong desire 
for political unity in a specified demarcated territory” (Dawisha, 2003: 13). Dawisha (2003) 
also argues that Arabism started as a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which ruled much of 
the Arab and Muslim world in the late 19
th
 century. Alewe (2000), however, argues that the 
work of Muslim scholars such as Jamal Adeen Al-Afghani (1839-1897) planted the seeds that 
led to the rise of modern Arabism. He suggests that “Al-Afghani called for Muslim 
unification and for the Arabs to be centre stage in this process” (Alewe, 2000: 24-25). 
Likewise, he argues that the Egyptian scholar Mohamed Abdou (1849-1905) “enriched the 
ideas of Al-Afghani and elaborated on it, calling for the revival of Arab history and literature 
and the study of Arabic language” (Alewe, 2000: 26). These ideas were later used by Arab 
thinkers such as Nasif Alyaziji (1800-1871), Boutrous Al-Boustani (1819-1883), Ibrahim 
Alyaziji (1848-1906) and Sateh Alhusari (1879-1968), who combined Arab and Western 
cultures in their elaborate development of Arab nationalism. Hence, Alewe (2000) argued that 
because of the threats that many Arab countries faced from Western powers, “Islamic religion 
in Egypt during these times (late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century) and much of the Arab world was  
synonymous for Arabism, not in a racial sense, but rather in a cultural one”(Alewe, 2000: 
141). 
Aljazeera came into existence in circumstances similar to those that threatened Arab countries 
in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Iraq was the leading Arab country advocating Arab 
nationalism, while organisations such as Al Qaeda were calling on Arabs and Muslims to 
unite and overthrow their dictators (Dabashi, 2012; El-Baghdadi, 2007; Lynch, 2006; Miles, 
2005; inter alia).  Therefore, since its inception in November 1996, Aljazeera has been  
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regarded with suspicion, and been subject to constant criticism not only from within the Arab 
world, but also from various Western analysts and commentators (Sakr, 2001; El-Nawawy 
and Iskander, 2003; Al-Jaber, 2004; Miles, 2005; inter alia). This criticism peaked during the 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, as well as during the subsequent 'War on 
Terror.' The station faced various accusations ranging from being a “mouth-piece for 
terrorism” to a “friend of terrorists” to “Bin Laden's favourite station” (Abuzalma and 
Jarboua, 2002: 66-67). Other accusations against the station included “stirring hate” and 
“conspiring with terrorists” (Al-Zaidi, 2003: 12). Commentators and analysts  who looked at 
Aljazeera’s development and the way it covered issues such as ‘terrorism,’ ‘Arabism’ and 
‘political Islam’ thought the station did not apply the values of objectivity, professionalism, 
neutrality and balance that it claimed to stand for through its motto ‘the opinion and other 
opinion’ (Abuzalma and Jarboua, 2002: 23).   
This raises the question of whether or not the station advocates Arabism and political Islam.  
Additionally, there is the question of how it applies its founding motto, ‘the opinion and other 
opinion’. Does the station galvanise support for its pro-Arabism, pro-political Islam agenda 
by encouraging anti-American, and anti-Israel and/or anti-Western sentiments? In the next 
section I will examine these questions. 
Aljazeera; anti-America, anti-Israel and anti-West 
Matin Indyk, a leading Middle East policy-maker and a former US ambassador to Israel 
during the Clinton years, acknowledges that while Aljazeera may have possibly opened the 
airwaves to a variety of viewers and ideas in the Arab world and beyond, the majority of 
these were extreme in their anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments. Consequently, he 
argues that there is no point in attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Arab world, 
because Arab leaders through the use of media outlets like Aljazeera find it beneficial to 
deflect hostility outward (Lynch, 2006). 
Hoffman (2003) agrees with Indyk. He describes Arab news, particularly Aljazeera, as “anti-
American and he calls for Arab states to rein in this kind of hate propaganda” (cf. Lynch, 
2006; 20). Likewise, Zakaria (2004) claims that Aljazeera “...fills its screen with appeals to 
Arab nationalism with slogans and calls that lead to inflaming anti-American and anti-
Semitism feelings. He also suggests the station goes out of its way to appeal to religious 
fundamentalism” (Zakaria, 2004: 3). Lynch (2006) has also noted that many Americans 
regard Aljazeera and the new media “as fundamentally hostile force generating anti-
Americanism and complicating foreign policy objectives in Iraq, Israel, and the war on 
terror” (Lynch, 2006: 6).  
Fandy (2007) traces the roots of anti-Americanism to the ideas of Arab nationalists and 
Islamic fundamentalists that developed as a result of US policy in the region. He notes that:  
the particular brand of anti-Americanism we see is the result of actions by the American 
administration that earned the animosity of Arab nationalists, the radical Islamists and 
the ruling elite all at the same time. By attacking Iraq and undermining the Ba’ath 
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regime of Saddam Hussein, America angered Arab nationalists. By attacking the 
Taliban and Bin Laden, the administration angered the Islamists.  
(Fandy, 2007: 89)  
These feelings, he argues, are reflected within Arab media organisations such as Aljazeera. 
He argues that “...the people who operate these outlets are interested in stories that carry an 
anti-American rhetoric; American occupation of Iraq, the U.S.-backed Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territories, along with the discourse of angry Islamists groups” (Ibid: 90). This, 
according to Fandy (2007), is not because of a lack of understanding of American or Western 
culture; since most of the famous Aljazeera producers of these anti-American or anti-Western 
shows “...are Western nationals...and have close cultural proximity to Western society” (Ibid: 
90). He argues that “Arab journalists living on the border-line between the Arab world and 
the West have reacted to their experience in the West by turning against it” (Ibid: 91). Fandy 
(2007) argues that this is not too dissimilar to the experience of the godfather of modern 
political Islam, Said Kutub, who knew American and Western cultures very well yet rejected 
them outright (Ibid: 89-94). As stated by Miles (2005), when Aljazeera was set up the 
majority of its editorial as well as technical staff came from the failed BBC Arabic television 
service in London. 
Aljazeera's claim of objectivity and balance, expressed through the application of its motto 
‘the opinion and other opinion,’ is also dismissed by Chafets (2001). He describes the 
station's attempt to apply it as “superficial” (Chafets, 2001: 1-2). Consequently, Chafets 
considers the station to be “...the most potent weapon in the Islamic arsenal” (Chafets, 2001: 
1-4). He goes on to describe the station as “...an Islamist’s propaganda machine that aims to 
spread hate against the US, Israel and the West in general by steering Arab feelings and 
amplifying them”(Ibid: 1-4). He writes that “Aljazeera is the great enabler of Arab hatred and 
self-deception. It propagates the views of Osama Bin Laden, it cheerleads for Palestinian 
suicide bombers, and it has become Saddam's voice” (Ibid: 3).  
Ajami (2001) goes further in his claims about Aljazeera. He asserts that it is controlled by 
Islamic fundamentalists: “Aljazeera reporters see themselves as anti-imperialists. These men 
and women are convinced that the rulers of the Arab world have given in to American might, 
these are broadcasters who play to an Arab gallery whose political bitterness they share - and 
feed” (Ibid: 1). For Ajami, Aljazeera is inciting Arab radicalism and fuelling Arab and 
Muslim anger against the US, and he states that it “...fans the flames of Muslim outrage” 
(Ibid: 3). Lamloum (2004) supports these ideas and argues that Aljazeera has become known 
for the anti-West ideologies that supposedly are widespread in the Arab world. She notes that 
it is “the channel which advocates all of the ‘isms’ which supposedly plague the Arab world, 
‘Islamism’, ‘populism’, ‘anti-Semitism’ and so on” (Lamloum, 2004: 12). 
In trying to explain why Aljazeera reports events in this manner, prominent Saudi writer 
Khashoggi (2002) argues that Aljazeera is being led by the masses rather than leading them. 
He suggests that Aljazeera’s staff and editorial management “...know the taste of the Arab 
street, and the Arab street is anti-American” (Khashoggi, 2002: 46). Khanfar (2011), the 
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former DG of Aljazeera, counters Khashoggi's accusation that the station is populist, stating 
“we are an Arab television providing news from an Arab perspective” (2011: 3).  
Along the same lines, Kessler (2012), Lynch (2006), Zayani (2005) and Tatham (2006) see 
the popularity of the station as reflecting a sense of frustration with the bias of Western media 
in general. Zayani (2005) states that the station represents a challenge to Western media, as 
for the first time in history it broke the Western flow of information. Even if the images on 
Aljazeera may be far more expressive of the Palestinian 'Intifada' and the situation in Iraq or 
Afghanistan than the version presented on Western media, many Arab viewers see Aljazeera 
as a viable alternative, offering coverage of the Middle East that hasn’t been distorted by the 
American news media. Robert Fisk, a British journalist agrees, arguing that: 
...it would be unfair to compare Aljazeera to the American media partly because the 
latter much like the society they serve, have their own specific nature. Certainly, the 
American media are more seasoned and more sophisticated and Aljazeera has a lot to 
learn from the American media experience. Indeed, as I have seen from my own 
experience the new look adopted by Aljazeera around the year 2005 looks much like 
the CNN Model.  
(cf. Zayani, 2005: 29)  
Pan-Arabism, Pan-Political Islam from a Qatari perspective: 
Aljazeera’s adoption of a pan-Arab, pan-political Islam agenda has been strongly linked to its 
co-founder and sponsor, Qatar, within the framework of its struggle with its powerful 
neighbour, Saudi Arabia (Fandy, 2007). Although both countries adhere to the Wahabi, Salafi 
strand of Islam, Qatar’s late ruler, Cheick Hamad Ben Khalifa Al-Thani, after he deposed his 
father and after Saudi Arabia is alleged to have attempted to support the deposed Emir, 
wanted to adopt a version of Islam that is more in line with the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, 
he extended his welcome to one of the most prominent scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Cheick Youssef Al Qardawi, and offered him his own show, ‘Al-Sharia and Life’ or ‘Islamic 
law and life’, and opened the doors of his country and of Aljazeera to opponents of Al-Saud, 
the Saudi ruling family (Kamrava, 2013; Fandy, 2007, Cherribi, 2006; inter alia). 
 Hence, Aljazeera’s relationship with and adoption of a pan-Arab, pan-political Islam agenda 
started in earnest, and Cherribi (2006); Fandy (2007); Rinnawi (2006); and others, argue that 
it was a strategy adopted by Qatar’s Emir. Cherribi (2006) examined Aljazeera’s coverage of 
France’s banning of the Islamic veil between the years of 2002 and 2005. Using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, he examined 282 current affairs stories and programs 
during these years. He argued that the station was also running advertising campaigns for the 
veil in between its programs, as well as that some of its most famous anchorwomen decided 
to wear the Islamic veil, and present the news and other shows with their hair fully veiled. 
Cherribi (2006) notes “...the tendency to wear the veil on some Arab channels is 
increasing...moreover, 95 per cent of schools of journalism are veiled” (Cherribi, 2006: 131).  
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According to Cherribi (2006), in light of its handling of the veil issue, and in light of the 
presence of a weekly show that deals directly with religious issues and has as a regular guest 
one of the most prominent political and spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement, Aljazeera is wholeheartedly pro-Arabism and political Islam. As for the station’s 
claim of objectivity, impartiality, and balance, Cherribi (2006) notes that: 
the patriotic and energetic on Aljazeera resemble Fox news, and the coverage is laden 
with opinion, but the similarities stop there. Unlike Aljazeera, the Fox Anchorwomen is 
not displaying her religious preferences with a cross or a veil, and the leading Fox 
current affairs program is not featuring a leading religious leader who directs 10 
Million religious viewers on how to interpret religious laws, and who is often called 
upon as a religious authority to speak on world affairs on the daily evening news as in 
the case of Paris riots in 2005.  
         (Ibid: 133)  
In the case of Aljazeera, Cherribi argues that many regard Aljazeera as pluralistic, adopting a 
free-media agenda within an Arab and Islamic context. He disagrees with this and notes that:  
Aljazeera may on the surface, look as if it offers pluralism with its variety of programs 
and opinions. In the case of the veil, however, there is only one perspective, and Islamic 
perspective that is to encourage women to wear the veil. Every aspect of the coverage 
of the veil is framed to encourage the production and reproduction of this way of 
thinking. 
(Ibid: 134)   
Thus, Aljazeera is the Islamic version of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), because 
of the time it devotes to the views of Islamic religious leaders, and its promotion of Islamic 
practices and values as a way of life that needs to be adopted and applied. In other words, it is 
a channel that adopts and promotes political Islam with a distinctive Arab flavour, whether in 
dress, behaviour, or system of governance and politics (Cherribi, 2006). 
Fandy (2007) partially agrees with Cherribi (2006). He, (Fandy, 2007) conducted a 
comparative analysis between Aljazeera and its close rival in the Arab world, Al-Arabiya, and 
found that the opinion that Aljazeera is a pluralistic source of free, unbiased news, objective, 
balanced and neutral, is far from the truth. While its rival Al-Arabiya is clear in its adoption 
of a pro-Saudi line (it is owned by a member of the Al-Saud family), Fandy pays close 
attention to Aljazeera on three main fronts. The first is the station’s relationship with its 
owner, the state of Qatar, while the second is its relationship with and adoption of a pro-
political Islam agenda that is contrary to its rival in the region, Saudi Arabia, i.e., the adoption 
of a moderate strand of Islam (Muslim Brotherhood), versus the Saudi ultra-orthodox 
interpretation of Islam (Wahabi Strand of Islam). Thirdly, he looks at the station’s employees 
and their own personal convictions and affiliations (mostly to either political Islam or Arab 
nationalism), which he argues had a pivotal role in determining the station’s outlook and 
coverage of various events (Fandy, 2007). As for the first, Fandy (2007) argues that the 
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station is controlled by the Emir of Qatar by various means. It is controlled in terms of 
appointments to senior positions, whether that means the Chairman of the board, the board 
members, or indeed the Managing Director of the station. It is also controlled directly by the 
Emir in terms of ownership and financing, as Aljazeera’s budget (which remains unknown at 
the time of writing) comes directly from Qatar’s Ministry of Finance and is managed jointly 
by Qatar’s Foreign Ministry and the Diwan (the Emir’s palace).  
Another mechanism through which the Emir of Qatar retains overall control of the station is 
the Chairmanship of the station, which has not changed since the station’s inception, and has 
always been a close ally of the Emir, and a member of the Al-Thani ruling family in Qatar. 
Cheick Hamad Ben Thamer Al-Thani is one of the closest allies of the Emir, and besides his 
role as Chairman of Aljazeera network, presides also over much of public television in Qatar, 
thus retaining multiple roles. He is also a person who, according to Al-Tamimi (2012), Abu-
Rab (2010), Fandy (2007), and Miles (2005), amongst others, has regular contact and 
meetings with the Emir himself, and with other influential members of the Qatari royal 
family.  
Fandy (2007) also examines the influence that Aljazeera employees have on the station's 
editorial and journalistic performance. He explains that the great majority of employees in the 
newsroom have strong beliefs either in Arabism or in other political Islam ideologies, and 
these influence the way they make their editorial and news coverage decisions. Fandy's 
(2007) arguments are supported by various surveys of Arab journalists in general. Pintak and 
Ginges (2008) point out that “Arab journalists draw a clear distinction between U.S. policy 
and the American people, reporting an overwhelmingly unfavourable  view of the United 
States (77 percent) and its polices (89 percent) and a strongly favourable view of the 
American people (62 percent)” (Pintak and Ginges, 2008: 200).   
Fandy (2007) points out that these three levels interact to direct and influence Aljazeera’s 
coverage and journalistic practices, orienting them towards a pro-Arab, pro-political Islam 
agenda. Fandy (2007) provides examples of what he describes as Aljazeera’s biased coverage 
of the Gaza war in 2006, and of the Israeli attack on Lebanon in the same year, and argues 
that the station’s coverage was far from being objective, balanced and neutral as the station 
used emotionally driven images of damaged civilian homes, both in Gaza and Lebanon, and 
opened its airwaves to Hezbollah leader Hussein Nasrallah and the Islamic movement Hamas 
in Gaza, to convey their messages unchallenged.  
On the other hand, the brief appearances of Israeli officials were designed to provide a face-
saving impression of objectivity, were short and most of the time under-represented the 
Israeli side, in terms of number of occurrences and time allocation. Moreover, Nisbet, et 
al.(2004) have argued that since the Afghanistan war (2001) and the invasion of Iraq by the 
US (2003), policy makers and political commentators have aimed at tackling the anti-
American sentiment in the Arab world, spread by television stations such as Aljazeera, 
through its promotion of a pan-Arab, pan-Islam discourse. They note that there is a 
“consensus among American policy-makers that Aljazeera was a major contributor to anti-
American sentiment” (Nisbet, et al., 2004: 12). The group of researchers reviewed and 
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examined a number of polls and studies on how stations such as Aljazeera, through their 
adoption of a pan-Arab, pan-political Islam, can influence the way the public at large views 
not only the United States, but the West in general. They note  
‘the evidence from our analysis indicates that TV news viewing has an important 
influence on anti-American attitudes among Muslims, above and beyond any macro-
level or socio-demographic factors. TV news coverage in the Muslim world, as is the 
case in the West, confronts viewers with a torrent of information, and the typical 
Muslim viewer is unlikely to be able to spend a great deal of time weighing, assessing, 
and deliberating the content of the news, arriving at carefully considered judgments 
about the United States and its policy actions. Instead, the extreme anti-American 
predispositions that are endemic to individuals  living in Muslim countries are likely to 
channel any opinion response, with these pre-existing views of the United States 
serving as perceptual screens, enabling individuals to select considerations from TV 
news that only confirm existing anti-American attitudes.’ 
       (Nisbet, et al. 2004: 32)  
The researchers outline the power of media organisations such as Aljazeera in shaping and 
driving anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in the Muslim and Arab world through 
the advancement of pan-Arabism and political Islam ideologies, as potential unifying calls 
across the region. They argue that this pattern of behaviour is politically driven by the 
station’s sponsors. Although, as outlined by Fandy (2007) and others, such a strategy is not 
clearly and publicly stated, the presence of a direct link between Aljazeera Chairman, as head 
of the board of Aljazeera, who retained his post since the inception of the station, a member 
of the Al-Thani ruling family and the Emir himself, is a clear indication, among other things, 
of this strategy (Fandy, 2007; Abu-Rab, 2010; Al-Tamimi, 2012; inter alia).  Hence, Nisbet et 
al. (2004) recommend a new American strategy in dealing with this phenomenon.  
Aljazeera and other emerging pan-Arab television news stations are powerful 
communication channels within the Muslim world. A more cost-effective strategy for 
the American government may be to continue to employ the previously-mentioned 
media agenda-building strategies designed to influence pan-Arab television portrayals 
of the United States and its policies. Increasing the amount of positive coverage of the 
United States reduces the ‘space’ available within Aljazeera broadcasts for critical 
content and, thus, the availability of negative considerations Muslim viewers can use to 
reinforce or bolster pre-existing anti-American attitudes. 
      (Nisbet, et al. 2004: 32-33) 
Ayish (2002) agrees, arguing that Aljazeera’s pan-Arab/pan-political Islam push is driven by 
the station owners. He suggests that examination of the station’s coverage of various issues, 
especially controversial ones such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the War on Terror, and the 
American invasions of Afghanistan (2001) or Iraq (2003), illustrates that “objectivity in the 
sense of balanced reporting of conflicting views seems to be virtually non-existent” (Ayish, 
2002: 150).  Ayish's (2002) content analysis of Aljazeera’s reporting of coverage of various 
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contentious issues found the station’s coverage to be sensational and heavily skewed towards 
pan-Arab and pan-Islamic issues and topics, while at the same time maintaining an anti-
American, anti-Western agenda.  
Historical criticism of the model: 
The arguments advanced in many of the works that regard Aljazeera as an advocate of 
Arabism and political Islam  have been criticised for their lack of understanding of the 
historical and cultural contexts within which Aljazeera was established and operates (Seib, 
2008; Lynch, 2006; Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; inter alia). 
Miles (2005) has argued that Aljazeera went through three main stages. The first started with 
the establishment of the station in 1996 and continued through to 11
th
 September, 2001. 
During this stage he noted that the station aimed to set up its operations and consequently 
introduced both new norms and journalistic practices that were novel in the Arab world. It 
made its airwaves available to all opposition groups in the Arab world and dealt with issues 
that were taboo in the region. During this stage Khanfar (2011) accepts that the station took 
risks and made mistakes but, he argues, its guiding principle of 'the opinion and the other 
opinion' was its safeguard. Miles (2005), Zayani (2005), Lynch (2006), Zayani and Sahraoui 
(2007) and Seib (2008), are among those who agree with Khanfar with regard to the general 
trend during this period, in which Arab news reporting was still in its infancy and Aljazeera 
was seen as a pioneer. Further, they suggest, the political and social climate in which 
Aljazeera came into being was dominated by two key ideologies in the region: Arabism and 
Islamism. 
Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), who spent considerable time analysing the culture of Aljazeera, 
concluded that it has a clear Islamic face, but that this is not a sign that the station adopts 
political Islam or pan-Arab ideology. They argue that this is superficial, because some of the 
prominent figures on its programs, such as the Brotherhood, Islamist leader Cheick Youssef 
Al Qardawi, or senior staff, have such Islamist ideological tendencies, but all this has to be 
viewed in the historic context in which the station came into existence and continued to 
operate (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007). Al-Shahri (2012) adds that claims that Aljazeera is a 
pan-Arab, pro-political Islam channel were at their strongest during its second stage of 
development, especially between the years of 2001-2005. He argues that this period saw the 
peak of the War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) and that 
anyone who dared challenge official American policies during that period was labelled as 
anti-American or anti-Israel, and as advocating Arab nationalism and political Islam.  
Thus Ajami (2001), Khashoggi (2002), Zakaria (2004), Al-Zaidi (2003), Cherribi (2006) and 
Fandy (2007), amongst others, could be seen as prejudicial and biased in their comments and 
remarks about Aljazeera. For instance, criticism of Aljazeera in Ajami (2001), Khashoggi 
(2002), and Zakaria (2004), is based on personal observations, and lacks any empirical 
evidence or data-set based on a clear methodology.  They also fail to account for what Hallin 
and Mancini (2010) regard as the elements that shape any media model; the social, political 
and economic system in which it is set up and operates. On the other hand, critics of authors 
such as Cherribi (2006) and Fandy (2006) accuse them of having an ‘anti-political Islam 
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agenda’ (Khanfar, 2010, 2012; Miladi, 2013; O’Rourke 2012; inter alia). It is also worth 
noting the clear overlap between many of the scholarly works advocating this model and 
other works that regarded Aljazeera either as pro-democracy and freedom, or as an agent of 
Qatar, serving its interests. For instance, Nisbet, et al. (2004), Alhassan (2004), Fandy (2007), 
Anzawa (2011), Al-Sadi (2012), and others, advocate both that Aljazeera is an advocate of 
pan Arabism/political Islam, anti-American and the West, and that at the same time the 
station made considerable strides in pushing media boundaries in an area dominated by press 
censorship and restrictions. In the same vein, Al-Zaidi, (2003); Alhassan (2004); Fandy 
(2007); Al-Sadi (2012); and others, regard the station as serving the interests of Qatar. This 
clear overlap is especially apparent between regarding Aljazeera as a promoter of pan-
Arabism/political Islam and as serving the interests of Qatar. 
Other critics of this model point out one of the main overlaps between these works. They 
argue that the advocates of this model have inherent political and ideological biases which 
not only view Aljazeera through Western eyes, but also with an anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, right-
wing agenda (e.g., Bishara, 2009;  El-Baghdadi, 2007; Atwan, 2008).  The proponents of this 
model dare not see or accept the existence of an Arab media organization that is breaking the 
Western monopoly on media and information flow. This, they suggest, would be too much to 
bear, especially when it touches on sensitive issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or 
presents the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq differently from Western media organizations.  Sakr 
(2001) argues that the problem with many of the arguments advanced by the pan-Arab, pan-
political Islam model amplify the misconceptions about media effects theories, and the idea 
that viewers are vulnerable to propaganda whether or not its content fits with their lifetime’s 
accumulation of experience, knowledge and beliefs. Her argument is supported by Al-
khazendar and Ali (2013); Hijjawi (2011); and Boyd Barret and Xie (2008); amongst others, 
who suggest that the success of Aljazeera has been too much to bear in the West.  
Empirical Criticism: 
The model that regards Aljazeera as an advocate of Arabism and political Islam can also be 
criticised empirically. A number of studies have looked at Aljazeera's coverage of the Iraq 
war of 2003. Awwad (2005) examined three Aljazeera programs (For Women Only,’ ‘Without 
Bound’ and ‘Opposite Direction’), and found no evidence that the station advances a pan-
Arab and pro-political Islam agenda. The study argued, however, that the station offers 
audiences across the Arab world an oppositional discourse that does not lead to challenging 
the hegemony of Western media discourse. This, according to Awwad (2005), challenges 
many of the arguments of the scholarly works which advocate this model. Awwad’s analysis, 
although limited in sample and method, serves as a useful tool in this respect. Similarly, Al-
Jaber (2004) looked at the credibility of Aljazeera among Arab audiences in the US. He found 
that “...respondents who viewed Aljazeera tended to perceive it as a credible source of 
information and balanced news”(Al-Jaber, 2004: 93). Furthermore, Telhami (2004) has 
argued that statistical evidence refutes the idea of Aljazeera as an advocate of Arabism and 
political Islam. He conducted a survey in five Arab countries and found that the deep, 
personal preoccupation for many ordinary Arabs with the treatment of Palestinians had 
nothing to do with Aljazeera. His study showed greater concern for Palestinians among those 
54 
 
who do not watch Aljazeera than among those who do. He concluded that anti-American or 
anti-Israel sentiments did not result from watching Aljazeera. In other words, anti-American, 
anti-Western, pro-Arabism, and pro-political Islam feelings are not the result of Aljazeera's 
coverage of issues. In the same vein, Iskandar (2003) does not see any evidence to support 
the notion of an intentional drive by Aljazeera to advance any particular ideology in the Arab 
world. He notes that:  
Aljazeera doesn’t appear to align itself with any social movement directly. Conversely, 
there are no definitive signs of an ongoing, coherent, and cohesive relationship between 
Aljazeera and any one issue, ideology, or group in the Arab world or 
beyond...Aljazeera, in fact, does not appear to have internalised or adopted the 
ideologies of any specific social movement in its coverage.  
(Iskandar, 2003: 2) 
Furthermore, Soueif (2001) argues that most scholars, observers and other parties (Arab or 
foreign) who advance this view were unsympathetic to the Palestinian Second Intifada of 
2000, zealously supported and advocated the 2003 invasion of Iraq and, more recently, took 
either a sceptical or overtly hostile stance towards the current Arab revolutions and uprisings. 
In contrast, other Arab or foreign scholars and commentators such as Tatham (2006), Al-Jaber 
(2004), Seib (2008), Rinnawi (2006), Miladi (2013) and McPhail (2010), who took the 
opposite stance on the same issues, praised Aljazeera’s professionalism and its use of Western 
journalistic values and practices, which many Western media outlets have abandoned in their 
coverage, especially during times of war and conflict.  
Conceptual criticism: 
Another element that casts doubt on this model is the exclusion of a key element in the 
culture of Arab political communication, namely the calculated ambiguity of Arab political 
discourse, regardless of the political identity of the speaker (Abdul-Raof, 2006). Abdul-Raof 
(2006) argues that pro-establishment figures inject a degree of ambiguity into their discourse 
in order to bridge the gap between an unpopular political establishment and the 
disenfranchised population. He adds that anti-establishment speakers, on the other hand, use 
the same tactic to avoid prosecution, or even persecution, by their tyrannical regimes. Thus, 
in the context of political communication, to read Aljazeera’s discourses literally is, generally 
speaking, to misread them. Therefore, as argued by the advocates of this model, Aljazeera 
promotes anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-establishment and counter-hegemonic sentiments, 
while at the same time providing audiences with alternatives in the form of Arabism and 
political Islam. Azran (2010) argues that:  
the arrival of Aljazeera into the global news scene in the wake of September 11 and its 
ability to challenge Western news domination in terms of values and scope is nothing 
short of revolution in the global information order...the global spread of Aljazeera 
reports has gradually been eroding Western dominance and promoting a counter 
hegemonic news perspective among audiences worldwide on a variety of platforms.  
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(Azran, 2010: 18)  
In the same vein, Iskandar (2003) sees this as speculative, as outlined earlier; simply because 
Aljazeera may show pro-political Islam messages or take a pro-Arabism position, does not 
necessarily mean that it associates itself with any of these ideologies. Thus, Aljazeera is 
regarded as an alternative to the mainstream media in the Arab world or in the West 
(Iskandar, 2003: 3). Iskandar (2003), however, does not think that Aljazeera fits within the 
definition of alternative media, because of its nature. He notes that:  
alternative media are democratic in terms of access and political aims, distancing 
themselves from the 'elitist professional' ideals of the mainstream press. This 
characteristic of alternative media cannot be met by Aljazeera, as the station functions 
much the same way as most mainstream institutions function -- it is a non-collective 
media enterprise...Aljazeera is in fact structurally on-par with its Western mainstream 
counterparts in terms of organization and planning. The station’s operations are no 
more collective than network television stations in the US. In fact, Aljazeera’s reporters 
and editors have years of experience in the industry. They possess extensive training 
from some of the world’s leading news agencies. Therefore, the image of an amateur 
staff operating an alternative medium is not applicable to Aljazeera...Aljazeera is owned 
by an undemocratic, autocratic state.  
(Ibid: 3)  
Iskandar (2003) sees Aljazeera’s counter-hegemonic approach and news agenda as one of the 
key distinctions of its being alternative media. He argues that it falls short and could in no 
way be considered as counter-hegemonic or anti-establishment, as the advocates of this 
model claim. This notion is what defines alternative media and sets them apart from 
mainstream media. He notes that “...alternative media could be defined distinctly as those that 
provide representations of issues and events that are in opposition to the portrayals of the 
same issues and events in the mainstream media” (Ibid: 4). Consequently, Iskandar (2003) 
concludes that “Aljazeera is instead situated in the mainstream media realm... because it does 
not represent a movement of any kind. Furthermore, since the station’s inception in 1996, the 
broadcast of such dissent has been emulated by other satellite broadcasters in the region, 
thereby mainstreaming most of the station’s news discourses” (Ibid: 4). Iskandar (2003) 
regards the argument of those who see Aljazeera as anti-establishment and counter-
hegemonic, through the promotion of pan-Arabism and political Islam ideologies, as 
inaccurate. He argues that the station’s motto, ‘the opinion and other opinion’, balances its 
coverage. He explains that:  
the station’s news coverage of opposition groups and dissident currents regionally and 
international are widespread and reflect a substantial concentration on counter-
hegemonic discourses. However, because of the station’s motto 'the opinion and the 
other opinion,' these discourses are often balanced with establishmentarian narratives 
that affirm and reflect the status quo in each respective case. These attempts to strike 
equilibrium between mainstream and subaltern messages affirm the station’s distance 
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from the ambitions of any particular social or political movement. Like most 
mainstream media, disconfirming any perceived political or social loyalties ensures 
immunity from criticism.  
(Ibid, 4) 
In this we note an overlap between Iskandar (2003), Abdul-Raof (2006) and Azran (2010), 
amongst others, in how the station is actually far from being anti-establishment. 
Furthermore, as outlined by Nafi (2008), Aysani (2007), Rayan (2005), Madini (1996) and 
Dahir (1994), and others, argued that political Islam and Arab nationalism have been bitter 
foes and conflicting concepts in modern Arab and Islamic history. Nafi (2008) argues that the 
nationalist Arab leaders that seized power in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya in 
the 1950s and 1960s turned these states into military dictatorships and lacked political 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, he notes ‘the military background of the ruling forces, their fragile 
base of legitimacy, and the sweeping programmes of modernisation and centralisation they 
pursued, turned the Arab nationalist entity into an authoritarian state. One of the major results 
of this development was the eruption of a series of confrontations between the Arab 
nationalist regimes and the Islamic political forces, in which questions of power, identity and 
legitimacy were, intertwined’ (Nafi, 2008: 2). 
Hence, the criticism of Aljazeera by advocates of this model such as Alhassan (2004), 
Cherribi (2006), Rinnawi (2006), Fandy (2007), Ajami (2001) and Chafets (2002), does not 
hold from a conceptual viewpoint as well.  For instance, Cherribi (2006) argues that he uses 
the keyword ‘veil’ to mean ‘hijab’ in Arabic, (Ibid: 126) which is not an accurate description.  
The ‘veil’ in Arabic means the face cover; however, the ‘hijab’ means the whole garment that 
covers the body from the head to the toes, with the exception of the face and hands. Thus, his 
arguments and conclusion are based on a major conceptual error. Ahmad (2012), Hamzah 
(2012) and Bullock (2002) are among those who have argued that many writers in the West 
confuse the concept of ‘veil’ and ‘hijab’, thinking that they have the same meaning, whereas 
in reality they are totally different in religious as well as cultural significance and meaning. 
The veil, for instance, which can sometimes be referred to as the ‘Burkha’ or ‘niqab’, is 
synonymous with the Salafi school of Islamic thought, whereas ‘hijab’ is the general dress 
accepted by the majority of Islamic schools. Even the author himself admits that, apart from 
Aljazeera’s religious programs (there is only one program, accounting for less than 1 per cent 
of the total output); the station could be regarded as any other Western media. Cherribi (2006) 
notes ‘if it was not for its religious programs, Aljazeera would easily fit in to the North 
Atlantic or liberal model in Britain and would be comparable to CNN or any other U.S 
network, if one were to remove the religious broadcasting on the Arabic channel’(Cherribi, 
2006; 132).  
 It is thus possible to argue that drawing the conclusion from analysis of one, two or three sets 
of programs, as Alhassan, (2004), Cherribi (2006), Fandy (2007), Rinnawi (2006) and others 
did, that Aljazeera is indeed biased towards Arabism and political Islam, is flawed and 
unrepresentative.  
57 
 
Methodological criticism: 
One of the key criticisms of the studies examined in this chapter is the weakness of their 
methodologies, both in terms of choice of method and of sample size. Cherribi (2006) notes 
that:  
‘in this study, I aim to show the variety of ways the veil comes onto the screen on Al-
Jazeera. I draw upon qualitative case studies of the most important examples of the veil, 
as well as my discussions with scholars and observers, and my own interpretation of 
discourse and visuals appearing on Al-Jazeera’. 
(Cherribi, 2006: 125)  
Cherribi (2006) selects his sample from a number of Aljazeera current affairs programs, 
noting that “Between December 2002 and April 2005, the veil was the subject of no less than 
282 current affairs programs and longer news stories on Al-Jazeera. I read the transcripts of 
each of these and identified the most important examples of coverage of the veil in Al-
Jazeera’s current affairs programming” (Ibid: 126). The problem is that Cherribi's selection of 
current affairs programs is too small to draw any significant generalisation. He specifically 
cites the example of ‘For Women Only,’ ‘The Opposite Direction,’ and ‘Shari’aa And Life’, 
which the author describes as biased in their coverage of the ‘veil’ issue. these significant 
programs, however, are regarded by the author as ‘objective’, such as ‘More Than One 
Opinion’, ‘Matters Of The Hour’, ‘Hassad Al Yawum’ and ‘Muntasaf Al Yawum’, which 
makes the selection less impartial (Ibid: 128-129). Along the same lines, Fandy's (2007) 
conclusions lack the support of a clear methodological framework. His argument is not based 
on any clear quantitative or qualitative method to justify the results, conclusions and 
implications of his overall study.  
With regard to his conclusion that Aljazeera is a tool for Qatari foreign policy in its 
competition with Saudi Arabia, he did not provide any qualitative, quantitative and/or 
comprehensive evidence to support this idea; rather he relied on his personal observations, 
notes, and a collection of widely-available sources.  Furthermore, he seems to suggest that 
Aljazeera promotes pan-Arabism and/or pan-political Islam in some of its programs. This 
might imply that the station’s news output, which is over 60% of its overall output, could be 
regarded as adhering to the values of objectivity, impartiality and balance. In the same line, 
Ayish (2002), Alhassan (2004), Rinnawi (2006), Fandy (2007), and others, claim to have 
provided evidence-based analyses of Aljazeera as a pro-Arabism/pro-political Islam channel.  
Ayish's (2010) work seems to be much more reliable as a source, though the sample could 
have been made much more representative of Aljazeera’s coverage by extending the time and 
nature of the study in order to cover longer broadcasting periods, as well as extending the 
range of programs. Thus the claim that Aljazeera advances two seemingly contradictory 
ideologies, as argued by the proponents of this model, is not supported by the historic 
evidence or by the clear disparity between and conflicting nature of these two concepts, and 
their respective development. A much broader context, taking into account internal Qatari 
factors, regional geopolitical variables, and global context, would have produced much better 
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arguments and resulted in stronger, evidence-based conclusions. Overall, most of the studies 
listed lacked solid empirical evidence to substantiate their claims that Aljazeera is pan-
Arab/pan-political Islam, and whatever evidence they have put forward (Alhassan, 2004; Al-
Jaber, 2004; Rinnawi, 2006; Cherribi, 2006; Fandy, 2007, Al-Sadi, 2012; inter alia) is limited, 
and could not be the basis for generalizable claims. They do, however, provide a useful guide, 
and point toward future studies on the subject. 
In chapter five I shall examine the second model applied to Aljazeera, considering it as an 
advocate of democracy, cultural dialogue and understanding. I shall also examine the station’s 
journalistic practices and its claim that it stands for objectivity, impartiality, and freedom of 
the press. 
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Chapter 5 
Aljazeera: an advocate of democracy, cultural dialogue and understanding 
In this chapter, I shall examine the various claims that Aljazeera has contributed to the 
advancement of democracy, freedom, cultural dialogue and greater understanding, both in the 
Arab world and beyond. I will also look at the station’s claim of objectivity, impartiality, and 
advancing a free press agenda in the Arab world. 
Aljazeera and the creation of free democratic space: 
The second model claims that Aljazeera created a revolution in terms of freedom of 
expression and people’s rights and aspirations. Lynch (2006) argues that Aljazeera “...ushered 
in a new kind of open, contentious public politics in which a number of competing voices 
competed for attention” (Lynch, 2006: 2). Lynch (2006) examined Aljazeera’s practices and 
ethos, and the political, social and economic context in which it came into existence, and  
concluded that a station such as Aljazeera might have helped create what he calls “a new kind 
of Arab public” and a “new kind of Arab politics” (Lynch 2006: 2-3).  
Qusaibaty (2006) follows the same line as Lynch’s analysis, and argues that Aljazeera’s 
editorial policy has aided in the creation of a new public space for dialogue, and of an 
alternative to other media organizations such as the BBC, CNN, and other Arab government-
owned or semi-controlled channels in the region. She suggests, however, that the channel’s 
“...policy of expressing various opposing views poses a fundamental challenge as it does not 
maintain a permanent frame, although it represents and gives more weight to Arab opinion” 
(Qusaibaty, 2006: 13). Lamloum (2004) agrees with Lynch (2006) and Qusaibaty (2006), and 
suggests that the station creates a space which allows for the growth of an alternative political 
culture in the Arab world. It, the network, shows the diversity of the Arab world in political, 
social and economic terms (Lamloum, 2004).  
In this the arguments of Lynch (2006), Qusaibaty (2006), and Lamloum (2004) have much in 
common with those of Miles (2005), El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), and Iskandar (2006), 
who considered Aljazeera's role as advancing a democratic and free-press agenda that is an 
alternative to existing media outlets, both inside and outside of the Arab world. There are 
clear differences, however, in terms of depth of analysis and methodological rigour, as well as 
reliance on empirical evidence. Qusaibaty's (2006) study seems to be grounded in a limited 
reliance on content analysis as a primary method of analysis, whereas Lynch (2006) relied on 
historical data as well as interviews as the basis for his conclusions. Loory (2006) goes 
further, arguing that democracy can be strengthened and the free flow of information 
encouraged, not only by fighting those who want to stifle a free press in their own countries, 
but also by guaranteeing access to news channels by organizations such as Aljazeera, and 
others.  
Soueif (2001) argues that within the Arab world, “Aljazeera has rendered censorship of news 
and opinion pointless. For us outside, it provides the one window through which we can 
breathe. It also provides reassurance against the negative or partial image of ourselves 
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constantly beamed at us every day from the media of whatever country we happen to find 
ourselves in”  (Soueif, 2001: 5). 
 Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), argue that it would be difficult to quantify with any certainty 
the changes brought about in the Middle East media scene by Aljazeera, but that such 
changes are real, and clear for all to see. Alhassan (2004) argues that Aljazeera challenged 
assumptions and encouraged free debate about all matters that relate to the future of Arabs. 
He notes that “Aljazeera played a pivotal role in unprecedented shaking of the region” 
(Alhassan, 2004: 114). What is more important, according to Walton (2003), is that Aljazeera 
has been able to break the Western monopoly on the interpretation of events and issues and, 
for the first time, has given viewers across the Arab world an Arabic version of events that is 
nearer to their concerns and, most importantly of all, to their culture. He notes that:  
the West has dominated information transfer and delivery for over 150 years. But, for 
the first time, we have a view that is different from ours, and this view is a strong one. 
Aljazeera is truly the first channel that transmits information from the south to the 
north, and thus changed a flow that should have changed a long time ago. Through 
Aljazeera, the East transmits to the West. In the past Arabs needed to go to BBC or 
CNN or FOX to get their news, from now on they have similar output in their own 
mother tongue, and in a way that is in line with their Arab and Islamic heritage. 
(cf. Alhassan, 2004: 119)   
The station’s effect on Arab broadcasting was to stimulate governments in the region and 
beyond it to set up alternative channels to compete directly with it. Saudi-backed media 
group MBC set up Al-Arabiya, the United States government established Al-Hurra ('the 
free'), Russia launched its own Arabic news service (Russia Today), and the BBC set up a 
rival Arabic service channel (Zayani, 2005: 1-6).  
I should note here that many of the advocates of this model have touched on common issues, 
i.e., the idea of Aljazeera as a force for change and for the creation of a space for ideas to 
develop, with the ultimate aim of creating a much more free and democratic society (El-
Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; Iskandar, 2003; Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006; inter 
alia). Zayani (2005) argues that Aljazeera fills a political void in the region and precipitates 
change. Through its various programs and special coverage of various events, it provides a 
pan-Arab opposition and a forum of resistance against the forces of tyranny, human rights 
violations, oppression etc. He raises a note of caution, however, regarding the station’s claim 
to be neutral, objective and balanced, and its campaigning stance in many issues especially in 
its programs. A clear contradiction may seem apparent here, however, Khanfar (2011) does 
not see any conflict between objectivity and presenting news from an Arab and Islamic 
perspective. He notes that “Aljazeera is an Arab television station that defends press freedom 
and aims to spread the values of democracy, and human rights” (Khanfar, 2011: 5). 
In the same vein, Miladi (2013), Lynch (2006), El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) and El-
Nawawy (2010), are amongst those who argue that the margin of freedom enjoyed by 
Aljazeera and others like it would serve to hasten democratic change in the region.  Sakr 
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(2001), Cervi (2005), Miladi (2006) and Al-Zaidi (2003), amongst others, describe this 
phenomenon as satellite democracy.  
Hafez (2004) goes further. He argues that the station has become a kind of de facto political 
party in light of the absence of a well-established democratic political system. He writes that 
“Aljazeera has been considered as one of the most important ‘Arab political parties’” (Hafez, 
2004: 12-14). Since most Arab countries have not yet established functioning democracies, 
relevant institutions such as political parties and a parliamentary opposition are still 
rudimentary. To many observers, Arab satellite television seems to have the potential to take 
over part of their designated role. As a mouthpiece of Arab peoples and 'the common man', 
Arab satellite broadcasting seems able to mediate between the state and society. Abdelmoula 
(2012) examined how Aljazeera contributed dramatically to changing the democratic 
landscape in the Arab world. He notes that “the first noticeable success Aljazeera has 
achieved in this regard, since its early days, was that Arab governments lost the power to 
impose on their subjects a particular reading on events or explanations concerning internal 
matters and foreign policies” (cf, Abdelmoula, 2012: 147). He goes on to suggest that 
Aljazeera’s effect went beyond this and resulted in deep political and economic changes, that 
led to the changes that are under-way in the Arab world and even beyond (Ibid: 264). This is 
what Pintak (2011) called “the revolution of Aljazeera”, whose sweeping changes led to the 
Arab Spring, and are spreading across the Middle East, with wider regional, as well as global, 
implications (Pintak, 2011).  
Aljazeera: a Credible and Objective Source of Information: 
Alterman (2000) and El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) state that Aljazeera’s code of ethics 
(adopted in 2006 after much criticism of the station) is strong evidence that the station aims 
to play a positive role in moderating the Arab street. Similarly, Atwan (2011: 1) suggests that 
Aljazeera went too far in its attempt to spread values that are described as moderate, while 
professing to exercise and practice the values of objectivity and impartiality in reporting 
events in the Arab world. He criticized the station, for example, for giving a platform to 
Israeli officials during what he regards as a clear-cut case of Israeli aggression against 
Palestinian rights, during the Gaza war of 2009. Lynch (2006) adds that the station has also 
played a an important role in Arab self-criticism, and has managed to highlight issues that 
have caused the Arab population to ask serious questions about what it means to be an Arab 
or a Muslim, and whether someone can be a Muslim and still accommodate the values of 
democracy, freedom, tolerance and plurality. Programs such as ‘More Than One Opinion’, 
‘The Opposite Direction’, ‘century witness’ and others have delved into issues that Aljazeera 
itself did not dare touch when it was first established but which have now become common 
themes. Lynch (2006) argues that the station provided the platform for open and frank debate, 
which may eventually lead to change.  In the same vein, Fagih (2002), Al-Jaber (2004), Atiya 
(2005) and El-Baghdadi (2007), are amongst those who argue that one of the main strengths 
of Aljazeera is that it is popular among Arab audiences, not only because it touches on 
sensitive issues and provides public space for debate and criticism, but also most importantly 
because it is a free, credible, and trusted source. They also suggest that many Arabs have seen 
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in Aljazeera something which they have missed in traditional Arab media, or in Western news 
organizations.  
In their study of the coverage of the Iraq war of 2003 by the main American networks, Aday 
et al. (2005) found that the overwhelming majority of stories aired during the war, both on 
American networks and on Aljazeera -with the exception of Fox News- were neutral at the 
story level, but that the general picture of the war presented by the news focused primarily on 
its whizz-bang aspects, at the expense of other important story-lines. Put another way, the 
press may not have covered the entire story; though in general what they covered they 
covered well. Furthermore, at both the macro and story levels, important differences between 
the networks based on cultural origin and broadcast format became apparent (Aday et al., 
2005: 15). 
Aday et al. (2005) compared US networks ABC, NBC, and CBS, with Aljazeera’s coverage 
of the Iraq war between the period of 20 March and 20 April 2003, and explored “whether the 
tone, balance and agenda were different” (Aday et al. 2005: 15-16). In other words, the 
study’s aim was to examine whether these television stations stuck to their declared principles 
of objectivity, neutrality, and balance.  Aljazeera's motto states that the station must be an 
impartial, balanced and objective news source, informing and educating audiences, while at 
the same time sympathising with people’s aspirations for freedom, democracy, and human 
rights. Many researchers argue that this is contradictory, as it would be impossible to be 
objective, impartial, balanced, and neutral, and yet adopt a campaigning tone in the coverage 
of various news stories, or set up a centre for human rights, as is the case with Aljazeera 
(Seib, 2008; Lynch, 2006; Al-Bashri, 2007; Fandy, 2007; Ammar, 2010; inter alia). To come 
back to Aday et al. (2005), in their analysis of the tone of the coverage, the study found 
Aljazeera’s tone which scored (89.2%) was almost as neutral as other American networks, in 
comparison with 95.6% for ABC, 95.4% for CBS, 94.4% for NBC, and 91.6% for CNN. The 
lowest neutrality rate, however, was registered with Fox News (62.1%). The results also show 
that the Fox News coverage was the most supportive of the US military campaign in Iraq, 
while Aljazeera and ABC were the least supportive of this campaign.  
The study also found that Aljazeera devoted more coverage to diplomatic initiatives related to 
the US campaign in Iraq (12.8%), in comparison with 6.2% for Fox News, 5.1% for NBC, 
2.3% for CBS, and 1.8% for ABC.  Aljazeera also provided the most coverage of protests 
against the US campaign (6.4%), in comparison with 3% for NBC, 2.6% for ABC, 1.6% for 
CBS, and 1.2% for CNN, while Fox News provided no coverage of the protests at all.  
Kolmer and Semetko (2009) examined television coverage of the Iraq war crises between the 
period of 20 March and 16 April in the UK, US, the Czech Republic, Germany, South Africa 
and on Qatar’s Aljazeera. They found that although all networks focused on the military 
operations in the first two weeks of the conflict, media organisations like Aljazeera focused 
on the broader aspects of the war, such as the civilian cost, more than other networks in the 
UK, US, and other countries covered in the study (cf. Cushion, 2012: 138). They also found 
that media in countries such as Germany, the Czech Republic and South Africa, as well as 
Aljazeera in Qatar, included other voices on the conflict, apart from the coalition, such as the 
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UN or national governments not taking part. The researchers remarked that the US media are 
more likely to present a positive image of the coalition in comparison to media in other 
countries. Other findings of the study showed that US media (27.3%), and Aljazeera (29%), 
were the least likely to present the Iraqi side of the conflict, in comparison to Czech media 
(38.1%), UK media (35.4%), South African media (32.8%), and German media (29.3%). This 
is important because Aljazeera has been accused by the U.S. administration of being a 
propaganda tool for the Iraqi government, while at the same time advocating a biased, anti- 
American position (Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Snow, 2007; Seib, 2008, 2012; Azran, 2010; 
inter alia). The study also found that Aljazeera was more likely to present the coalition's 
position on the conflict (59.6%), than the UK media (56.4%), German media (50.6%), Czech 
Republic media (44.6%) or South African media (40.8%).   
The study also revealed that Aljazeera's coverage of the war could not be clearly defined as 
positive or negative. In the case of presenting the coalition view, it was judged to be 81.6%, 
in comparison with 83.2% for UK media, 82.2% for Czech media, 68.3% for South African 
media, and 60.5% for U.S. media. In the case of presenting the Iraqi side of the conflict there 
was no clear difference as Aljazeera scored 86.4%, in comparison with 76.8% for UK media, 
71.9% for German media, 71% for Czech media, 60.5% for South African media, and 35.5% 
for U.S. media. With regard to Aljazeera’s coverage of the coalition in the Iraq war, the study 
found it to be with no clear difference from UK media (83.2%), Czech TV (82.4%) to 
Aljazeera’s (81.6%), with the highest negative level of coverage on South African TV 
(26.9%). They also found that Aljazeera provided the lowest rate of positive coverage of the 
allies. 
 The study shows that U.S. media are more likely to present a more positive view of the 
coalition than other media. Media in the UK and Germany, however, as well as Aljazeera, 
would seem to be presenting relatively neutral coverage of the war, in order to present a 
balanced view from both sides of the conflict. The study’s overall conclusion, however, is 
that the reporting of the war was conditioned by the national political context (cf. Cushion, 
2012: 139). 
Cushion (2012) examined how various media outlets across the world provided a Middle 
Eastern perspective to events while the U.S. was engaged in the Afghanistan war (2001-
2012). He found that while Japanese broadcaster NHK, “did not feature any Arab voice, but 
its US focus was not viewed as pro-American or pro-war…Aljazeera, however, was the most 
explicit critic and framed coverage from a Middle Eastern perspective” (Cushion, 2012: 132).  
Ayish (2010) examined Aljazeera’s coverage of the Gaza war of late December 2008, 
between Israel and Hamas in the besieged Palestinian territory of Gaza. The study aimed “to 
show how a leading 24 hours television network, driven by Western style journalism 
conventions framed the disproportionate bloody conflict already billed by the UN appointed 
fact finding team as amounting to a war crime and a crime against humanity” (Ayish, 2010: 
222).  The study found that a third of Aljazeera's coverage of the war framed ‘popular 
reactions to the crises (33%), while official reactions accounted for roughly half that amount 
(17%). It also found that just over a quarter of the coverage (28%) was dedicated to 
64 
 
humanitarian issues. Throughout Aljazeera’s coverage of the crisis, Palestinian civilians 
“received the highest level of occurrences both as primary and secondary actors in news 
reporters” (Ayish, 2010: 226). On the other hand, the Israeli government received the second 
highest rate of occurrences as a primary actor (12%), followed by non-Arab-state actors, such 
as NGOs and others (11%), then non-state international actors (8%), followed by the Islamic 
movement Hamas (7%) and the Palestinian authority (5%) (Ibid: 227).  The study concluded 
that Aljazeera’s coverage of the Gaza conflict “not only featured Palestinians more frequently 
than Israelis, but that also presented the former in more favourable contexts” (Ibid: 230). 
Ayish (2010) argues that given the nature of the Gaza conflict, the fact that it was between 
unequal parties, and that the higher number of civilian causalities was among the Palestinian 
population. He notes “it was natural to show large number of dead civilians, including 
children, and massive devastation of residential areas, simply because that was the reality 
Aljazeera was expected to cover” (Ibid: 230). Aljazeera's coverage of conflicts in this manner 
is what El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), Seib (2008), and Azran (2010), amongst others, 
regard as contextual objectivity, which takes cultural and regional context and characteristics 
into consideration.   
Ayish (2010) comments “Aljazeera’s focus on the humanitarian aspects of the Gaza crises 
seemed also to demonstrate the asymmetrical nature of the conflict in which innocent 
civilians were prime casualties” (Ibid: 232). Ayish's (2010) conclusions about Aljazeera's 
coverage of conflicts and wars are supported by a number of studies, especially regarding the 
human focus. El-Ibiyary (2006) examined the visual representation of war and how it shapes 
public opinion in a study comparing Aljazeera’s and CNN’s coverage of the Iraq war in 2003. 
The study found that the coalition's media message was challenged by Aljazeera's coverage, 
which was controversial in nature and provided a different perspective from that provided by 
CNN. The study also suggests that the style and nature of Aljazeera’s coverage challenges 
Western interpretations of concepts such as objectivity, balance, and impartiality (El-Ibiyary, 
2006). Al-khazendar and Ali (2013) attempted to examine Aljazeera’s professional practice, 
and whether the station is objective and professional. They surveyed 611 students and found 
that the majority of them (63.5%) regarded the station as highly objective, while (77.9%) 
credited the station as highly professional.  
The common theme of the above studies is that Aljazeera tends to present the human aspect 
of stories, especially during times of conflict. The studies also overlap in terms of Aljazeera's 
interpretation of objectivity, which tends to be slightly different from that adopted by Western 
media. They differ, however, regarding the level of difference between Aljazeera’s outlook on 
events in comparison with other media organisations, in the West. 
Abul-Makarem (2014), however, disagrees. He argues that Aljazeera's perceived objectivity, 
impartiality and balance changed dramatically after the removal of former Egyptian President 
Mohammed Morsi from power, on the 30th of June 2013. He notes that: 
Aljazeera’s credibility has declined since 2011 because of its paradoxical coverage and 
interpretations of the transformation in the political situation in Egypt and 
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Syria…Aljazeera’s ostensible political agenda raises scepticism about its hidden 
identity and provokes an inquiry into its political mask. 
(Abul-Makarem, 2014: 1)   
He examined Aljazeera's coverage of the political situation from July to November 2013, and 
found that “Aljazeera is a mouth-piece of the Muslim brotherhood…the station does not 
represent the views of all Arabs…with the presentation of political Islam as the dominant 
ideology with superficial tokenism when it come to objectivity, impartiality and balance” 
(Ibid: 3-4).  On the other hand, Al-Jaber (2004) examines the credibility of Aljazeera in the 
context of media broadcasting in the Arab world, and as a unique news broadcaster that 
adopted Western news values and journalistic values, while at the same time adapting to the 
special character of Arab and Muslim society and culture. He set out to examine whether 
Aljazeera adopted the norms of objectivity, impartiality, balance and neutrality in its coverage 
of various news stories in the Arab world and beyond in the same way as Western 
broadcasters do. He also set out to examine whether Aljazeera was regarded as a source of 
news information among audiences. He found that Aljazeera was the most credible news 
source among audiences in the Arab world, while at the same time adopting Western news 
values and journalistic practices, in line with Arab and Muslim society and culture.  
His analysis of the station’s performance focused on a survey of around 500 members of the 
Arab Diaspora in the U.S. He found that Aljazeera is the most credible source of news among 
audiences, and that people trust its reporting because it’s neutral, informative, authoritative 
and trustworthy. He notes that “the respondents believe that Aljazeera employees who present 
the news are trustworthy, Aljazeera presents all sides of issues, and Aljazeera gets its facts 
right…these findings indicate that the respondents who viewed Aljazeera tended to perceive 
it as a credible source of information and balanced news” (Al-Jaber, 2004: 90-92).  
Historic criticism of the Second Model 
 
What is noticeable about the above works is the level of overlap regarding Aljazeera’s 
ushering in of a new era in the Arab world and beyond, and that it provides a serious attempt 
at reporting on the Arab world and, later, on the world from an Arab perspective, hence 
providing an alternative (Cushion, 2012; Ayish, 2010; El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2003; Seib 
2008; Lawati 2008; Azran 2010; inter alia). There are, however, clear distinctions between 
these different works in terms of taking account of the historic context in which Aljazeera 
came into existence, as well as in terms of conceptual grounding, empirical evidence and 
methodological rigour. I will examine these in the next sections. 
This model has fallen into the same trap as the model which claimed that Aljazeera is an 
advocate of Arabism and political Islam. It assumes that Aljazeera has an unlimited effect on 
audiences and that audiences are sitting in their living rooms, passively absorbing and acting 
upon the station's messages. The model’s advocates also treated all the different Aljazeera 
programs as though they were in the same category, whereas evidence suggests that there are 
clear differences, especially when it comes to historical perspectives and the evolutionary 
pattern that the station’s programs have followed since its inception. We have seen programs 
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appear, make a strong showing within certain historic, social and political circumstances, 
only to be replaced later by other programs and formats that best fit the new period. For 
instance, one of the most influential programs since the station’s inception, ‘More Than One 
Opinion’, disappeared because the historical conditions that led to the creation of this 
program changed in early 2010. Another program that followed suit is ‘Top Secret’, since the 
proliferation of internet and social-networking sites in the Arab world meant that what was 
top secret when the program started in 1996 was no longer so in 2004. Qassim (2012), while 
accepting that Aljazeera has been an important phenomenon in the Arab and world media 
scenes, doubts whether it had the effect on audiences that many of this model's supporters 
claim. He argues that the station does not have the power to impact the audience’s views or 
beliefs. In this, Qassim (2012) has much in common with the likes of Sakr (2001), Zayani 
(2005), Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), Khanfar (2011), Hijjawi (2011), and others, who 
although accepting that Aljazeera had an effect on the political and social scene in the region, 
concede it only a limited role, and one which has to be considered within a much wider 
historic context.  
Hijjawi (2011) also argues that the claims that Aljazeera changed the Arab media scene 
dramatically, influenced the outcome of the Arab Spring, toppled some regimes and installed 
others are exaggerated. The station, he suggests, does not create awareness or solid political 
culture. Instead, it allows viewers to believe in their own thoughts and their own ability to 
carry out change. For Tunisians, Aljazeera’s coverage of the revolution was like a mirror in 
which they saw themselves reflected, and this helped them believe in their revolution, and 
carry it through to its successful end. As for the Egyptian revolution, Hijjawi (2011) argues 
that the station had a minimal effect in mobilizing the Egyptian street. 
Al-Zubaidi (2004) goes further when she argues that Aljazeera’s claim of campaigning for 
democratic change and values does not go beyond tokenism. In her study of Aljazeera’s 
output she has much in common with Fandy (2007), Cherribi (2006), Al-Sadi (2012), and 
others who argue that Aljazeera does not advance a pro-democracy or pro-freedom agenda, 
and that it does not apply the values of journalistic professionalism, objectivity, balance and 
neutrality in the same way as more established Western media organisations such as the BBC 
or CNN.  
Another factor that weakens this model, as outlined by Al-Sadi (2012), is the tendency to 
dismiss the norms, beliefs, and objectives that govern the Arab audience’s interactions with 
any particular mass medium, and the historic, political and social factors that influence them. 
He argues that:  
…historically the popularity of a given mass medium in the Arab world (e.g. the BBC, 
or the Voice of Arabs radio) says more about the needs and expectations of the Arab 
audiences than it does about the medium itself. In other words, the relationship between 
the popularity of a mass medium like Aljazeera and its possible impacts on the Arab 
audience is more complex than presumed by the proponents of this model.  
(Al-Sadi, 2012: 2-4)  
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It is thus clear that other factors such as historical context, cultural, social, economic and 
personal elements have to be taken into account if we are to have a complete and 
comprehensive understanding of this relationship. This is what Lewis (1991) has described as 
the process of meaning construction that occurs between the viewer and television (i.e., 
Aljazeera) with the multiple factors that come into play (Lewis, 1991; Hafez, 2004; Zingerali, 
2010; inter alia).  
El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), Al-Jaber (2004), Lynch (2006), and Seib (2008) are 
amongst those who have argued that Aljazeera started broadcasting in an environment in 
which the majority of television stations was either directly or indirectly controlled by Arab 
governments. Dissenting voices were unheard of. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) described 
Arab television in the year when Aljazeera came into existence, saying that “...they broadcast 
mostly propaganda...the news programs in many of these networks broadcast protocol news, 
that is, items in government news bulletins about official’s activities, visits and 
announcements’ (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003: 39). The coming of Aljazeera, however, 
changed all of that. El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) note that:  
...today, there is one exception to the rule of Arab state ownership of satellite news 
networks, and it is Aljazeera...only Aljazeera has dared to challenge Arabic traditions 
and political  restraints by airing programs open to all opinions...Aljazeera staff 
prioritize stories according to their newsworthiness, not their acceptability to local 
politics.  
(Ibid: 42)  
Ayish (2010) touched indirectly on the importance of historical and cultural contexts when 
studying media organisations such as Aljazeera, though I would argue that he could have 
given it more prominence in his study, especially in his concluding remarks about Aljazeera’s 
humanizing of the bloody conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic organisation 
Hamas. He could have addressed the difficulty organisations such as Aljazeera face when 
covering such issues as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a highly emotive issue, and the almost 
impossible task of being objective, neutral and balanced within the Western definition of 
these concepts.  Ayish (2010) notes that:  
Aljazeera journalists were firm in advocating their coverage as mirroring rather than 
constructing miserable and unbalanced realities on the ground. Hence, it was natural to 
show large number of dead civilians, including children…because that was the reality 
Aljazeera was expected to cover.  
(Ayish, 2010: 230)  
He failed to relate this to the station’s motto and code of ethics, which describes Aljazeera as 
a pan-Arab television news network that covers events, news and developments from an Arab 
perspective, while standing for and promoting people’s aspirations for freedom, democracy 
and human rights (Cherkaoui, 2010; Seib, 2008; Miles, 2005; inter alia). Cherkaoui (2010) 
argues that one cannot examine media organisations in the Arab world without taking into 
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consideration the historical, social, and cultural contexts within which such media outlets 
came to exist and operate. He also explains that these historical, cultural, and social 
influences are part and parcel of Arab media operations and activity. These historical contexts 
include influences and ideologies such as pan-Arabism and political Islam, as well as regional 
and global geopolitical factors (Cherkaoui, 2010). He argues that pan-Arabism and pan-
political Islam constructed an image of the West in the Arab and Muslim mind that presents 
them as ‘invaders’ or the ‘others’, and that media organisations such as Aljazeera tended to 
reflect this mood among the Arab masses (Ibid: 206). He thus notes with regard to Aljazeera’s 
coverage of the Iraq war, in comparison to that of the American network CNN, that:  
Aljazeera focused on the horrors expected from the bombing campaign. This 
contributed to the general sense of refusal against a war the Qatari-based channel 
considered illegal from day one. The illegality of the war was an important meta-frame 
for Aljazeera’s entire coverage. In this context, the notion of resistance was articulated 
by the behaviour and rhetoric of Aljazeera’s journalists.  
(Ibid: 206)  
These journalistic practices are embedded in the context of pan-Arabism and pan-political 
Islam, as he further states, in that “...it is clear that Aljazeera anchors could not bear to watch 
Baghdad being bombed so intensively. They and their reporters were imbued with deep pan-
Arabism sensibilities, which tended to equate the bombing and invasion of Baghdad with the 
desecration of sacral body” (Ibid: 206). 
Empirical criticism: 
Critics of this model (such as Bashri, 2008; Fandy, 2007; Kenane, 2006; Qusaibaty, 2006; 
Alhassan, 2004; inter alia) have cited a number of empirical studies to support their 
arguments. Fandy (2007) argues that Aljazeera has had a limited impact on agenda-setting or 
forcing change in the Arab world.  Al-Sadi (2012) conducted a contextual analysis of three 
Aljazeera programs, ('More Than One Opinion,' 'The Opposite Direction' and 'Without 
Bounds') and found that “...the channel’s anti-establishment discourse is far from being a 
manifestation of a substantive, liberational, anti-establishment political rhetoric that 
undercuts the policies and political perspective of the Qatari state” (Al-Sadi, 2012: 3).  
Bashri (2008) conducted a content analysis of two Aljazeera programs, 'The Opposite 
Direction' and 'More Than One Opinion', during the years 2004 and 2005. She also conducted 
a survey in a number of Arab countries, about Aljazeera’s ability to set the news agenda. She 
concluded that Aljazeera has had a limited impact on audiences across the region, in terms of 
agenda-setting. The station, according to Bashri (2008), has certain influences on the public 
of the region, as it does stress certain topics more than others, but it does not influence how 
people think or feel about these themes. She notes that “...public opinion in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds is far more complex than its counterpart in other parts of the world” (Bashri, 
2008: 29).  Similarly, Al-Tijani (2011) looked at the role played by Aljazeera in forming 
public opinion about the issue of Darfur. The study used a survey as well as in-depth 
interviews in order to examine the extent to which Aljazeera’s news coverage informs and 
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shapes public opinion in Sudan. He concluded that the station did not cover the event as it 
should have, in terms of duration and scope. He also noted that the station’s coverage lacked 
impartiality and objectivity in presenting various sides of the story. 
Furthermore, Qusaibaty (2006) suggests that Aljazeera's earlier, well-intentioned reporting 
and ground-breaking style has been damaged as a result of its coverage of various 
controversial issues. She notes that “Aljazeera’s motto has brought both success and failure to 
the channel as it stresses integration and differentiation on an equal plane.  Rather than 
observe coherence, the viewer watches cacophony, an orchestra” (Qusaibaty, 2006: 45). In 
her study of a number of the station’s programs, Qusaibaty remarked about Aljazeera’s 
program, 'For Women Only', that “Aljazeera programs revealed a tendency to present 
programs in a dichotomous manner, often caught between an imagined West and Arab world” 
(Qusaibaty, 2006; 45).  This tendency, according to Qusaibaty, means that the “...overall 
discourse therefore presents strong tendencies towards particular biases” (Ibid: 46). She went 
on to conclude that “...the channel presents the current status, enforces it, and criticises it. 
While providing an illusion of democracy on the airwaves, Aljazeera does not, however, 
provide for significant actual change” (Ibid: 46).  
Fandy (2007) regards Aljazeera as a biased organization that claims to be objective and 
balanced. He notes that “...any content analysis of Aljazeera will reveal that it is a channel 
that represents the viewpoint of the new alliance in the Middle East, namely the Ba’thistis or 
Arab nationalists and the Islamists” (Fandy, 2007: 130). Fandy cites the example of the 
prominent Islamic figures that have two regular shows on Aljazeera. The first, Youssef Al 
Qardawi, is one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and has a weekly show 
called 'Islamic Law and Life.’ The second person is Ahmad Mansour, who has two shows, 
‘Without Bounds' and 'Century Witnesses’ (Ibid: 130). In the same vein, Aday et al. (2005), 
finding that Aljazeera was as likely as American CNN to provide neutral coverage of the Iraq 
war, has been criticised as not reflecting the reality of the station's coverage. These results are 
in line with a number of other studies, though Cherkaoui (2010),  Awwad (2005), Atiya 
(2005), El-Ibiyary (2006), and others, argue that Aljazeera’s coverage of issues such as the 
Iraq war of 2003 and the Palestinian issue is skewed more towards the views held among the 
Arab masses, and these have tended to be anti-American or anti-Western 
Kolmer and Semetko’s (2009) study of Aljazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war, in comparison 
with coverage by other media networks in the US and other parts of the world, has been 
criticised for its findings, which showed that US media (27.3%) and Aljazeera (29%) were 
least likely to present the Iraqi side of the conflict, in comparison to Czech media (38.1%), 
UK media (35.4%), South African media (32.8%) and German media (29.3%). This finding 
goes against many other studies which showed that Aljazeera’s coverage was perceived to be 
either neutral (Seib, 2008; Lynch, 2006; Zayani, 2005; Aday et al. 2005; Al-Jaber, 2004; inter 
alia), or slightly biased towards the Iraqi position, as a manifestation of pan-Arab ideology 
and aspiration (Ayish, 2005; Cherkaoui, 2010; Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007; inter alia). That 
the study also focused on Aljazeera as compared to other media in the US, Britain, Germany, 
the Czech Republic, and South Africa assumes that Aljazeera represents the entire Arab and 
Muslim media landscape, which is far from accurate. It would have been more representative 
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had it included media from a different Arab country, such as Egypt or the Maghreb region, 
and another from a non-Arab Muslim state such as Malaysia or Pakistan. 
In the same line, Schenk and Ahmed (2011) compared the Aljazeera and CNN International 
framing of the Iranian election 2009, and found that Aljazeera stuck to its guiding 
professional principles of focusing on the aspiration of the general population while at the 
same time striving to provide balanced coverage of both sides of the story. They note: 
‘Al Jazeera thus fulfilled its own mission as a news broadcaster including criticism of 
existing governments in the Middle East region - in this specific case of the Iranian 
regime’(Schenk and Ahmed, 2011; 18). They also found strong evidence to support the 
assumption of Aljazeera being a serious counter flow. In this they also note ‘our analysis 
revealed a stronger engagement on the part of AlJazeera with the Iranian people, whereas 
CNNI’s framing of the election aftermath took more of a Western view and focused more on 
election fraud, disregard of human rights, and those in the West affected by the outcome. This 
underlines the specific role of AlJazeera compared to other international news channels – 
covering the same issues but in a different framing’. (Ibid, 19). 
 
Conceptual criticism: 
Alhassan (2004) has argued that Aljazeera’s marketing of itself as an agent of democratic 
change, freedom, the rule of law and human rights cannot be reconciled with its claim of 
journalistic objectivity, impartiality and neutrality. He argues that these terms are also subject 
to interpretation, especially when it comes to applying them to an Arab media environment 
dominated, directly or indirectly, by undemocratic governments.  Alhassan's (2004) 
examination of Aljazeera's coverage of African issues finds that the station provides a blurred 
image of the African continent, with its focus concentrated on the Arabic-speaking nations, 
and misrepresenting other parts of the continent. He also argues that the station's application 
of its motto ‘the opinion and other opinion’ has not been evenly applied, especially with 
regard to the conflict in South Sudan, the dispute in Chad, or other areas of political strife in 
Africa. It would be unfair, however, to expect Aljazeera Arabic, whose audience base is 
mainly in the Arabic-speaking North African countries of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan, to focus on countries that neither receive the station, nor 
understand the language in which it broadcasts. The definition of concepts such as objectivity, 
balance and neutrality used by Aljazeera is clearly influenced by cultural, social, and most 
importantly, historical factors.   
Alhassan (2004) also remarks that the version of democracy, freedom and liberty that 
Aljazeera advocates is highly influenced by the vision of its host and sponsoring state, Qatar. 
Alhassan (2004), however, conflates Arabic-speaking countries with the rest of Africa in his 
study, and fails to consider the cultural, conceptual, and historic differences between them. In 
the same vein, Hafez (2004) doubts whether media such as Aljazeera can play a significant 
and influential role in introducing or hastening democratic change in the Arab and Muslim 
world, in an environment dominated by state-operated or semi-controlled media 
organizations. He argues that the general situation of Arab media and organizations such as 
Aljazeera specifically renders approaches such as mainstream transformation theory not 
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suitable for analysis in this case (Hafez, 2004: 2). He notes that the transformation theory 
stressed the role played by the:  
... elite, who in the case of political parties, design political programs and finally create 
governments and recruit political personnel for leadership. In summary, according to 
democratic transformation theory (non-revolutionary) political reform and 
democratization always has been the privilege of political counter-elites and 
oppositional parties. Mass media has played no role in the process.  
(Ibid: 2)  
Thus for television to play any role in democratic society there has to be a democratic system 
in place. In line with this perspective, Hafez remarks that: 
It is only after systemic changes to democracy occur and electoral democracy is 
established that television is considered important for formulating the public agenda 
and representing civil society in a functioning democracy. Transformation theoreticians 
stipulate that the mass media, television and the big press, are not as crucial in the 
authoritarian phase as certain dissidents, artists and other freedom fighters might be, 
and that it is only in the phase of consolidation of democratic institutions that the media 
are effective’  
(Ibid: 3)  
He argues that for a media organization in the Arab world to be relevant and an effective 
player in democratic transformation: 
...the news media must not only mirror the people, but should inform them, correct 
them and also educate them. If they do not, there is an inherent danger that a political 
culture that has never experienced democracy will merely reproduce itself, and that the 
old populism of the regime will merely be replaced by a techno-populism. 
(Ibid: 5) 
He does not see the media playing this role as compromising the concepts of objectivity, 
neutrality and balance “...as long as it seeks to compensate for the lack of articulation people 
suffer under authoritarian rule. But it conflicts with objectivity if it does not reflect all or, at 
least, a significantly broad spectrum of the important voices of the opposition as much as the 
government” (Ibid: 5). This is the shortcoming that many ascribe to Aljazeera, especially in 
its coverage of the Arab spring, and in terms of the contradictory nature of its messages. 
Aljazeera’s public message regards these contradictions as errors of judgement by its 
employees during the course of carrying out their duties in a very fast-moving news 
environment, especially during the events leading to the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya. The station’s defence is centred on the notion that in times of crisis, conflict and 
unrest, media organisations make news judgements in line with their editorial policies and 
guidelines. These decisions are correct most of the time, but errors happen whether in the 
coverage of the Iraq war of 2003, or the Israeli/Palestinian conflict of 2009, or the Arab 
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Spring (Khanfar, 2011; Cherkaoui, 2010; Pintak and Ginges, 2008; Nisbet et al., 2004; inter 
alia). Khanfar (2011) notes that:  
we made mistakes in the application of our motto not because it was wrong, but 
because it is not enough and we are working on expanding our editorial horizon with 
new guiding principles. Despite these, I think Aljazeera has always remained balanced, 
fair and objective applying professionalism as we see it from our Arab and Islamic 
perspective; we are after all an Arab and Muslim network broadcasting from within an 
Arab and Muslim country, within a region that lives according to certain cultural, social 
and historic values. It is there that we have our audiences and it is to them that we are 
accountable at the end.  
(Khanfar, 2011: 11) 
This process has been described by El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) as “contextual 
objectivity” (2003: 54). Regarding Aljazeera’s drive to fulfil its audience’s presumed needs, 
which leads it to exaggerate stories, they note that “...it would seem that the theory of 
contextual objectivity – the necessity of television and the media to present in a fashion that 
is both somewhat impartial and yet sensitive to local  sensibilities – is at work” (2003: 54). 
They argue that many Arabs who watch Western media regard it as lacking in objectivity (El-
Nawawy and Iskadar, 2003). Many Arab viewers who watch CNN believe that American 
television is biased against Arabs. They have argued, for example, that the word 
'assassination' is seldom used in the U.S. media when describing the Israeli policy of 
assassinating anti-Israeli political activists who belong to various Palestinian factions. Such 
events are instead referred to as 'targeted killings'. This often feeds into a belief in much of 
the Arab world that the Western media skew coverage in ways that Israel would prefer, 
preventing Palestinians and Arabs from airing their positions as often as the Israelis (Ibid: 
53).  
 El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) explain that many Arab Palestinians who are killed in 
conflict with Israel are described as ‘martyrs’ because, to many Arabs, they are defending 
their right to live in their own homeland (Ibid: 53). El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) state that 
this “...runs contrary to much of the tone that is broadcast by Western TV media, yet it 
reflects more accurately the nature of the Arab view of the Middle East events” (Ibid: 53). 
They conclude that every single media organization struggles with the application of 
objectivity as it covers events for its specific audience, meaning that “...contextual objectivity 
can be seen in every broadcast in every media outlet in the world, not just Aljazeera and the 
US networks” (Ibid: 202). 
Methodological criticism: 
One of the key studies in this section is Ayish (2010), and it would appear to be well-
researched and backed up with supporting data. It would have been better still, however, if 
the research had drawn a comparison between before the start, during, and after the Gaza war 
of 2009, in order to provide a full test of the hypothesis. Ayish (2010) based his findings on a 
total of 144 video reports broadcast on Aljazeera between 27
th
 December 2008 and 18
th
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January 2009. The reports were taken from Aljazeera's website as well as from YouTube. The 
major problem with this is that Aljazeera put only a selected sample of its total coverage of 
the crisis on its website. This tended to include only the most prominent stories, and they 
would hardly provide a comprehensive, representative sample of the station’s coverage of the 
conflict. It would have been better to request video from the station’s library. The researcher 
used framing analysis according to issue, actor occurrence rank, and presentation mode. This 
would seem appropriate for the aims of the study, however the data gathered were not fully 
analysed, especially regarding the presentation of Hamas, Palestinian civilians, and 
Palestinian authorities, who were ranked bottom in actors' primary and secondary 
occurrences, well below Palestinian civilians, the Israeli government, non-state Arab actors, 
international actors, Hamas, Egypt, other Arab governments and the UN. Ayish's (2010) study 
nonetheless provides a useful analysis of Aljazeera's coverage of conflict, and its application 
of ideas of objectivity, neutrality, and balance within the context of Arab and Islamic culture, 
politics, and other social factors.  
In the same vein, Zayani's (2010) analysis of the changing face of Arab news media, with 
special focus on Aljazeera, provides an examination of literature on the subject. The 
researcher makes use of his own observation of the changing nature of the Arab media scene, 
and of the impact of Aljazeera. The study, however, lacks a clear methodology, and thus the 
researcher does not make any claims of generalizability for his study. There is no clear 
sample, since although he mentions 'Aljazeera', generally there is no specific program 
sample, clearly identified. The study is, however, a very useful guide and source with regards 
the changes happening in the Arab media scene. El-Ibiyary's (2006) examination of the 
television representation of the War on Terror through comparing CNN’s and Aljazeera’s 
coverage of the Iraq war in 2003 uses content and discourse analysis. The study’s conclusion 
that military power has the ability to control media presentation of war images, however, 
draws attention to the limitations of such power in the case of television stations such as 
Aljazeera, suggesting that CNN and Aljazeera provided two different images of the war.  
Qusaibaty (2006) used framing analysis to examine Aljazeera’s ability to provide an 
alternative to other Western as well as Arab media as news source, and to create public space 
for dialogue, free of censorship. The study covered January to March 2005, and 7 to 8 
programs were transcribed, with a total sample size of 24 programs. This sample is too small 
to develop any meaningful conclusions. Additionally, these three programs, although popular, 
do not represent the whole output of Aljazeera. It would have been much more useful to have 
extended the time-span of the study and select news items, as well as other programs beside 
the ones chosen. It would have also been better to have added another method, in order to 
have complemented the findings of the study.  
In Chapter Six, I will examine the third model applied to Aljazeera, considering the station as 
a propaganda agent for the state of Qatar. I will critically examine this claim and whether it 
has any bearing on the station’s journalistic practices. 
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Chapter 6 
Aljazeera: a propaganda tool for Qatar: 
In this chapter, I will critically evaluate the third model applied to Aljazeera and examine 
whether the station is actually a propaganda tool for the state of Qatar. I will examine whether 
the station’s journalistic practices reflect this claim, and explore the process of formulating 
editorial policy by decision-makers from the station. 
Proponents of the third model argue that Aljazeera is a tool serving the national interests of 
the state of Qatar, within the Middle East and beyond. Al-Sadi (2012), Anzawa (2011), Azran 
(2010), Powers (2009), Fandy (2007), Jreij (2006) and Alhassan (2004) are amongst those 
who argue that Aljazeera is a propaganda tool for Qatar, both on the political and the strategic 
levels. They suggest that the station was set up as part of Qatar's drive to modernise its 
internal, regional politics, and to increase its influence in the Arab and Muslim world and 
beyond. Al-Sadi (2012) conducted a contextual analysis of three of Aljazeera's most popular 
programs, ‘The Opposite Direction,’ ‘More Than One Opinion,’ and ‘Without Bounds,’ and 
concluded that Aljazeera’s anti-establishment discourse is far from being an expression of a 
real, liberational or anti-establishment political rhetoric that is contrary to the policies and 
political perspective of Qatar. Rather, the discourse is an expression of a rhetorical strategy 
that allows Aljazeera to increase Qatari influence and help boost Qatari policies in the region 
and beyond. He states that this is done in three main areas and in three ways:  
…based on the findings of my textual analysis, I argue that the channel’s anti-
establishment discourse is far from being a manifestation of a substantive, liberational, 
anti-establishment political rhetoric that undercuts the policies and political perspective 
of the Qatari state. Rather, the discourse is a manifestation of a rhetorical strategy that 
allows Aljazeera to bolster Qatari policies in three ways: a) by initially identifying itself 
superficially with the viewers’ 'radicalism,' in order to b) subtly deflect from itself the 
radical precepts of the two most popular ideologies—Arab nationalism and jihadist 
Islamism, or from any radical program of action that they may inspire—and c) by 
creating a need for, and orienting the audiences’ 'radicalism' towards, an alternative 
political ideology that fits with the policies and strategic interests of the Qatari 
government...  
       (Al-Sadi, 2012: 3)  
Al-Sadi's (2012) argument is based on the notion that Aljazeera’s perceived pan-Arab, pro-
political Islam agenda is a deception maintained in order to hide the real motives of the 
station in serving and advancing the policies of Qatar. He also regards the station’s claims of 
objectivity, professionalism and advancing a democratic agenda as limited. He states that 
“Aljazeera becomes a means of reinventing, not challenging, Arab autocracy” (Al-Sadi, 2012: 
4). 
Al-Sadi (2012) explains that Aljazeera aims to promote Qatar as:  
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...an Arab state that aspires to democratic values, a self-reforming state that meets much 
of the expectations of the Arab masses and could, thus, replace both radical Arab 
regimes, such as Syria and Iraq, and unpopular moderate, pro-Western Arab regimes, 
such as Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and so on.  
(Ibid: 5)  
He thus concludes that Aljazeera “...is a tool to reshape, reform Arab authoritarian regimes 
instead of challenging them” (Al-Sadi, 2012: 1-2). Within this context, Sakr (2007) agrees 
that is difficult to consider the messages that Aljazeera carries as anything other than an 
“...attempt by Qatar’s ruler to burnish his Arab nationalist credentials  as a way of cushioning 
the highly controversial policies of his government on key issues such as relations with the 
United States and Israel” (Sakr, 2007: 125). In the same vein, Powers (2009) accepts that 
Aljazeera has served Qatar well and enabled the tiny Gulf country to become a force to be 
reckoned with, not only in the Arab world, but also globally. He notes that:  
Qatar has emerged as a regional force, a model for economic growth and Arab political 
modernization that just 10 years ago didn’t exist. Yet, essential to Al-Jazeera’s 
popularity and, thus, to Qatar’s rise in influence was the perception that the tiny Gulf 
peninsula had little strategic ambition in the region, a perception that is rapidly 
changing. As Qatar’s geopolitical ambitions grow, it will be important to see how they 
are reflected in Al-Jazeera’s programming, as well as viewer perceptions of the 
Network.  
(Powers, 2009: 133) 
Souag (2012), managing director of Aljazeera Arabic, argues persuasively for the importance 
of Qatari wealth and influence. He explains that “...in the media age it is all about soft power 
and if you are a small country like Qatar you want to be successful and drive through your 
policies and strategy in the region, you don't need warships or airplanes; you need soft power 
and is done through the media, science and culture” (Souag, 2012: 2-3). He affirms that “I 
believe that the Emir was aware of this and I believe that's a great vision” (Ibid, 2-3).  Al-
Tamimi (2012) agrees, arguing that Aljazeera has been instrumental “...not only in serving the 
country’s foreign diplomacy (Qatar’s), but also in designing and implementing these policies 
directly or indirectly” (Al-Tamimi, 2012: 84). Al-Tamimi (2012) adds, however, that 
Aljazeera had a direct and overwhelming influence on Qatari internal affairs, as “...it helped 
to quicken the pace of change politically, economically and culturally” (Al-Tamimi, 2012: 
83). 
Fandy (2007) also argues that Aljazeera did not bring any real change to the Arab media 
scene. He states that the change the station advocates is superficial, and does not address the 
lack of democracy, or of a real civic society capable of instigating debate and mounting a 
challenge to existing institutions in the Arab world. He explains that, despite Aljazeera's 
claim of independence and contributions to social change, the fact remains that it is the state 
and not market forces that shape Arab media and Arab politics. The state has a great deal of 
impact on programming and the general direction of Aljazeera, and many other so-called 
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independent satellite channels in the region. So, Fandy (2007) argues, even if not all Arab 
media are formally state-owned, the state retains strict control over them. The media in the 
Arab world are therefore instruments of the regimes that fund them (Fandy, 2007: 8-9). He 
also suggests that Aljazeera reports on other Arab states, criticising certain regimes while 
praising others, but conceals the problems of Qatar or seems willingly to forget about them. 
For example, while the station reported extensively on Saudi princes having been implicated 
in the bribery scandal surrounding the British arms company BAE Systems, it ignored similar 
investigations implicating Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim  
Bin Jabr Al-Thani (Fandy, 2007: 9).   
In the same vein, Anzawa (2011) has argued that from the day it was set up, Qatar set out to 
use Aljazeera to promote the small country, and to help it become an important regional 
player. He notes that “without any doubt, Aljazeera helps project a significant image of Qatar 
not only in the Middle East but also all over the world. Just as none has been more visible 
than Aljazeera, the network has been inextricably connected to Qatar” (Anzawa, 2011: 60). 
Hroub (2013), Khatib (2013), Dorsey (2013) and Hanson (2013) are amongst those who 
agree with Anzawa in this regard, adding that Qatar's use of Aljazeera to serve its national 
interests tries to counter two major threats that the small country faces: Saudi Arabia on one 
side, and Iran on the other. They argue that Qatar invited the US to have a military base on its 
soil in order to counter these two dangers, while at the same time allowing Aljazeera to 
appear anti-American, as a way of acting on behalf of the U.S. as a regional broker. Khatib 
(2013) argues that the Arab Spring was a great example of how Qatar used Aljazeera 
extensively to advance its political and strategic objectives, in support of certain groups over 
others. In Libya, she notes that “Qatar acted as an interlocutor for the Arab league and Arab 
states that were pushing for international intervention in Libya, not only through formal 
diplomatic channels, but also by means of public diplomacy through the Aljazeera network” 
(Khatib, 2013: 421).  
Aljazeera an instrument of Qatari survival:  
Qatar, a tiny country with a population of around 1 million, of whom 80 per cent are migrant 
workers, is faced with two imposing neighbours in Saudi Arabia and Iran (Al-Tamimi, 2012). 
The father of Cheick Hamad Ben Khalifa, who set up Aljazeera, Cheick Khalifa Al-Thani, 
followed a policy of almost complete submission to Saudi Arabia (Kamrava, 2013). His son, 
Cheick Hamad, however, sought to build a modern state that strives to be different from its 
neighbours, and in this, founding Aljazeera was one of the first steps he undertook, perhaps 
motivated especially by the alleged attempt to re-instate his father with Saudi Arabia’s help 
(Miles, 2005). This later led Qatar to strip some 6,000 members of the Al-Gufran clan of their 
Qatari citizenship, because they had patrolled the border on behalf of Saudi Arabia (Dorsey, 
2013: 13). The Qatari citizenship with these two neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran, had 
deteriorated, especially when Saudi Arabia blocked a multi-billion dollar deal for Qatar to 
supply gas to Kuwait via pipelines going through Saudi territory. This led Qatar's Energy 
Minister to declare “we have not received clearance from Saudi Arabia hence it is not 
feasible” (cf. Dorsey, 2013: 13).  Anzawa (2011) argues, therefore, that Aljazeera was the 
most important tool in the strategy of the new Emir against both Iranian, and especially Saudi 
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Arabian influences. The success of Aljazeera was not guaranteed, however, as its owners 
admitted on several occasions. When the station started to provide a platform that no other 
broadcaster in the region would or could provide, however, Saudi Arabia started to take 
notice. Anzawa (2011) notes that “Qatar challenges to Saudi hegemony, struggling for 
supremacy of Arab media (scene) is particularly distinguished. Saudi Arabia had sensed that 
its dominance of regional news was weakened by the growing popularity of Aljazeera. Under 
these pressures, Al-Arabiya was launched in March 2003” (Ibid: 22). Saudi King Abdullah, 
while still Crown Prince, “accused Aljazeera of being a disgrace to the Gulf Corporation 
Council (GCC), of defaming the members of the Saudi royal family, of threatening the 
stability of the Arab world and of encouraging terrorism’ (Anzawa, 2011: 23).  
Beyond that, Anzawa concludes that Aljazeera “became the viable news channel to compete 
with Western hegemony, captivating millions of Arab viewers” (Ibid: 72). He regards 
Aljazeera as vital for the survival of the state of Qatar, and thus argues that “Qatar has no 
other choice but to differentiate itself from other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, for 
the sake of survival in the region” (Ibid: 72). In this regard, Hroub (2013) argues that 
Aljazeera is such an important instrument for the survival of Qatar as a state that the Emir 
takes personal interest in its running and affairs, because it has allowed the country to become 
a player not only on the Arab scene, but also on the world stage.  This was particularly the 
case during the international campaign in Libya, and the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Yemen, much to the dismay of Saudi Arabia. He notes that “Aljazeera allowed Qatar to 
circumvent some of its conventional geopolitical shortcomings” (Hroub, 2013: 2). Aljazeera 
has also contributed, however, to societal change in Qatar itself, and exposed some of the 
contradictions of its society. Hroub remarks: 
when conventional media evolve into geo-media they create their own autonomous 
dynamics, affecting politics and on occasions compelling their patrons to adopt 
positions that they otherwise might not necessarily have adopted. Thus, in a process of 
reversal, the media that were supposedly formed by the foreign policy of their creators 
become so influential that they are able to affect that same foreign policy. 
(Ibid: 2)  
Hanson (2013) goes further, arguing that Aljazeera's first and, to date, only Chairman, is a 
trusted member of the Qatari royal family, someone who meets with the Emir every morning, 
and sits in what he describes as the group of ‘movers’ within the Qatar decision-making class. 
These include Cheick Hamad Ben Khalifa Al-Thani, the former Emir, the current Emir, 
Cheick Tamim Ben Hamad, Cheicka Moza Bint Nasser Al-Missned, the mother of the current 
Emir and wife of the previous Emir, Cheick Hamad Ben Jassim Ben Jaber, the former Prime 
Minister of Qatar, Cheick Khalid Al-Atiya, the current Foreign Affairs Minister and Cheick 
Hamad Ben Thamer, the Chairman of Aljazeera. He describes these people as “individuals 
who have a strong influence on the Emir, who are able to influence decisions directly” 
(Hanson, 2013: 2). Dorsey (2013) argues, however, that the deployment of Aljazeera as a 
pivotal instrument of Qatar’s foreign policy may have managed to instigate internal changes, 
but they have been limited and superficial. He notes that “Hamad (the former Emir of Qatar) 
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created institutions and government offices that were populated with loyalists as well as his 
offspring and bore the characteristics of autocracy, centralised and personalized decision- 
making, reliance on patronage networks and an absence of transparency and accountability” 
(Dorsey, 2013: 16). He argues that this applied also to Aljazeera, with appointment decisions 
being made directly by the royal palace, and the network's budget and expenditure a closely 
guarded secret (Dorsey, 2013). This lack of good governance and transparency, and the 
prevalence of secrecy, whether in the case of Aljazeera or of state affairs, led to major 
setbacks for the country’s internal as well as external policies. Dorsey (2013) notes that:  
Qatari foreign policy setbacks are paralleled by Aljazeera’s mounting problems 
resulting from perceptions that it is promoting the brotherhood and changes in the pan-
Arab in television-market. The Aljazeera experienced a boom as primary news source 
in the heyday of the Arab revolt that toppled the leaders in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and 
Yemen, but has since seen its viewership numbers decline with Arabs turning 
increasingly to a plethora of newly established local news broadcasters. Market 
research Company Sigma consul reported that Aljazeera market share in Tunisia has 
dropped from 10.7 per cent in 2011 to 4.8 per cent in 2012 and that the Qatari network 
was no longer among Egypt’s ten most watched channels.  
(Ibid: 20) 
Others (Anzawa, 2011; Kamrava, 2013; Hanson, 2013; inter alia) argue, however, that the 
station continued to be a chief operator for Qatar’s foreign policy objectives beyond the Arab 
world, as it expanded by setting up Aljazeera America, Aljazeera Balkan, and Aljazeera 
English. 
Aljazeera: Qatar and the creation of Qatari media-space: 
In his comparative study of Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya, Fandy (2007) concluded that such 
stations have been established, and operate, in order to advance political goals. He notes that 
“...both channels are used by their respective governments as part of their bid for regional 
hegemony” (Fandy, 2007: 140). Anzawa (2011), Dorsey (2013), Hanson (2013), and Al-
Tamimi (2012) are amongst those who have also argued that the Aljazeera media empire is 
extending, and becoming a serious threat to Saudi dominance in the region. This threat, they 
argue, has become most apparent since Aljazeera Sports acquired the Saudi-owned ART 
group’s sports rights. 
Lynch (2006), after analysing a number of Aljazeera programs over a five-year period (1999-
2004), concluded that Qatar realised the trends dominating the Arab public, especially 
regarding the Palestinian issue, thus directing Aljazeera to present Qatar as the defender of 
Palestinian rights. He notes that: 
the issue of Palestine was, without question, the area of the widest consensus in the new 
Arab public sphere. Support for the Palestinians against Israel was rarely, if ever 
contested…Palestine served as a unifying focal point, one which diverse political 
groups could use as a common front, rather than as a point of meaningful debates.  
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(Lynch, 2006: 10) 
In the same vein, Shariff (2012) notes that Qatar's popularity seems to be on the rise, 
especially since the Arab Spring, as the country is perceived as being on the side of the Arab 
masses, and as doing something tangible to help them to achieve their goals. On the other 
hand, there are those in states like Syria, Tunisia and Libya who resent what they see as 
Qatar’s meddling in their internal affairs for the past few years, and especially since the 
beginning of the Arab Spring, perceiving that Qatar has perfected the art of punching above 
its weight in regional and international affairs. The state uses its vast wealth and its media 
outlet, Aljazeera, to project soft power, but it is with the onset of the Arab Spring that Doha 
truly seems to have made major inroads into the region. Shariff states that it used Aljazeera 
directly in the Arab Spring, like Libya, Syria, Egypt and others, to advance its policy of 
change (Shariff, 2012: 5).  
Abdullah (2011) also acknowledges that, with Qatar's rapid ascent in the region, there is no 
denying the central role played by Aljazeera, and especially the Arabic version, which has 
become exceedingly popular.  Abdullah states that the station: 
...is a tool, and a very effective tool in Qatar's foreign policy. And there's nothing wrong 
with that. I think the BBC is a tool of British foreign policy, and CNN of American 
foreign policy and so on. Yes, Aljazeera is part of Qatar's soft power. And like any 
modern state, it is exercising it.  
(Abdullah, 2011: 14)   
Al Ezzi (2011) concurs, stating that, “As for the use of Aljazeera as a tool, this is a reality we 
see every day. But the station attained its present status well before the Arab revolts began; it 
was not only as a result of these revolutions” (Al Ezzi, 2011: 7).  Tabarani (2011) argues that 
in 2010 even those most optimistic about Qatar's potential could not predict that the Gulf 
state would one day be leading the Arab League and speaking on its behalf. He noted that the 
year of the Arab Spring brought political change to several Arab countries. These changes, he 
argued, have seen a state like Qatar stepping in as a force in Middle East politics (Tabarani, 
2011: 17). 
This trend of Qatar using Aljazeera to achieve its political and strategic objectives and 
policies is welcomed by many people in the Arab world. Abdullah (2011) acknowledged this 
policy by Qatar; even though it may discredit Aljazeera, it has its merits and admirers in the 
Arab and Muslim world. He described Doha's role as “mind-boggling”, observing that:  
Qatar has played a constructive and positive role … in [the] Afghanistan [talks], in Yemen, 
Lebanon … sometimes on behalf of bigger powers in the region. By default or by design, 
Doha today is the political capital of the Arab world. And there's a lot of investment that has 
gone into this. (Abdullah, 2011: 13) 
Powers (2010) examined the relationship between Qatar and Aljazeera and how the latter 
helped the former emerge from the dominating influence of Saudi Arabia/ Iran and become a 
regional as well as an international player, through the deployment of Aljazeera as soft power. 
80 
 
He concluded that, right from its inception, Aljazeera's primary aim was to be the chief 
defendant and promoter of Qatar’s regional and international interests, although the network, 
in doing so, changed the regional and global media environment, challenging dominant 
perceptions and trends.  Pintak (2007) agrees, suggesting that Qatar’s territorial disputes with 
its neighbours, particularly with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran, as well as its desire to 
become a regional as well as a world player, was behind the deployment of Aljazeera as one 
of its most potent weapons. This venture, however, was a big gamble, without any guarantee 
of success.  The Saudi threat to Qatar’s existence, attacking border posts and straying into 
Qatar’s territory, was of major concern to the new Emir when he took over in 1995. His 
ultimate and primary aim was to use Aljazeera to influence regional as well as global politics 
so as to serve the country’s interests (cf. Ruhing, 2007). Pintak (2007) notes that:  
the Emir didn’t set up Aljazeera to get a membership card at the press club. It’s about power. 
This has allowed him to, if not checkmate, and then at least occasionally checks the Saudis. 
He did it for the same reason he brought Central Command to Qatar. It made him a player in 
the region. (cf. Rushing, 2007: 134).  
Similarly, Power (2010) concludes that:  
today, Qatar has emerged as a regional force, a model for economic growth and Arab 
political modernization that just 10 years ago didn’t exist. Yet, essential to Aljazeera’s 
popularity and, thus, to Qatar’s rise in influence was the perception that the tiny Gulf 
peninsula had little strategic ambition in the region, a perception that is rapidly 
changing. As Qatar’s geopolitical ambitions grow, it will be important to see how they 
are reflected in Aljazeera’s programming, as well as viewer perceptions of the 
Network... Qatar relied primarily on Aljazeera to defend itself from attacks from 
regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
(Power, 2010: 122) 
Historical criticism of the third model: 
In the above paragraph, it is noticeable that there is a large overlap between Fandy (2007), 
Powers (2009), Anzawa (2011), Al-Tamimi (2012), Al-Sadi (2012), Khatib (2013), Hroub 
(2013), and others, when they argue that Aljazeera is serving the foreign and national 
interests of Qatar. There are, however, clear differences in terms of the relative strength of 
arguments, and of providing empirical evidence to support the various arguments presented. 
Fandy (2007), Al-Sadi (2012) and Anzawa (2011) provided the strongest cases in support of 
their assumptions. In the following sections, I shall discuss some of these issues. 
The claims that Aljazeera is a propaganda tool used by Qatar to achieve its strategic as well 
as foreign policy objectives may seem strong at first. An examination of each of these 
reveals, however, a lack of understanding of the historical contexts in which the station came 
into being. They also fail to understand the development of Aljazeera since its inception in 
1996.  
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Fandy (2007), Anzawa (2011), Hanson (2013), and Al-Sadi (2012) have much in common in 
their criticisms of Aljazeera as a tool of Qatar. They criticise the way Aljazeera covered the 
Lebanese crises, however, and other controversial issues in the region, and conclude that 
Aljazeera was established in order to serve the foreign policy aims of Qatar. I would argue, 
however, that the picture is much more complex than that. Miles (2005), Zayani (2005), 
Lynch (2006), and Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), are amongst those who have argued that the 
level of independence afforded to Aljazeera in its day-to-day running was unrivalled in the 
entire Arab world. Fandy (2007) also touched on other historic realities regarding Qatar's 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, and Qatar’s internal politics, though here again he fails to take 
account of historical events. Aljazeera has openly addressed these concerns, with the 
country’s Foreign Minister, Cheick Hamad Ben Jabr, appearing on ‘Without Bounds’ and 
answering all questions that were put to him, whether on the tribe of ‘Murra’, who were 
stripped of their Qatari citizenship, or on Qatari relations with Saudi Arabia, or indeed on the 
American bases in Qatar, and many other issues (Without Bounds, 15/11/2000, 16/10/2002, 
31/12/2003, 22/6/2005, 28/6/2006, 24/6/2009, and 28/3/2011).  Al-Sadi (2012), who 
conducted a textual analysis of three Aljazeera programs, failed to understand the historical 
context in which these programs developed.  
He also failed to take into account the wider variation offered in the station’s coverage, which 
counters the perception of pro-Qatari bias in the agenda of the programs analysed. He argues 
that the stations aims were an ...effort by Aljazeera to make Arab viewers identify with a new 
paradigm of an Arab state that Qatar epitomizes—a democratizing, self-reforming state that 
meets much of the expectations of the Arab masses and could, thus, replace both radical Arab 
regimes, such as Syria and Iraq, and unpopular moderate, pro-Western Arab regimes, such as 
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia’ (Al-Sadi, 2012: 3).  
What Al-Sadi fails to consider is that Qatar as a nation is still formulating its strategic 
outlook, and that the country, according to Dorsey (2013), Hanson (2013), Hroub (2013), and 
Miladi (2013), amongst others, has not yet established its strategic objectives and aims, 
meaning that these are subject to change and alterations. This is in line with what Al-Tamimi 
(2012) regards as the 2030 strategy that is constantly changing and adapting to national, 
regional, and global challenges. In the same vein, Qassim (2012) suggests that Qatar is a 
relatively new country, and to assume that the country uses Aljazeera in order to orient Arab 
audiences towards an ideology that is still unclear, as argued by Al-Sadi, undercuts the latter’s 
arguments.  
Therefore, as stated by Tabarani (2011), Qatar’s use of Aljazeera as a tool to achieve its 
strategic objectives, as claimed by the proponents of this model, is in doubt. He argues that 
Qatar's intentions remain unclear and ambiguous, in that while some say Qatar has a 
Napoleon complex, others say it has an Islamist agenda. Qatar was very active diplomatically 
even before the Arab Spring, but I cannot argue that there is any specific interest that the 
country is pursuing through its expanding role. Qatar has no interests at stake. What is 
obvious, according to Tabarani (2011), is that Qatar’s policy seems to be policy for policy's 
sake. He suggests, however, that a Sunni revival, through supporting mainstream Islamist 
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groups (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood) in the countries that are witnessing change, could make 
sense from a GCC security perspective, in order to confront Iran (Tabarani, 2011).  
Souaiaia (2011) supports the above arguments. He sees Qatar’s engaging in too many 
political and non-political initiatives, on too many sides, as ad hoc diplomacy. He explains 
that their wide networks of military, political, and diplomatic relations make their strategy 
seem contradictory and unprincipled (Souaiaia, 2011). 
 
Al-Tamimi (2012), Abu-Rab (2010), Seib (2008), and Rushing (2007) are amongst those who 
have argued that, far from influencing Aljazeera, Qatar has been influenced by the station. 
They suggest that the Emir’s drive to reform his country, and to introduce democracy in a 
region that is still dominated by autocratic regimes, owes much to the culture that has been 
instilled by Aljazeera. Al-Tamimi (2012), Khanfar (2009), Qassim (2012), and others all 
acknowledge that Aljazeera has had a profound impact on Qatar as a country. It serves not 
only to inform and instil awareness among Arab populations, but especially within the 
boundaries of its host country. They argue that many of the advocates of this model failed to 
study Qatari society and to understand its religious, tribal, and cultural roots. They argue, for 
instance, that before the advent of Aljazeera, it was a rarity to see Qatari women working in 
any sector let alone the media. Now, more than a decade after it was set up, there are 
hundreds of Qatari men and women working for Aljazeera.  
Khanfar (2009) argues that it has become a dream of Qatari men and women to get a job at 
Aljazeera. In other words, Qatar has changed beyond recognition and that, they argue, is a 
sign of the changing nature of the relationship between Aljazeera and its co-sponsor, the 
Qatari government. Others who advocated this model (Dorsey, 2013; Hanson, 2013; Anzawa, 
2011; inter alia), although they presented a detailed analysis of Qatari political history, and of 
its interaction with its most imposing neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran, failed to provide any 
broader perspective on the interaction of historic links and relationships between Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. They failed, for instance, to account for the fact that many of Qatar’s clans 
and tribes are an extension of their counterparts in Saudi Arabia, or that many of Qatar’s 
elites, including influential and prominent business families, have an ancestral relationship 
with Iran (Kamrava, 2013). 
Empirical criticism: 
Al-Sadi (2012) conducted a textual analysis of three programs on Aljazeera that represent less 
than 5 per cent of the total station output. The three programs have a different style and 
approach to dealing with various issues and, therefore, it would be not correct to generalise 
based on these programs. His analysis also seems to be lacking in statistical rigour. Other 
studies (Ayish, 2010; Zingarelli, 2010; El-Nawawy and Powers, 2008; Aday, et. al, 2005; El-
Nawawy and Iskandar, 2003; inter alia) have found no evidence of Aljazeera being biased 
towards Qatari policy, or on any other particular issue. Jreij (2006) studied the relationship 
between Aljazeera and Qatar, and whether the station is a tool for Qatar’s overall strategy. 
She concluded that the premise that Aljazeera is part of Qatar’s propaganda machine is 
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difficult to prove because the relationship between Qatar and Aljazeera is very complex. She 
explains that, although Qatar maintains control over Aljazeera through financing its activities 
and through the overall supervisory role exercised by the Aljazeera Chairman, who is a 
member of the Qatari royal family, Aljazeera “...has a large margin of freedom...and fights to 
preserve the professionalism of journalism” (Jreij, 2006: 23).  
Their motto was described by Al-Ali (2002), the former director of Aljazeera, as the soul of 
the station, and the philosophy that underpins its operation and vision (Miles, 2005). It is 
clearly visible in almost all Aljazeera bulletins and on-air promos, and is posted on many 
walls in the station (Miles, 2005; Al-Jaber, 2004). It is also this motto that differentiates 
Aljazeera from all other stations, be they privately or government owned. Yet my study 
reveals that a number of respondents who prefer Aljazeera are less likely to think that the 
station stands by its own motto when compared with respondents who watch other Arab news 
or non-Arab news channels. It is worth mentioning here that many writers (Lynch, 2006; 
Sakr, 2007; Fandy, 2007; Qassim, 2012; inter alia) believe that what the Emir of Qatar has 
done should be applauded and admired. 
Sensitive Qatari issues such as the relationship between Doha and Riyadh were discussed 
openly on a number of Aljazeera programs which were broadcast live, without any limits 
being placed on the discussions by the country’s Prime Minister, Cheick Hamad Ben Jaber 
Al-thani. Other issues such as the American bases in Qatar, human rights issues in Qatar, and 
the strained relationships between Qatar and other Arab countries, were also openly discussed 
(see Without Bounds, 15/11/2000, 16/10/2002, 31/12/2003, 22/6/2005, 28/6/2006, 24/6/2009, 
and 28/3/2011). Ayish (2010), Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), Fandy (2007), Lynch (2006) and 
others, regard this, however, as reinforcing the view that Aljazeera is being used by Qatar. In 
the same vein, Anzawa (2011) sets out his aim to argue that:  
‘Aljazeera is not merely an international media giant, but also a powerful player in 
contemporary Arab politics…in order to understand how the Qatari government and the 
Emir of Qatar have manipulated the so-called ‘independent’ Aljazeera satellite network 
as an effective political instrument’  
(Anzawa, 2011: 1-2)  
In his introductory chapter, however, there is not a single word about any strong evidence the 
researcher is providing in order to substantiate his claims, or about how he intends to collect 
evidence to support his assumptions. The claims advanced about Aljazeera being a political 
tool of Qatar thus rely on a series of statements and quotes taken from other scholarly 
research. The researcher does not provide a single piece of empirical data to support his 
claims about Aljazeera and Qatar. Nonetheless, this research is useful in providing a 
collection of views about the relationship between Qatar and Aljazeera, particularly 
considering the lack of studies in this area. Similarly, Dorsey (2013) also analyses different 
scholarly works on Qatari internal and external politics, and the country’s interactions with 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and the U.S., without a single piece of empirical evidence to support the 
claims he puts forward. Anzawa (2011) and Dorsey (2013) would be described as historic 
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studies, that describe the advent of Aljazeera, and the claims that accompanied it along the 
way. In the same vein, Hanson's (2013) attempt at analysing Qatari policy and the role of 
Aljazeera did provide some evidence from case studies and examples of Qatari policy 
engagement, though these could be seen as analysis of various scholarly works, articles, and 
public and media pronouncements by Qatari officials. The study, however, provides an 
insight into the circles of power within the state of Qatar, and the proximity of the Aljazeera 
Chairman to the circle of decision-makers in the country. 
Conceptual criticism: 
The central argument is that Aljazeera is a propaganda tool for the state of Qatar, and that it 
uses the station in this respect (Alhassan, 2004; Al-Hail, 2004; Fandy, 2007; Al-Sadi, 2012; 
inter alia). Noe and Raad (2012) have argued that Qatar has been very clever in using 
Aljazeera in order to advance its political and strategic objectives. They note that “Qatar has 
gone overnight from being an active member of the rejectionist and resistance axis to the 
spearhead of imperialism aimed at destroying the resistance and at dividing the Arab world 
on sectarian lines” (Noe and Raad, 2012: 4). Herman and Chomsky (1988), Herman (1996), 
Chomsky (2004), Elridge, et al. (1997), Philo (1982) and Khaeler (2009) have developed the 
argument that media is a tool for manufacturing consent, and acts as a hegemonizing tool. 
They examined the political economy of the media, especially in terms of how ownership and 
control of the media impacts its behaviour (cf. Murdock and Golding, 1977; Curran and 
Seaton, 1991).  The central argument of Herman and Chomsky (1988), as explained by 
Herman (2003), states that:  
dominant media are firmly imbedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking 
businesses, owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); and they are funded 
largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, and who want their ads to 
appear in a supportive selling environment. The media also lean heavily on government 
and major business firms as information sources, and both efficiency and political 
considerations, and, frequently, overlapping interests, cause a certain degree of 
solidarity to prevail among the government, major media, and other corporate 
businesses. Government and large non-media business firms are also best positioned 
(and sufficiently wealthy) to be able to pressure the media with threats of withdrawal of 
advertising or TV licenses, libel suits, and other direct and indirect modes of attack. The 
media are also constrained by the dominant ideology, which heavily featured 
anticommunism before and during the Cold War era, and was mobilized often to induce 
the media to support (or refrain from criticizing) U.S. attacks on small states that were 
labelled communist.   
(Herman, 2003: 3) 
To apply the central tenets of the propaganda model to Aljazeera and its relationship with 
Qatar would be difficult. Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), Lynch (2006), Zayani (2005, El-
Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), amongst others,  described Aljazeera coming onto the media 
scene in the Arab world as nothing short of “revolutionary” (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007: 23). 
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They further state that “Aljazeera has come to represent the pioneer, the dissident, the 
maverick, the oppositional, the anti-establishment, and the eccentric. It takes risks, does 
things differently, and ignores the culture of political restraints and media practices in the 
region” (Ibid: 25). Fandy (2007), however, disagrees and regards Aljazeera as a political tool 
in the hands of its founder, Qatar, and thus as implementing one of the key preconditions of 
the propaganda model: ‘media ownership’. He notes that “Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya are not 
in reality privately owned channels; they are controlled by the States of Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia respectively” (Fandy, 2007: 66). What is missing is empirical evidence to determine 
with any degree of certainty whether Aljazeera is directly operated and used by Qatar as a 
propaganda tool in order to exercise control over the masses in the Arab world. It is worth 
noting that Herman and Chomsky (1988) never claimed that their model explains everything. 
Herman (2003) states that they “...explicitly pointed to the existence of alternative media, 
grassroots information sources, and public scepticism about media truthfulness as important 
limits on media effectiveness in propaganda service and we urged the support and more 
vigorous use of the existing alternatives” (Herman, 2003: 5).  
There are clearly key differences in the applicability of the propaganda model to Aljazeera, 
and indeed to any other media organisation in the Arab world. The model was designed 
initially to look at the way the U.S. media were used within the context of the political 
economy of the media, and how they may be used as an agent of social control. Television 
stations such as Aljazeera are still in their infancy, and therefore it would be overly simplistic 
to assume that they have the same complex relationship to their ownership that exists in the 
U.S. It would also be difficult to assume that advertising has any bearing on media 
organisations such as Aljazeera, because advertising in the Arab world has not developed 
sufficiently for it to be an important source of income for television stations. Aljazeera and 
many other Arab broadcasters are still dependent to a large extent on their sponsoring 
governments. As argued by El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), however, the government of 
Qatar has tried to avoid interfering in the affairs or operations of Aljazeera, including the way 
it covers various events.  
In the same vein, Dorsey (2013), Hanson (2013) and Al-Sadi (2012) are amongst those who 
assume, with regard to concepts such as Saudi hegemony or Qatari hegemony, the presence 
of a national project in both these countries that has all the components of a comprehensive 
national model, which is not the case. The use of the term hegemony with respect to Qatar, or 
indeed Saudi Arabia, as argued by Miladi (2013), Zingarelli (2010), Seib (2008), Zayani and 
Sahraoui (2007), Lynch (2006), and others, disputes the existence of such a project either in 
Saudi Arabia or in Qatar. Such a use is also, as argued by both Sakr (2001) and Curren and 
Park (2000), reminiscent of the dominance of Western thinking when looking at media 
phenomena such as Aljazeera. In the same line, Al-Sadi (2012), Anzawa (2011), and Fandy's 
(2007) studies of Aljazeera as being an instrument of Qatari policy, and exploring the idea 
that the station is used as a propaganda tool, do not provide an illustrative conceptual analysis 
to justify the use of this term.  
Methodological criticism of the third model: 
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The proponents of this model have also been criticized for their methodological weaknesses. 
Al-Sadi (2012) sets out to “offer a close reading of the channel’s political discourse on issues 
that sharply divide the Arab public from the Qatari government and other Arab regimes” (Al-
Sadi, 2012: 1). To carry this out he chose to use contextual analysis of five of Aljazeera's 
most popular programs.  
over a five-year period, 1999 through 2003, I closely read the channel’s political 
discourse on three key political issues (the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, and the question of Arab unification) as covered primarily by three of the 
channels’ most popular programs, Faisal Al-Qasim’s ‘The Opposite Direction,’ Ahmad 
Mansour’s ‘Without Bounds,’ and Sami Haddad’s ‘More Than One Opinion’. At other 
points in my analysis of Aljazeera’s political discourse, I also examined the coverage of 
the same political issues in two other popular programs, Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s ‘Religion 
and Life’ and ‘Aljazeera Pulpit’.  
(Ibid: 3)  
Al-Sadi's sampling is flawed because he chooses programs which are by their nature populist 
and, on the basis of their analysis, draws a conclusion to apply to the whole of the station’s 
output, regardless of differences in the nature of news programs and talk shows. Furthermore, 
the period covered meant that on many occasions these programs were dedicated to specific 
issues such as the Gaza war of 2009, or the Iraqi war of 2003, for much shorter periods, while 
the news items dominated the station’s overall output. Thus, even the sample of programs 
chosen is not representative. It would have been much better to have chosen a much more 
varied sample that combines news broadcasts, pre-recorded programs, and live coverage slots 
that are a combination of news and such programs. The study does, however, provide very 
useful empirical evidence, despite its methodological weaknesses, that could guide future 
research into the relationship between Aljazeera and Qatar, within a limited range. The 
researcher concludes that:  
Aljazeera falls in line with other state-sponsored Arab media, whose main objective is 
to defend the legitimacy of the state in order to perpetuate the existing political order. In 
the Qatari case, the existing political order epitomizes a reformed, self-democratizing 
Arab autocracy, but an autocracy nonetheless,  
(Ibid: 17)  
This position would need further study in order to ascertain with a much higher level of 
certainty the veracity of the claims advanced by the researcher. The researcher’s reliance on a 
single method to test his claims also limits the validity of his conclusions. The use of content 
analysis, and perhaps focus groups, would have provided a combination of qualitative as well 
as quantitative data to strengthen the broader arguments made in his research.  
Equally, Alhassan's (2004) study of Aljazeera’s coverage of African issues, and his 
subsequent conclusions that the station is a political tool for Qatar, do not stand on a strong 
methodological rationale. He chose to study around 400 university students at the Universal 
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African University, which he claims represents around 14 nations of the continent, which still 
leaves 30 countries unrepresented in his sample. He chose also to have closed questions or 
semi-closed ones, which limited the nature of the data gathered. His content analysis of 500 
Aljazeera programs between the years 2000 and 2002 is also not representative of the 
station’s output, especially in terms of news, which accounts for more than 60 per cent of the 
station's programming.  He chose to interview six people at the station in order to add a 
qualitative aspect to his study but this number of interviewees is too small to reveal any 
statistically significant data. His choice of interviews is too narrow, and focused on 
journalists or presenters in Doha, without a single representative from senior management 
with responsibility for key strategic or editorial decisions. This also limited the range of data 
gathered from the interviews. It would have been better to interview a much wider spectrum 
of people from Aljazeera, especially people in Doha and in outside offices, if not in person 
then on the phone. His content analysis could have benefited greatly from a comprehensive 
sample strategy, that could have covered news bulletins, other programs and other fillers that 
the station uses, and which many of its opponents argue are value-laden, subjective, and show 
the real mobilization effect of the station (Ajami, 2001; Chafets, 2001, 2002; Cherribi, 2006; 
Fandy, 2007; inter alia).  
Having analysed Aljazeera in the context of all three models I shall move to the overall 
conclusion of this study, and answer the questions I asked at the beginning of this research. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and discussion 
In this final chapter, I shall present the key findings of this research, as well as further 
exploring, to some extent, their significance for academic research about Aljazeera. I shall 
end with a discussion as well as outlining some of the difficulties I encountered as a 
researcher, while I was at the same time working for Aljazeera. I will delineate some research 
areas that require further exploration in any future academic endeavour.  
When I began this study I wanted to identify the most prominent models applied to Aljazeera 
nature and journalistic practice, in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, as examined in 
various scholarly works. I also aimed to examine, through these studies, the extent to which 
the concept of a ‘model’ might apply to Aljazeera’s programmes. 
After examining a selected sample of the most important works on Aljazeera, I concluded 
that a large body of research supports the idea  that Aljazeera is, to a large extent, serving the 
interests and policies of the state of Qatar, intrinsically related to the complexities that these 
interests and policies entail. This is the case internally, within the bounds of Qatar itself, and 
regionally, in terms of its competing interests with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, lately, the 
UAE. The role that the Aljazeera network, as it has become known, plays for Qatar, globally, 
is entangled with these interests as the tiny country, after its success on national and regional 
levels, aims to take its ambitions to the  global stage. (See Hanson (2013), Hroub (2013), 
Qassim (2012), Al-Tamimi (2012), Al-Sadi (2012), Anzawa (2011), and Fandy (2007), 
amongst others). 
Despite what has been said about Aljazeera’s impact on the spread of freedom, democratic 
values, journalistic professionalism, and the drive to usher in a new era in the Arab world and 
beyond, by challenging traditional information flow from the North to the South, this role has 
to be taken within the context of Aljazeera’s primary objective, which is to advance Qatari 
interests and policies. This primary function played by Aljazeera is greatly enhanced by its 
non-news programs, such as, ‘Al-Itijah Al Muakees’, ‘The Opposite Direction’/ ‘Bila 
Houdoud ’,  ‘Without Bound’/ ‘Shahid AlA al Asar’/‘Century Witness’ and many others. 
Although the station’s news and current affairs programs attempt to present objective, 
balanced and impartial coverage, most of the literature examined agree that the overall trend 
of serving the interests and policies of Qatar extends to these news and current affairs 
programs, especially at times of war and conflict, or when dealing with controversial issues 
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the War on Terror.  
The research also suggests that the station had an effect on Qatari society itself, although it 
would be difficult to quantify such an influence, or determine if it was a direct consequence 
of Aljazeera’s perceived role, or if it was part and parcel of the network’s primary purpose to 
serve, defend and advance the Qatari Emir’s reformist agenda, nationally, regionally and/or 
globally. In other words, a number of works argue that one of the aims of Aljazeera -within 
the context of serving the country’s interests as primary objective- is not only to challenge 
traditional norms and practices in the rest of the Arab world alone, but to change Qatari 
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society itself from within (See Al-Jaber, 2004; Miles, 2005, Al-Tamimi, 2012; Hroub, 2013; 
among others). Any visitor familiar with Qatar before Aljazeera came into being in 1996 
would today notice the enormous transformation that the country has gone through, not only 
in terms of infrastructure, but also in social, political, cultural and economic terms. To cite but 
one example, the sight of Qatari women, before the time of Aljazeera, working and 
interacting with male colleagues, was almost non-existent. It was Aljazeera that opened the 
door for Qatari women to work and to develop a career, and this opened the door for women 
in other sectors within the country to follow Aljazeera’s example. These were enormous 
changes that were introduced into Qatari society –which is deeply conservative in nature as it 
follows the Wahabi strand of Islam-  leading many scholars to credit Aljazeera with this 
transformation (Dorsey, 2013; Hroub, 2013; Al-Tamimi, 2012; Qassim, 2012; inter alia). 
I have also found that many scholars (Rugh, 1979; Sakr, 2001; Hafez, 2004; Miles, 2005; 
Lynch, 2006, Ayish, 2010; and Hallin and Mancini, 2010; inter alia) agree that Aljazeera, 
since its inception, has provided somewhat different, revolutionary media practices, that may 
constitute a media model in their own right, bearing in mind that media practice in the region 
is still dominated by a classically authoritarian model.  
I have found that many scholarly works examined agree that the hybrid model is probably the 
best suited to encapsulating Aljazeera’s nature and journalistic practices. In other words, a 
model that combines loose state control mechanisms  trying to emulate public service ethos 
with values such as, contextual-objectivity/impartiality at the heart of the network. The 
station also attempts to adopt certain libertarian, free-market approach within a limited scope.  
Many scholarly works (for instance Sakr, 2001, 2005, 2007; El-Nawawy and Iskadar, 2003; 
Miles, 2005; Seib, 2008; Miladi, 2006; inter alia) have argued that this has been  most 
obvious during Aljazeera early years, and become more evident, especially after the station 
transformed itself into a network, adopting many of the attendant free-market norms, 
practices, systems and organisational structures, and thus, as argued by Al-Tamimi (2012), 
limiting political interference. 
I have also found agreement between scholars concerning the importance of taking into 
account historic, social and political factors when attempting to examine Aljazeera’s nature 
and journalistic practices.  These factors were not adequately addressed or were sometimes 
completely ignored by many of the studies that examined Aljazeera.  
I shall now turn to a detailed examination and analysis of my research findings regarding 
each of the three models. My presenting of these findings will not adhere to the same order I 
adopted in my initial chapters of analysis within the thesis’s main body; rather I will present 
these findings in order of importance.  
Aljazeera: advancing Qatar’s interest first and foremost 
The model, ‘Aljazeera: propaganda agent for Qatar,’ looks at Aljazeera as serving the 
interests and policies of the state of Qatar. This is the key finding of this study. However, the 
picture is not as simple as might seem. Aljazeera’s role as subservient to Qatar happens in a 
number of ways.  
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Firstly, research stresses the political economy of Aljazeera as a state-funded institution. In 
short, there is no obvious reason why a small state like Qatar should set up a television 
station, spending billions of dollars in expanding its global reach (current estimated spending 
on all Aljazeera channels exceeds one billion dollars a year), without the prospect of its 
investments being returned at some stage in the future in the form of political gains and the 
advancement of the country’s national interests, whether in terms of the nation, becoming a 
regional or a global player. Scholars such as Fandy (2007), Hanson (2013) and Hroub (2013) 
are amongst those who have argued that the Emir of Qatar exercises direct control over 
Aljazeera via his financing of the station, through a direct grant from the Ministry of Finance 
since the station was established in 1996, and/or indirectly, through the appointment of the 
network’s board of directors and Chairman, and through the drafting of its charter.  
The influence of the Emir on the station’s day-to-day running is well-documented, shown by 
both the Emir’s daily contact with the Chairman, and the fact that the Emir takes the network 
Chairman with him on almost every official trip abroad, all of which serves to indicate the 
Emir’s direct and indirect influence on the station. It is also evident that in its long history 
Aljazeera has gone through many changes in terms of its management and board 
membership, but the only person who has remained in his post is the Chairman, who is a 
member of the Qatari royal family and a trusted member of the small circle of decision-
makers in Qatar. Through the Chairman, the Emir and the state exercise control and influence 
over the network’s direction. Such control is also exercised through key appointments to 
Aljazeera’s board of directors, and to other key positions in the network, such as the Director 
General and the head of news and current affairs. This influence is also apparent through the 
financing of the station, which still comes directly through the Qatari Finance Minister to this 
date.  
Secondly, this premise is supported by empirical data derived from a number of sources 
(Dorsey, 2013; Hanson, 2013; Noe and Raad, 2012; Al-Sadi, 2012; Al-Tamimi, 2012; Ayish, 
2002, 2005, 2010; inter alia), which indicate that the primary purpose and objective behind 
Aljazeera is to serve the national interest of Qatar. These works found some evidence of a 
correlative link between Aljazeera’s coverage and take on events, especially in its 
programming about Qatar’s policies and objectives.  
Zingarelli (2010), Ayish (2010), El-Nawawy and Powers (2008), Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), 
Fandy (2007), Aday et al. (2005) and El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), are amongst those 
who have cited the example of Aljazeera's coverage of Saudi Arabian and Qatari relations, 
and concluded that Aljazeera’s critical coverage of Saudi Arabia tended to correlate directly 
with the ups and downs of Saudi/Qatari relations.. They also cited the examples of the 
station’s coverage of the Iraq war of 2003 and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to 
illustrate the correlation between the station’s coverage of these issues and Qatari policies and 
positions. Although these sources did not always look directly and specifically at these issues, 
they present useful data that provides evidence of this correlative relationship. 
Perhaps, the strongest indicator of this correlation between Aljazeera take on events and 
Qatari policy comes from the station/network, coverage of what is known as the Arab Spring, 
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especially in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Here we notice strong agreement between scholars 
such as Hijjawi (2011), Al-Zayat (2012), Al-Sadi (2012), Hanson (2013) and Dorsey (2013), 
amongst others, in detecting a direct link between Qatar’s support and direct involvement in 
revolutions in these countries, and the zeal with which Aljazeera presented its coverage 
(especially between 2011-2013).  For instance,  Al-Zayat (2012), who looked at the 
correlation between Aljazeera’s coverage of the Arab Spring in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, and 
the official Qatari position, found that the stronger the Qatari position was in support of these 
revolutions, the stronger the coverage dedicated to these revolutions by Aljazeera (bordering 
at times on direct involvement such as campaigning on behalf of one side of the divide).  
In the same vein, the model that sees Aljazeera  as advancing of  a pan-Arab, pro-political 
Islam agenda and the use of  anti-Western, anti-Israel, anti-American discourses and rhetoric 
as a deflection in order to direct audiences towards adopting pan-Arab/pro-political Islam 
ideologies compatible with Qatari interests and vision. This model can be combined with the 
model that sees Aljazeera as serving the interests and policies of Qatar for a number of 
reasons.  
First, because these two ideologies (pan-Arab/pro-political Islam) are not apparent as being 
evidently adopted by the ruling family in Qatar and there is no empirical evidence to support 
this. However, there is correlative evidence suggesting that they (the Qataris) have adopted 
one or both of these ideologies at times of heightened tension with neighbouring countries, 
notably Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt. So, there is no consistency in adopting these ideologies 
and It could be argued that they have been adopted as a pragmatic measure from the Qataris.  
For instance, from  1997 to 2003 and conflict between Saddam Hussein and the West, Qatar 
seemed to have strongly adopted a supportive stance of Iraqi regime and consequently 
Aljazeera’s tone and coverage seemed to take a strong and somewhat evident Arab 
nationalism coloration. However, between 2003 to around 2013 Qatari policy and interests 
seem to have shifted towards adopting a policy in support of political Islam in line with 
political changes in the region –notice here again the competing tendencies between Qatar 
and the trio of Saudi Arabia/Iran/Egypt- and hence Aljazeera’s tone and coverage seemed to 
be more sympathetic/supportive to political Islam. Hence, from Scholarly works examined 
Qatar’s adoption of pan-Arab/pro-political Islam is subservient to its national interest’s 
policies.  These two ideologies are apparent in many of Aljazeera’s programs encouraging 
audiences to adopt a Qatari version of pan-Arabism/political Islam, and hosted by pan-Arab 
thinkers such as Azmi Bishara, and pro political Islam figures such as Cheick Youssef 
AlQardawi and others. Aljazeera being pan-Arab/pro-political Islam serves the interests of 
Qatar as ideologies that allow it to challenge Saudi/Iranian version of Islam, while at the 
same time claiming to provide a moderate alternative (combining Arabism/political Islam) 
across the entire Arab and Muslim world.  
Second, a number of advocates of Aljazeera as an advocate of pan-Arabism and pro-political 
Islam have argued that the former Emir of Qatar, Cheick Hamad Ben Khalifa Al-Thani, 
himself (abdicated to his son Cheick Tamim Ben Hamad in 2013) may harbour pan-Arab/pro-
political Islam inclinations. However, this view is not supported by any empirical data.  
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Nonetheless, the general trend and the link between Qatar’s interests and its interchanging 
adoption of pan-Arabism/pro-political Islam stance are strongly supported by empirical data 
as provided by a number of scholarly works examined in this study. For example, Fandy 
(2007) concludes in his comparative research looking at Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya that 
Aljazeera represents a new type of alliance between nationalists and Islamists in the Arab 
world (cf. Hafez, 2004: 9). Fandy (2007) goes further, arguing from his examination of 
certain Aljazeera programs that the pro-Arabism and pro-political Islam agenda can be seen 
as remarkably obvious, especially the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood. Dorsey 
(2013), Kamrava (2013), Hanson (2013), Powers (2009) and Hafez (2004) are amongst those 
who agree with this idea. Dorsey (2013) remarks, regarding this relationship between Qatar, 
Aljazeera, and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, that they (the Qataris) regard this 
relationship as driven by their desire to differentiate themselves from its powerful neighbour, 
Saudi Arabia. Another example of this combination of pan-Arabism and political Islam is 
given by Hafez (2004), who argues that Aljazeera’s coverage of controversial issues in the 
Arab world, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is deeply influenced by the dominance of 
pan-Arab ideology, with a deep inclination towards a political strand of Islam in the form of 
the Islamic movement Hamas (the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement). 
In other words, as explained by Powers (2010), Arabism in combination with political Islam 
are ideological trends that the Qataris noticed could be used as driving forces in pursuing 
their national interests. 
To sum up, Qatar’s interests and policies influence very strongly Aljazeera’s nature and 
journalistic performance and ensure that the network is subservient to their national interests 
and policy aims. Aljazeera’s pan-Arabism/pro-political Islam is also a result of Qatari policy 
that regards the adoption of these ideologies as serving its interests as it battles to assert itself 
regionally and globally. The Qataris ensure Aljazeera adopt these ideological positions 
through a number of control mechanisms, i.e., ownership, finance and appointment of the 
networks board members, senior managers and editorial auditing policies. 
Aljazeera: providing a unique Arab media model 
I have established, during the course of this study,  that the concept of a ‘model’ is used in 
social sciences as “a simplified picture of a part of the real world that has some of the 
characteristics of the real world, but not the entire world” (Lave and March, 1993: 3).  In this 
sense the model, according to Little (1998), is a system of connected, related concepts to 
describe an idea or phenomenon. I have concluded that Aljazeera's nature and journalistic 
practices could be seen as constituting a unique media model within the socio-political 
context of the region from which it originated. What this means is that Aljazeera is indeed 
subservient to Qatari political and other interests, but at the same time it is allowed a much 
higher level of operational freedom which makes it seem, in a region that is dominated by 
media censorship and restrictions, as a beacon of press freedom and advocate of democratic 
values. This freedom has also allowed Aljazeera to develop a unique tradition of Arab 
journalistic practices that established itself across the Arab world, initially based on public 
service ethos brought in the station founders from their experience at the BBC Arabic 
television. This tradition has been proliferating across the region encompassing the values of 
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contextual objectivity, neutrality and balanced reporting of events and news. In other words, 
we may indeed have with Aljazeera a unique media model and practice that is evolving 
beyond and above the hybrid paradigm, although within its current practice the hybrid model 
with much adaption seems an accurate representation of Aljazeera. The network is also 
attempting to become financially more self sufficient through constant restructuring and 
adoption of certain market driven practices. Hence, as suggested by Ayish (2002, 2005, 
2010), El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003), Sakr, (2001, 2005, 2007), Al-Jaber (2004), Hafez 
(2004), Iskandar (2006), Qusaibaty (2006), Lynch (2006), Seib (2008, 2011),  Powers (2009), 
Abdelmoula (2012), and Miladi (2013)  agree that the nearest model encapsulating  
Aljazeera’s nature and journalistic performance is the hybrid model, with much adaptation 
taking into account cultural, political, social and historic factors that impacted the setting up 
and development of Aljazeera. It is a model that combines loose state control/ ownership with 
some level of private sector practices, while at the same time enjoying a margin of freedom 
within the complexities and contradictions of Qatari policy and objectives.  
Furthermore, as a direct consequence of this margin of operational freedom enjoyed by 
Aljazeera, it had profound effect on the Arab media landscape. The precise nature of this 
effect remains to be determined, but from the research examined in this study it can’t be 
ignored or denied. Many researchers strongly agree that Aljazeera has, since its inception, 
revolutionized the media’s role and practices in the Arab world, and accelerated the process 
of change, including within Qatar itself, and also, for the first time in modern media history, 
may have seriously challenged the traditional North-South flow of information. Scholars such 
as El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003),  Hafez (2004), Zayani (2005), Miles (2005), Lynch 
(2006), Zayani and Sahraoui (2007) and Powers (2010) are amongst those who agree that 
Aljazeera’s journalistic style, combining Western practices with Arab cultural and religious 
contexts, in what El-Nawawy and Iskandar call ‘contextual objectivity’ (El-Nawawy and 
Iskandar, 2003: 53), may have developed a media model that is being copied by others, in the 
Arab world and beyond. In other words, this is what Powers (2010) terms “the integration of 
this ‘Arab’ approach…into Western technological news formats and media that is the key to 
Aljazeera’s success” (Powers, 2010: 153).  
Zayani and Ayish (2008) agree, arguing that despite Aljazeera’s questionable relationship 
with Qatar, “it is still safe to say that the channel has enjoyed an amount of editorial 
independence that is unusual for the region” (Zayani and Ayish, 2008: 442). To illustrate this 
point further,  Aday et al. (2005), after comparing Aljazeera and American news channels, 
concluded that the station provided an alternative view that challenges existing assumptions 
and previously held views. Other scholars such as Abdullah (2012), Abdelmoula (2012), 
Miladi (2013), Thai (2010), and Seib (2008) have gone further. They argue that Aljazeera 
started a revolution in the Arab world which is driving change and providing a real alternative 
public space, despite the station’s weaknesses, especially in planting the seeds of what is 
called the ‘Arab Spring’.  
Other research suggests (e.g., Al-Hail, 2004; Seib, 2008; Al-Tamimi, 2012; Qassim, 2012; 
Hroub, 2013; inter alia) that this presumed effect extends to influencing and changing its host 
country, Qatar. This suggests that the station has matured during its years of development, 
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and has evolved to a level where it is now influencing not only the Arab world, but more 
specifically the Qatari government. In terms of this effect, Hroub (2013) accepts that 
Aljazeera has evolved into a position where it has become more powerful and imposing even 
on its patrons, the Qataris (Hroub, 2013: 2). Al-Kuda and Khamees (2008) argue that Qatar 
before Aljazeera and Qatar after Aljazeera are completely different countries.  
In the same vein, Galander (2013) argues that although Aljazeera’s coverage does not comply 
with norms of objective reporting as defined by the West, this does not render its take on 
events unacceptable or objectionable. He suggests that the station is a model of advocacy 
media that is unique in the region (Galander, 2013: 14). Such an advocacy role, Al-khazendar 
and Ali (2013) argue, has been successful in proliferating change within Arab society and 
media practice (Al-khazendar and Ali, 2013: p78).  
 
To sum up, while Aljazeera is clearly projecting Qatar’s political vision of the world and 
advancing its interest regionally and globally, the Qataris, especially as the station became a 
global network; have adopted a-hands off approach, by which they exercise overall control 
through an administrative/financing mechanism, while at the same time allowing Aljazeera 
freedom to operate. For instance, Aljazeera American output and programming is completely 
different from that of Aljazeera Arabic, which may lead many to think that they are indeed 
two different channels and yet both channels are owned by Qatar. This has led scholars such 
as Hroub (2013) to argue that Aljazeera, as it evolved into a much bigger entity, has assumed 
a greater level of autonomy than when it was first established in 1996.  
It could also be argued that the concept of national Qatari interests has become expanded as 
the network and indeed Qatar became a much bigger player regionally and globally. While in 
the early years of Aljazeera, this concept could have been to spread the values of democracy, 
freedom, human rights…etc, while at the same time adopting ideologies such as pan-Arabism 
to contrast Qatar with its powerful neighbours Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt. In later years 
especially after the start of Arab Spring, and the proliferation of freedom of expression in 
many Arab countries, limited success of certain democratic experiences, e.g. Tunisia, the 
adoption of Political Islam became the norm. However, in recent years and especially after 
2013 it is noticeable that Qatar is again switching in a much more balanced position in its 
adoption of either ideologies, while at the same time continue to advance values of 
democracy, human right and freedom of expression. This is clearly expressed in Aljazeera’s 
coverage and programming.  
The key point here is the clear correlation between Qatari national interests/policies and the 
way Aljazeera reflects these interests through its coverage and programming. This (Qatari 
policy and interests) would seem a maze of contradictions, giving the impression that the 
models identified are un-compatible or un-reconcilable? However, a closer examination of 
how Qatar defines its interests and policies would reveal a clear pattern with the ultimate aim 
for Qatar to become a regional and global player with a clear policies/ambitions distinct from 
its regional rivals, Saudi Arabia/Iran and later on Egypt (See Anzawa, 2011; Qassim, 2012; 
Al-Tamimi; 2012; Dorsey, 2013; Hanson, 2013; among others). In the same line, if one 
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follows the political changes in the Arab world, the relationship between Qatar its 
neighbouring countries, and the shifting regional and global alliances, a clear pattern emerges 
that establish a clear link between these changing political, economic, social scene and Qatari 
definition of national interests/policies. Aljazeera reflects these changes through its coverage 
of events and various programs. Consequently, Aljazeera advancing pan-Arabism/political 
Islam or advancing democracy/freedom of expression are integral part of Aljazeera serving 
Qatari interests/policies. Hence, none of the three models can operate nor exist without the 
other. They are a reflection of a complex/interchanging Qatari politics and interests in a 
region that is equally changing beyond recognition. 
Discussion: 
On a much broader level, the issue of media control through finance and management 
structures as well as ownership, considered in relation to supporting national interests and 
achieving strategic policy objectives (as I have been discussing with regard to Aljazeera) has 
been examined at great length and depth by Murdock and Golding (1977), Herman and 
Chomsky (1988), Murdock (1991), Herman (1996, 2003), and Curran and Seaton (2010), 
amongst others.  Herman (2003) for instance, argues that two of the filters of the propaganda 
model, ownership and advertising, have become more relevant in modern times, especially 
with the weakening of public broadcasting, greater levels of media concentration, and the 
weakening of journalistic professionalism (Herman, 2003: 14). These two filters can be 
considered as applying to Aljazeera with both positive and negative effects. On the positive 
side, the fact that Aljazeera is a media organisation owned by a so-called Third World 
country, and therefore not having to rely on conventional sources of funding, puts it in a 
position to challenge conventional broadcasting norms and practices (Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 
2006; Seib, 2008; Alhassan, 2004; inter alia). Reliance on financing from a non-democratic 
state, however, may render the station prone to manipulation, to serve the interests of its 
sponsor state.  
The other question that deserves great consideration is how much effect Aljazeera is having 
in reversing the North-South information flow, as suggested by Miladi (2013), Seib (2008), 
Lynch (2006), Zayani (2005), and Miles (2005), amongst others. This notion of dominant 
flows of information from the West’s core, discussed in an earlier chapter, is regarded by 
many, especially in the developing world, as cultural imperialism (Curran and Park, 2000; 
Barker, 1997; Murdock and Golding, 1977; inter alia). Barker (1997: 183), for instance, notes 
that “cultural imperialism is understood in terms of the imposition of one national culture 
upon another and the media are seen as central to this process as carriers of cultural meanings 
which penetrate and dominate the culture of the subordinate nation”. He argues that there is a 
link between cultural and economic imperialism resulting in the reproduction of “global 
capitalism” as the dominant ideology (Ibid: 183).  
This is what Hall (1981, quoted in Barker, 1997) describes, in that “...television messages 
carry multiple meanings and can be interpreted in different ways. That is not to say all 
meanings are equal among themselves, rather, the text will be structured in dominance 
leading to a preferred meaning” (cf. Barker, 1997: 117). In other words, the meaning 
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preferred by the Western dominant ideology. Hence, Seib (2008) argues that Aljazeera has 
been able to compete with this process of meaning-construction and provide audiences with a 
competitive and credible alternative reading that challenges the Western one.  This is an area 
that deserves a detailed examination as a possible avenue toward testing the theory of the 
'Aljazeera effect', based on robust empirical data. It is a task that this study has attempted to 
answer within a limited range and within the overall aims of the research. However, I have to 
say that it was a difficult task to undertake, for a number of reasons.  
First, there are very few comparative media studies in the Arab world to serve as a guide in 
outlining the parameters of this work. The research that I managed to collect and review 
suffered from a number of weaknesses and drawbacks. They tended to suffer from a lack of 
methodological rigour, a lack of empirical evidence to substantiate any claims advanced, and 
were often of an essentially descriptive nature. Furthermore, the field of comparative media 
studies within the Arab world is still at the beginning of its development, and has a long way 
to go before it reaches maturity, especially among scholars in the Arab world and among Arab 
academics residing in the region.  
Second, time constraints meant that not enough time was spent drawing up general patterns 
for the purposes of determining Aljazeera’s nature and journalistic practices, alongside the 
models identified in this study  distilled from a much broader range of resources. If I had had 
more time available to me, I would have collected a much bigger and more varied sample, 
and spent more time sifting and examining its contents.  
Third, even the most insightful of the works on Aljazeera, considered in terms of academic 
rigour, depth of analysis and methodological clarity and design, could not escape from certain 
ideological biases, although not declared, as is the case with many of the advocates of the 
model, Aljazeera as an advocate of Arabism/political Islam (Fandy, 2007; Cherribi, 2006; 
Ajami, 2001; Chafets, 2001; inter alia), or an undeclared hostility to political Islam/Arabism.  
I have also to acknowledge that my position as an employee of Aljazeera helped me greatly, 
but at the same time was a source of great difficulty. It helped me because during the course 
of my work for the station, from the day it was set up to the completion of this work, I have 
been aware of many of the debates, arguments, and controversies about Aljazeera, in 
considerable depth. This was of great help, because over the years I have managed to collate 
an array of personal documents and other information that helped guide my research. It also 
made the task of making sense of such differing views, within the limitation outlined above, 
much easier. Enjoying such a privileged position, however, impaired to a certain extent my 
endeavour to conduct my research in a purely impartial and objective manner.  
First of all, my position within the organisation imposed a heavier burden on me constantly to 
ensure that I retain a greater level of neutrality and objectivity, and only follow the evidence 
and empirical data, wherever that may have led me.  
Second, being an employee of the station meant that I am bound by confidentiality clauses, 
and I found myself not at liberty to divulge information or pieces of documents or other data 
that may have served to enhance this piece of research.  The greatest difficulty I found was 
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the intense nature of my job, which meant spending much of my time on assignments abroad, 
and also meant that despite repeatedly taking time off to work on my research, I still found it 
very difficult to re-focus after each time I engaged with my day-to-day job duties and tasks. 
Nonetheless, I have made strenuous efforts to maintain a continuous level of concerted effort 
to compose this thesis, while at the same time attempting to remain neutral, objective and 
balanced, within the bounds of human nature. I think, however, that I have managed to 
present a comprehensive view of Aljazeera’s nature and journalistic practices, from a unique 
‘insider’ perspective, and have helped to advance the academic understanding of this 
organisation. I think I have also managed to open up new avenues which prompt further 
research in future, concerning, for instance, the nature of Aljazeera’s influence on Qatari 
society. I will touch on some of these areas in later sections. I think my inner knowledge of 
Aljazeera and of Qatari politics/personalities served me well in formulating a broader 
understanding of the relationship between Aljazeera and Qatar and making sense of the vast 
array of materials on the subject. However, much remains to be done on this subject, which I 
hope others will find the time and the resources to undertake. I shall mention in the next 
section some of the areas that I think still warrant further exploration. 
Further areas of research: 
Furthermore, the relationship between Qatar and Aljazeera and the use of Aljazeera by Qatar 
to advance its political as well as strategic objectives remain an area that requires further 
research to develop strong empirical data to explore the nature of this relationship. In the 
same vein, the presumed impact that Aljazeera had on Qatari society and the enormous 
changes that took place in this tiny Gulf state, many within Qatar and outside it attribute to 
large extend to Aljazeera not only because of its journalistic practices, but also because it 
challenged certain Qatari taboos and conceptions, as it opened its door for example to Qatari 
women. This area could be tackled in through a number of topics, looking at the station 
impact on freedom of expression, legal and journalistic frameworks and social and economic 
change. One other area of research that need further exploring is the assumed role of the 
station in the Arab spring and the claim that it played an important role in toppling many of 
the Arab rulers. Academic research based on clear and strong empirical analysis is needed to 
establish the existence of this relationship or its absence. This is very important, especially 
after the change of leadership in Qatar and setbacks that the country’s foreign policy faced in 
Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi was deposed, and much of 
what has been achieved as a result of the Egyptian revolution has been revoked by the 
military.  
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